

# CURRENT HISTORY

A WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL

MARCH, 1984

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# Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

MARCH, 1984  
VOLUME 83 NUMBER 491

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# Current History

MARCH, 1984

VOL. 83, NO. 491

*In this issue, seven specialists examine the changing political, economic and military situation in the nations of Africa South of the Sahara. Michael Clough, writing on United States policy in the area, believes that United States diplomacy has recently focused on "constructive engagement," that is, American policy toward white South Africa and Namibia. As he notes: "... the administration believed that an agreement on Namibia would set in motion a self-reinforcing spiral of positive developments in southern Africa. By the end of 1983, however, the Namibian negotiations appeared to be totally stalemated; and without a Namibian success to legitimate it, the entire United States strategy of constructive engagement was called into question."*

## United States Policy in Southern Africa

BY MICHAEL CLOUGH

*Adjunct Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey*

**I**N 1983, President Ronald Reagan's southern Africa strategy of "constructive engagement" underwent a subtle but nonetheless real transformation.\* Waning optimism regarding the prospects of a settlement in Namibia, escalating conflict between South Africa and its immediate neighbors, and growing domestic concern that the United States was becoming too closely identified with the white regime in Pretoria led the administration to refocus its efforts.

Although Namibia remained high on the policy agenda, the United States paid greater attention to creating a broader regional security framework in southern Africa. One consequence of this shift in emphasis was a warming of relations between the United States and Mozambique. In addition, the administration grew increasingly concerned about public questioning of the sincerity of its opposition to white rule in South Africa.

The most critical assumption underlying the United States policy of constructive engagement is a belief in the economic and military predominance of the white regime in South Africa, both domestically and regionally. It is that perception of reality rather than any fondness for white rule that most influenced the administration's early thinking on this question. Domestically, white predomi-

nance implies that blacks lack sufficient resources to overthrow the apartheid system; thus, if change is to occur in the near term it will have to be accepted by whites. Regionally, South African predominance means that South Africa's neighbors are in no position to break economic ties with Pretoria or to provide support for exiled South African opposition movements. Finally, South Africa's currently secure position, deriving from its relative economic and military self-sufficiency, makes it unlikely that such pressures as economic sanctions or arms embargoes will be effective.

The Reagan administration's belief in the viability of constructive engagement as an alternative to the more confrontational strategy followed by President Jimmy Carter's administration rested on a second, much more arguable, assumption: that the South African government's objectives were not incompatible with American interests. More specifically, the Reagan administration believed that South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha was willing to take the steps required for a sustained improvement in United States-South African relations—i.e., initiate far-reaching internal reforms and accept Namibian independence, and develop mutually accommodative relations with its neighbors.

Given these two assumptions, the administration believed that the United States ought to focus not on how best to coerce Pretoria but rather on how to assist in the creation of domestic, regional and international conditions that would make it possible for the South African government to move in a positive direction. In its judgment, this objective could be best accomplished by a strategy of communication and confidence building.<sup>1</sup>

\*The views reflected in this article are strictly those of the author.

<sup>1</sup>One individual, Chester Crocker, has been almost solely responsible for formulating, adapting and implementing constructive engagement. He first spelled out the underlying assumptions of this approach in a series of articles and monographs written before he took office, the most important of which was "South Africa: Strategy for Change," in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1980-1981.



In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker presented constructive engagement primarily as a means of reinforcing movement away from apartheid in South Africa. The Namibian issue and the more general problems of the region were only briefly mentioned. This emphasis changed quickly after Crocker took office.

In early January, 1981, just weeks before the inauguration of the Reagan administration, all the main parties to the Namibian conflict attended a "preimplementation" conference in Geneva. It was called to deal with South African charges that the United Nations (UN) was biased in favor of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), and thus could not be expected to impartially implement UN Security Council Resolution 435—the UN plan for Namibian independence that had been previously agreed to by both South Africa and SWAPO. At the time, most observers regarded this as a bogus issue—a cover for South Africa's real concern, which was that SWAPO would win an independent election. Any chance that the conference might succeed was quickly dashed when President-elect Reagan decided not to send an observer to Geneva or to endorse the UN initiative strongly. Preferring to wait and see whether a new, more conservative American administration might offer it a better deal, the South African government refused to engage in serious negotiations.

Why did the incoming administration choose not to back the Geneva initiative? Crocker implied that the negotiations were so hopelessly stalemated that an intercession by President Reagan would not have served any purpose. A more important consideration was the fact that Crocker, whose appointment was vigorously opposed by Senator Jesse Helms (D., North Carolina) and other ardent conservative Reagan supporters, was in no position to mobilize political support for a credible effort to rescue the Geneva talks. He needed time to develop a rationale capable of persuading the deeply anti-Communist President to embrace a UN plan that was almost certain to put a "pro-Soviet, Marxist-oriented" government in power in Namibia.

In the first months of 1981, the new administration's Namibian strategy began to take shape. The critical linchpin in that strategy was the idea of linking a South African withdrawal from Namibia to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Such a "linkage" would serve two purposes. First, it would win support from key officials who would have otherwise had little interest in the Namibian issue. The Cuban troops in Angola had been a major concern of conservatives ever since Cuba intervened on behalf of the MPLA (the Angolan Popular

Liberation Movement) during that country's civil war in 1975 and tipped the military balance against two American-backed parties; one of which—UNITA (the National Union for Total Angolan Independence), led by Jonas Savimbi—was still carrying on a guerrilla war in southern Angola in 1981. By holding out the promise of a possible "rollback" of Cuban and Soviet influence, Crocker was able to commit United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig and President Reagan to his plan. This domestic political dimension has been too frequently overlooked in analyses of the linkage issue.

Second, the Cuban troop linkage could help to create the conditions necessary to gain final South African approval of implementation of Resolution 435. The administration did not believe it would be possible to coerce Pretoria into an agreement; South Africa had to be enticed. The withdrawal of Cuban troops from the region was one possible enticement. The promise of an improvement in bilateral relations between the United States and South Africa following a Namibian settlement was another. Of perhaps more importance in State Department thinking was the belief that the Botha government was willing to withdraw from Namibia but hesitated because of fears that such a withdrawal would be used by right-wing parties in South Africa to mobilize opposition to Botha's domestic reform program. If the Cuban troops in Angola went home as part of a Namibian deal, Botha might be able to claim it as a victory and use it to deflect domestic criticism.

Finally, the Reagan administration was apparently convinced that it would be possible to win Angolan approval of a linkage formula. In 1981, there were grounds for such a belief. The Angolan government had several very strong reasons for wanting to dispatch the Cubans as quickly as possible. First, they had to pay for the Cubans with scarce hard currency that could have been more productively used for other purposes. Second, the Cuban presence was a major barrier to increased Western aid and investment, and therefore it limited Angolan economic growth. Finally, the MPLA may have believed that a settlement ending South African support for UNITA guerrillas would significantly reduce the UNITA threat. Publicly, the government in Luanda had always maintained that the only reason for the continued Cuban presence was the threat from South African forces based in Namibia. On several occasions, leading MPLA officials had declared that the Cubans would be sent home once Namibia became independent. Thus, the issue, even as it was presented by the Angolan government, was not whether but when and on what terms the Cubans would leave.

The United States State Department almost certainly realized that the administration would be strongly criticized for explicitly linking the Angolan and Namibian issues. However, Crocker gambled that his most important potential critics—the leaders of the Frontline States<sup>2</sup> and the members of the Contact Group<sup>3</sup>—would be

<sup>2</sup>The Frontline States are an informal group of southern African states, including Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which have played a key role in the Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations.

<sup>3</sup>The Contact Group was formed in 1977 as an informal Western negotiating team with representatives from Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.

forced to go along with his initiative because, as he reportedly remarked, his "was the only game in town."

Crocker's Namibian initiative was set in motion on March 29, 1981, when he formally announced that the administration had completed its review of southern Africa policy and had decided to engage its energies in the search for peace in Namibia. Over the next few months, his efforts were directed at gaining an "unambiguous" statement from the South African government that it was ready to negotiate in good faith. By late summer, he believed he had such a commitment. This opened the way for more detailed discussions of the few details regarding implementation of UN Resolution 435 that had not been resolved during the Carter administration.

On September 24 the Contact Group approved an American negotiating plan. A final settlement was to be achieved in three phases. First, agreement was to be reached on a set of constitutional principles to protect minority rights in Namibia after independence. In phase two, negotiations were to focus on 1) the rules and procedures to be used to elect a constituent assembly that would draw up an independence constitution, 2) the mechanics of a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, and 3) remaining questions regarding the composition of UNTAG (the UN force that would supervise the transition period). Finally, phase three would involve implementation of the agreement. The linkage between Cuban troops in Angola and a Namibian agreement was not part of the plan approved by the Contact Group. Instead, it was to be treated as a separate issue that would be addressed in bilateral talks between the United States and Angola.

By February, 1982, substantial progress had been made. South Africa and SWAPO had agreed to a statement of constitutional principles. At this point, the major unresolved issue concerned the formula that would be used to allocate seats in the elections for a constituent assembly. But none of the principal parties viewed this as a major stumbling block to a settlement. In July, 1982, the Contact Group announced that phase one had been completed. Discussions now focused on the details of the transition. By this time, however, the Cuban troop linkage had become the only important issue in the negotiations.

By mid-1982, Chester Crocker had already held a series of lengthy discussions with Angola's Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge to explore the possibilities for an agreement on the Cuban troop issue. In June, President Reagan dispatched Vernon Walters, a multilingual special ambassador with strong conservative credentials, to Luanda to meet with Angola's President José Eduardo dos Santos. Walters's task was to discover whether or not the upper levels of the MPLA government were indeed serious about this issue.

On September 12, 1982, President Reagan sent a personal letter to African heads of state expressing his commitment to the linkage principle. This action marked the

beginning of an intense diplomatic struggle. Two days after receiving President Reagan's letter, the leaders of the Frontline States rejected the President's position. At the same time, the dos Santos government launched a multifaceted diplomatic strategy of its own that included efforts to solidify ties with Eastern bloc countries, mobilize African and international opinion, and exploit divisions within the Contact Group.

Since the fall of 1982, "linkage diplomacy" has taken a number of interesting and often seemingly contradictory twists and turns. These have included:

- a 10-country visit to Africa in November, 1982, by Vice President George Bush, during which he reiterated the administration's commitment to linkage in extremely uncompromising terms;
- Ministerial-level meetings between the United States and Angola in October, 1982, and April, 1983;
- Separate bilateral meetings between senior Angolan and South African officials in Cape Verde in December, 1982, and February, 1983;
- discussions between Assistant Secretary Crocker and Soviet officials; and
- rumored meetings between South African and Soviet officials in late 1983.

Despite all this activity, by January, 1984, there appeared to be little prospect that an agreement could be reached on the linkage issue. The Angolan government had reportedly informed the United States that it was no longer willing to discuss the question; and the number of Cuban troops in Angola was said to be increasing. The South African government continued to insist that it would not withdraw from Namibia until the Cubans left Angola. And France had withdrawn from active participation in the Contact group on the grounds that there was no likelihood of a settlement.

There are a number of explanations for this turn of events. One widely held view is that the Reagan administration's Namibian initiative was all along merely a disingenuous means of shifting the blame for the Namibian stalemate away from South Africa, undermining the position of the MPLA government and making it possible for Jonas Savimbi to come to power in Angola. This may turn out to be the effect of Crocker's efforts (and that is doubtful), but it is unlikely that it was his intent. To the contrary, one of the greatest ironies of the current situation is the fact that it is the fragility of the MPLA's hold on power that now most threatens American diplomatic efforts.

In early 1981, many Africa watchers feared that President Reagan would move to embrace Savimbi. When the administration formally requested that Congress repeal the "Clark Amendment" of 1976 that prohibited American support for opposition forces in Angola, it appeared to confirm the fact that officials were indeed thinking along these lines. On August 29, in the administration's first major statement on southern Africa, Crocker de-

clared that UNITA was "a significant and legitimate factor in Angolan politics." Then in December, Savimbi made a semiofficial visit to Washington during which he met with Secretary Haig and other high ranking officials.

Since his meeting with Haig, however, Savimbi's support in Washington has appeared to wane. Significantly, no mention was made of Savimbi in Under Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger's June, 1983, statement of administration policy. Nor did Crocker repeat his acknowledgment of Savimbi in any speech or statement in 1983. In addition, no effort has been made to resurrect the campaign to repeal the Clark amendment since the repeal was defeated in the House of Representatives in 1981. Although Savimbi supporters still can be found in many positions in the Reagan administration, they are noticeably quiet in public; and they do not appear to include Crocker or any other senior State Department official. In fact, one effect of the negotiations over the Cuban troop issue has been that the administration has come very close to according de facto recognition to the MPLA government in Luanda. By stating that the United States recognizes that no government can be expected to commit suicide through negotiations and by offering to discuss security guarantees with Angola, the administration has implicitly acknowledged that any agreement would have to ensure the MPLA against Savimbi.

The problem with the Reagan administration's Namibia strategy was not that it was duplicitous, but rather that it may have seriously misjudged South African intentions. Like many other analysts in 1980, Chester Crocker held the view that the South African government—including in particular the military—recognized that a settlement was inevitable. However, there now appears to be a large and influential group within the South African military that does not believe South Africa must or should accept a settlement that would allow SWAPO to come to power. This group is evidently convinced that the Namibian conflict—and possibly the Angolan conflict as well—is militarily winnable.

If the South African government had been genuinely interested in a Namibian settlement, the linkage issue could have been resolved. Instead, by significantly escalating its military activity in southern Angola, increasing its support of Savimbi, and adopting an uncompromising stand on the terms of a possible Cuban troop withdrawal, South Africa has created a situation on the ground that makes it very difficult for the MPLA to consider concessions. In this respect, South Africa's offer in December, 1983, to withdraw its forces from Angola may be not so much a sign of its willingness to reduce pressure on the MPLA, but rather an indication that UNITA's military position has improved to the point that Savimbi no longer needs direct South African support. The administration's inability to untie the linkage knot has made the broader regional dimension of constructive engagement increasingly important.

In a major policy speech in October, 1981, Crocker

recognized that to be successful, constructive engagement had to be directed at the entire southern African region, not just South Africa. In his words, "Until there develops a structure of understanding—some reciprocally understood basis for coexistence—between South Africa and its neighbors, this situation will remain a major source of instability and could result in growing conflict across borders." However, during their first year in office, Crocker and his aides spent far less time on this dimension than they did on the Namibian and South African issues. To the extent that the Reagan administration had a regional policy in 1981 that was separate from its Namibian policy it could be summed up as an attempt to ensure the success of Zimbabwe.

Why did it choose to support the self-avowed Marxist, albeit pragmatic, government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe? In part, its policy was due to the momentum that had been created by the Carter administration's extremely warm embrace of Mugabe following his landslide election victory in the spring of 1980. But the Reagan team was persuaded to boost bilateral aid to Zimbabwe substantially (\$225 million for the period 1982–1984) because of the following arguments: that Mugabe, despite his Marxism, was anti-Soviet; that support for Zimbabwe provided a useful counter to charges that constructive engagement was directed only at Pretoria; and that a stable and prosperous Zimbabwe might ease the process of change in South Africa.

In mid-1983, there were signs that many officials in Washington were becoming disillusioned with the so-called "special relationship" with Zimbabwe. There were several reasons for concern. In early 1983 there had been a brutal military crackdown on dissidents and their supporters in the Matabeleland area; a growing number of Mugabe's political opponents were being detained; and Zimbabwe had taken positions in the United Nations on two issues of high emotional importance to the Reagan administration—an abstention in a Security Council vote condemning the Soviet shooting down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, and Zimbabwe's cosponsorship of the Security Council resolution condemning the United States invasion of Grenada. In September, 1983, Mugabe visited the United States, but his trip only served to raise further doubts in the minds of some high officials about the wisdom of supporting his government. In December the administration cut aid to Zimbabwe by \$35 million. At year's end, however, there was still considerable un-

(Continued on page 135)

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*"Despite its proclaimed nonalignment, Mozambique has concluded military and/or political treaties with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, North Korea, East Germany and Cuba. It is completely dependent on Warsaw Pact and Cuban military equipment . . . By all measures, Mozambique is the major factor in the internationalization of the conflict between South Africa and the frontline states" of southern Africa.*

## Mozambique: Nonalignment or New Dependence?

BY MICHAEL S. RADU

*Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia*

WHEN the People's Republic of Mozambique became independent in June, 1975, it was viewed as a potential model for a "new" type of development in Africa; a revolutionary restructuring of the economic, political and sociocultural patterns of colonial times. The ruling Mozambique National Liberation Front (Frelimo), led by a group of committed Marxist-Leninists since the late 1960's, had attracted international attention as well as significant amounts of aid from a large variety of sources long before Portugal withdrew. Following the Lusaka accords of 1974 that transferred power to Frelimo, Soviet-bloc governments and "progressive" Western groups, noting Frelimo's outspoken and oft-repeated revolutionary aims, hoped that its coming into power would speed the process of "liberation" in countries like South Africa and Rhodesia.

Since Frelimo has been in power for more than eight years, the regime has consistently presented itself, and has been presented by its apologists, as one of the most revolutionary in the third world. Frelimo's economic, political and military performance since 1975 deserves a new examination, since Mozambique is one of the most strategically located African states. Moreover, changes in Frelimo's policies, internally as well as externally, deserve

serious reexamination in light of Mozambique's significant regional influence.

At the time of independence Frelimo described itself as a "liberation movement," a rather loose coalition of anti-colonial groups. By 1969, however, the leadership was made up of a group of activists and intellectuals, some of them white, mestizo or Asian, whose common denominator (in addition to their anticolonial position) was a very articulate brand of Marxism-Leninism, reinforced by their dependence on Chinese and, by the early 1970's, Soviet-bloc military, political and financial support. One of Frelimo's most striking features, which may make it unique among third world revolutionary groups, is the cohesion, unity and stability of its leadership. The same leaders who won the 1967-1969 power struggle against bona fide nationalists like Uria Simango and Lazara Kawandame (following the assassination under suspicious circumstances of the movement's founder, Eduardo Mondlane) still retain the top positions in Mozambique.

Although speculation regarding possible differences among the Politburo's eleven top members<sup>1</sup> has persisted since 1974, those differences have never surfaced publicly. The position of Samora Moises Machel, Frelimo's president, the Chief of State, and the supreme commander of the armed forces (the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique-FPLM), has clearly improved, making him the undisputed leader of the country. The quasi-official ranking of the Politburo members remains the same, and they all seem to play important policymaking roles.

In February, 1977, Frelimo's third congress formalized what was by then a well-known fact: the "movement" was an elitist, "vanguard" Marxist-Leninist party, tailored according to the Soviet and East European pattern. The membership of the party was strictly limited to well-trusted cadres, and today the party does not seem to have more than a few thousand members.<sup>2</sup>

The party's total control over the country was repeat-

<sup>1</sup>The official ranking of the Politburo is as follows: Samora Machel; Marcelino dos Santos; Joaquin Chissano; Alberto Chipande; Armando Guebuza; Jorge Rebelo; Mariano Matos; Sebastiao Mabote; Jacinto Veloso; Mario de Graca Machungo, the only member not among the founders of Frelimo and without a military rank; Oscar Monteiro, the newest member but probably more influential than Machungo. The military members, some with little or no actual military record, rank from marshal (Machel) to major general to colonel (Monteiro); all of them have recently occupied or still occupy government roles closely related to the army or the secret police.

<sup>2</sup>The figures vary, from a few thousand by 1980 (Michael Radu, "Mozambique," in George Delury, ed., *World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties*, vol. 1 [New York: Facts on File, 1983] p. 706) to perhaps as many as 30,000 following the recruitment drive of 1979-1981.

edly stressed by statements from the leadership and ensured by the type of "elections" it staged. For instance, the 1977 elections for local, district, provincial and municipal representatives were exercises in the popular approval of candidates either nominated by Frelimo or selected from Frelimo candidate lists. Provincial governors are appointed by the President, and they are responsible to his office or to the Politburo.

During the transitional government led by Joaquim Chissano from September, 1974, to June, 1975, before formal independence was granted, Frelimo concentrated its attention on eliminating all possible threats to its rule, including legitimate anticolonial groups like Coremo and spontaneous attempts to organize free African unions in the transportation sector after the 1974 Lisbon coup. So strong was Frelimo's hostility to trade unionism that it not only banned strikes even before independence; it postponed the formation of state-controlled unions until 1983.

Despite its self-proclaimed role as the symbol, representative and leader of the Mozambican "people," Frelimo had a very real problem in attracting the popular support of the majority. On the one hand, during the anticolonial war, by its own admission the group was never a serious threat to Portugal's control over the most populous and economically important provinces, including Zambesia, Sofala, Manica, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo. According to its own propaganda, Frelimo had only opened a (largely symbolic) "front" in Zambesia on July 1, 1974, after the political collapse of the Portuguese and the coup in Lisbon.<sup>3</sup> Thus, all the mining areas, the important cities, the agricultural regions, and perhaps as much as 80 percent of the population were largely untouched by either the anticolonial war or by Frelimo's propaganda. In addition, the earliest supporters of Frelimo's anticolonial war, the Makonde people of the northern province of Cabo Delgado, had second thoughts after their leader, Lazaro Kawandame, was expelled and forced to defect to the Portuguese in 1969. It is thus not surprising that Portugal succeeded not only in containing Frelimo militarily, but also in doing so at a very low cost in terms of Portuguese lives, by deploying black Mozambican troops, including elite counterinsurgency forces, against Frelimo's numerically inferior troops.<sup>4</sup>

The Portuguese recruited their forces from among the Makuas of the central region and the Shona-speakers of Sofala, Manica and Gaza. In other words, at the time of independence Frelimo's popular support and military prowess were uncertain, although independence itself provided the party with a significant degree of temporary, "soft" support in the major cities. Once the immediate post-independence euphoria evaporated, however, Freli-

mo had to rely on its own efforts and those of its allies to retain and consolidate power.

## MOZAMBIQUE'S POLITICS

The principal characteristic of Mozambique's politics is the complete control of the party over the government, a characteristic shared by all traditional Communist regimes. All 11 members of the Politburo are also government ministers or army leaders and, since the expansion of guerrilla activities in 1980, they have also directly controlled all economic, military and administrative activities in the most important provinces.

The appointment of Marcelino dos Santos, Frelimo's top ideologue, as governor of the Sofala province during a proclaimed "decentralization" effort, is one example of the regime's unwillingness to share or even delegate authority. While he has extensive powers in Sofala, dos Santos is responsible only to the Politburo, of which he is the second ranking member. Far from increasing provincial participation in local decision making, therefore, the appointment of top Frelimo leaders as provincial resident ministers tightened Maputo's grip over the country. This extreme centralization of political and administrative power was effective in the sense that it allowed Frelimo to eliminate any organized opposition or alternatives to its rule but, on the other hand, it has magnified the inefficiency and ineptness of the Maputo-based bureaucracy and has alienated large numbers of peasants. The institutions and tactics used by Frelimo to maintain and expand social control over the population have also contributed to the steady erosion of popular support for the regime.

Ever since coming to power, Frelimo's internal policies have been characterized by strong ideology, harsh suppression of all real or potential dissent, and continuous use of legislative measures to solve social problems. Stridently atheistic and particularly anti-Catholic, the regime immediately took over all religious schools, hospitals and properties, expelled a number of priests, and conducted a relentless antireligion campaign.

Frelimo's attitude toward village and tribal chiefs has been equally hostile, less because it saw the chiefs as obstacles to modernization than because they were seen as local alternatives to the party cells. The traditional chiefs have either been eliminated or sent to "mental decolonization camps," and their authority has been further eroded by the forced relocation of villagers to large collective villages. These villages, the *aldeias comunais*, were intended to facilitate party control over the countryside and to disrupt traditional loyalties, even at the cost of the collapse of agricultural production. Ironically, in many regions the new authorities not only maintained but also expanded the Portuguese-established *aldeiamentos*, or strategic villages, initially organized as a part of the anti-Frelimo war effort.

The policy of forced collectivization pursued by Frelimo since 1976 was known to be both politically motivated and economically dangerous. At the time it embarked on

<sup>3</sup>Samora Machel, *Le processus de la revolution democratique populaire au Mozambique* (Paris: Harmattan, 1977), p. 16.

<sup>4</sup>Douglas L. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (1961-1974), *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February, 1976), p. 23.



that policy, the regime was certainly aware of the catastrophic impact collectivization would have on production, if not from the experience of the Soviet Union and East Europe, than from that of Guinea and Tanzania. Nevertheless, this policy was pursued; the economic cost soon became apparent; and the ideological motivation was obvious. Bent on creating a "new Mozambican man" and distrustful of the peasantry's "lack of collective consciousness,"<sup>5</sup> Frelimo was prepared to accept economic losses in exchange for social, political and security control over the countryside. This approach characterized Mozambique's economic policy until the recent and faltering attempts to introduce some flexibility and efficiency in the productive sectors.

### ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Frelimo's approach to development has consistently been political rather than economic, directed toward changes in the structure of power and in attitude rather than toward rapid growth. The economy inherited from the Portuguese was centered on an extremely important service sector (primarily railways and harbors) that provided most of the hard currency revenues; agriculture, with a slightly larger share of the gross domestic product (GDP); and a small industrial sector, concentrated on mining and food processing. A second major characteristic of the economy was its high level of integration with the regional system dominated by South Africa. Mozambique's service sector was by far the most dependent on the regional economic subsystem, with the major ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala, as well as the railroads servicing them, relying almost totally upon the foreign trade of South Africa, Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland and, to a lesser extent, Zaire. Third, both the agricultural export sector and the existing industrial infrastructure were completely dependent upon the white and the Asian communities, the only communities possessing the necessary skills and capital.

Once in power, Frelimo's hostility toward private enterprise became state policy, and a massive wave of confiscations took place between 1975 and 1977. Although the government has always described the process of complete destruction of local private enterprise in Mozambique as "nationalization," the term confiscation is far more accurate, since in the overwhelming majority of cases no compensation was ever paid or even promised. In less than two years the government confiscated all major factories and plantations owned by the white community and all but one of the banks, established a monopoly over external trade, and took control of most mines and all ports and railways. From small trucking firms to fishing boats, and from rental apartments to funeral parlors, small enterprises were also eliminated. In addition, under the pretext that retail traders in the cities

and the countryside were "exploiting" the people, the entire rural and urban distribution network was taken over by the regime and replaced by government-owned state stores.

The economic impact of this rapid destruction of the local private sector was devastating, as was to be expected, and the damage done at the time of independence has never been repaired. Of the more than 230,000 white Mozambicans, a large number of whom were born in the country (a fact that did not prevent the regime from consistently, and pejoratively, referring to them as "settlers"), over 90 percent fled the country in less than two years, taking with them most of the country's managerial, medical, technical and agricultural skills. Some preferred to destroy their property rather than allow Frelimo to confiscate it and were subsequently accused of "sabotage." Most left for either Portugal or South Africa, where they formed large, articulate and politically active pressure groups hostile to the new regime in Maputo and highly supportive of all its internal and external enemies.

The entire distribution network collapsed rapidly, due to the managerial ineptness of the new state bureaucrats. Basic consumer items, from soap and matches to cooking oil, disappeared from the stores and were available only on the flourishing black market at exorbitant prices. The regime's response to this situation has included attempts to blame Rhodesia and, since 1979, South Africa, for the economic collapse; half-hearted attempts to denationalize restaurants, small retail outlets, and small companies in 1980; and, in 1983, the institution of harsh penalties for black marketeering, including public flogging and capital punishment.

A second ingredient in Frelimo's economic policy was rapid and often brutal change in the agricultural sector. More and more subsistence farmers were forced into the *aldeias comunais*, expected to work collectively on state-owned land but often denied both credits and technical help, which were in scarce supply and were concentrated in the newly established state farms. The state farms were almost exact copies of the East European and Soviet *sovkhoz* system and many of them, particularly in the Limpopo valley, were established and managed by Bulgarian experts. Despite the investments made in those farms, production is still far below either expectations or pre-independence outputs. This poor performance stems from the use of inappropriate equipment (like tractors with heated cabins from Yugoslavia and East German and Soviet wheat combines for rice harvesting) and erroneous advice. A particularly significant example of the latter was the Bulgarian-advised cultivation of rice directly on the banks of the Limpopo, instead of the traditional terraces, with the result that the frequent floods destroyed most of the harvest.<sup>6</sup>

The impact of the regime's agricultural and industrial policies spelled disaster for the country and a particularly painful political failure for Frelimo. Not only was Frelimo's popular appeal weakened, but Mozambique be-

<sup>5</sup>David and Marina Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (New York: Holmes & Meyer, 1981), pp. 86-90.

<sup>6</sup>*Christian Science Monitor*, May 3, 1982.

came increasingly dependent on international, principally Western, aid. There are three major aspects of the failure of Frelimo's economic policies, all closely related.

First, the volume of production in agriculture declined sharply from the time of independence onward, both in terms of export crops and foodstuffs for domestic consumption. Thus, despite a dramatic increase of population (from 8,223,000 in 1970 to 12,130,000 in 1980), the production of maize, the main staple for the population, declined from 364,000 tons to 250,000 tons during the same period; sorghum, from 202,000 tons for 1969–1971 to 152,000 tons in 1981; millet, another staple, declined 50 percent by 1981.<sup>7</sup> Similar trends occurred in the production of cash crops: a decline from 84,000 tons to 33,000 tons of cotton seed and from 210,000 tons to 120,000 tons of cashew nuts between 1970 and 1980. The combined impact of these trends was that, at a time when Mozambique has become less and less able to feed its population, it has also become less and less able to pay for the increasing quantities of food it has to import.

Second, the collapse of the rural distribution system, the forced collectivization in some areas, and the general insecurity of the countryside because of Rhodesian retaliatory raids after Frelimo's direct role in the guerrilla war across the border and later because of the MNR\* operations, resulted in a massive exodus to the cities, particularly Maputo. The natural catastrophes of 1977 and 1978 (floods) and 1981–1982 (drought) accelerated this process. The government's policy of the forced return of new migrants to the countryside, while not always effective, alienated those who perceived the city as their only opportunity.

Finally, the reliance on East European and Cuban agricultural experts and management techniques, the destruction of productive plantations after their confiscation by the state, the ineffective or even nonexistent government rural distribution network in some areas, the lack of adequate and prompt measures against flooding or drought, and the general poverty of the country made Mozambique far more vulnerable to natural disasters. Without emergency reserves and with the few existing reserves diverted to the military and the capital, the government was unable to cope with the effects of adverse natural conditions. The only source of relief was the international community, primarily the United States; the European Community, and Frelimo's traditional friends in the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands.

In addition to all these factors, Frelimo's decision to rely on its East European allies had an impact upon mining, one of the few sources of revenues besides export crops, energy, and transportation fees. The coal mines

around Moatize, in Tete, are exploited by the East Germans, who also manage and exploit the gold mines in Manica; the major tantalite deposits in Zambezia, particularly at Morrua, are jointly exploited by the Soviets and East Germans; the Soviet Union is also involved in the exploitation of copper deposits at Mavita, in Manica. None of these arrangements brings Mozambique any hard currency, most of the payments to Mozambique being in the form of barter or imports of obsolete, inadequate, or expensive Soviet-bloc machinery and expertise.

The tertiary sector, which accounts for 65 percent of the GNP, is by far the largest source of hard currency, particularly from South Africa. Although traffic through Maputo, Beira, and Nacala still has not returned to pre-independence levels, it has begun to recover from the effects of Frelimo's decision to close the border with Rhodesia in March, 1976, and thus to accept the loss of all revenues from Rhodesian, Zambian and Zairean traffic. The traffic through Maputo declined from 13 million tons in 1974 to 3.8 million tons in the first half of 1980, while Beira's traffic declined from 2.7 million tons to 0.4 million tons for the same period. These figures also indicate the impact that Mozambique's regional foreign policy has had on its economy, which, in turn, is closely related to the internal political situation of the country and the implications of the continuing civil war.

## REGIONAL POLICIES AND INTERNAL WAR

No one in southern Africa, least of all in Mozambique, would deny that an increasingly serious war is taking place in that country. That consensus, however, does not reflect the causes of the war or its real nature. Frelimo and its military and political allies in the region see the activities of the MNR guerrillas as a form of South African "aggression" against a progressive Mozambique, committed to the fight against apartheid. For South Africa, as well as for many Western opponents of Frelimo, the civil war in Mozambique and even the existence of MNR itself are the results of Frelimo's economic and political errors. As is usual in such cases, the truth seems to lie somewhere in the middle.

In light of South Africa's importance in the region and of Mozambique's dependence on Pretoria, which provides 65 percent of Maputo's hard currency revenues each year, it is only natural that Mozambique's regional diplomacy is centered on its position vis-à-vis South Africa. While the same is true for all black-ruled states in the region, Mozambique's ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its close military, political and economic ties with the Soviet bloc are an important addition-

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\*Resistência Nacional Mocambicana—the anti-Frelimo guerrillas.

<sup>7</sup>The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review of Tanzania, Mozambique, Supplement 1983* (London: The Economist, 1983), p. 27. The statistical material that follows is taken from this source.

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*"For the last 35 years, [South Africa] has been all but a one-party state with a strong military presence. Its regional predicament, coupled with the move to a strong presidency, will accentuate the power and predominance of the military . . . ."*

## South Africa: No New Political Dispensation

BY PATRICK O'MEARA

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**T**WO recent events in South Africa, the constitutional referendum of November 2, 1983, and the bombing of the air force headquarters in Pretoria on May 20, will have far-reaching consequences. In different ways they represent new directions that will affect policies, political and military responses, and the quality of life for the foreseeable future. The ruling National party received substantial support in the referendum for the first reordering of the South African constitution since the Union of South Africa came into being in 1910. While the proposed changes will enable Coloureds (people of mixed race) and Indians to elect their own representatives to separate Parliaments, the constitution is flawed: neither of these Houses will have the status or power of the white Parliament nor will they be able to change fundamentally discriminatory laws like the Group Areas Act. The greatest weakness of the new constitution is that it patently excludes all Africans from any form of representation other than in the homelands. Thus, while it makes limited concessions, its ultimate purpose is to retain and sustain white power.

On May 5, South Africa's new constitution was formally introduced in Parliament. It proposed to establish a Coloured House of Representatives with 85 members and an Asian House with 45 members. In addition, the white House of Assembly would continue, with 178 members. This plan, referred to by Prime Minister P.W. Botha as "healthy power sharing," went before the South African electorate in the November referendum. The proposed constitution was rejected by both the official opposition, the Progressive Federal party (PFP) and the right-wing Conservative party. The Progressives were opposed to the constitution because Africans, who make up 70 percent of the population, would have no form of representation under the new constitution. The government's position was that they already had political rights in one of the homelands. The Conservative party was opposed because it felt that the constitution would cause a major dilution in the policy of apartheid.

Neither South Africa's 2.8 million so-called Coloureds nor its 800,000 Indians were asked to vote on the new constitution. Elections for their separate Houses will thus ultimately reflect their approval or disapproval of the constitution. However, after the November 2 victory it was announced that they would become eligible for mili-

tary conscription. A key part of the new constitution makes it possible for Parliament to continue to operate if either the Coloured House or the Indian House attempts to destroy the workings of the new constitution by non-cooperation, or if for some reason these Houses are not able to function. In the event of disputes between the various chambers over legislation of general interest, the President of South Africa will have the power to refer the issue to the President's Council. This Council will have 20 white members, 10 Coloured members and 5 Asian members, all of whom will be elected by their respective chambers, plus 25 members appointed by the President. Under the constitution, the President will be elected by a college which will be dominated by whites, the office of Prime Minister will be abolished, and all powers will be transferred to the new President. The presidency is to some extent modeled on the Gaullist presidency in France. The President will have autocratic power and will be able to declare martial law. Part of the argument in favor of a strong presidency is that only decisive leadership can bring about racial reforms, although this view overlooks the risks and dangers inherent in such a presidency and its potential for authoritarian rule.

Of the 2.7 million eligible voters, 76 percent participated in the November 2 referendum; 66 percent, or 1,360,223, voted "yes" and 691,577 voted "no." Prime Minister Botha indicated that the new constitution would probably be implemented in the second half of 1984. He also insisted that there was no "hidden agenda" providing for more participation in the governing of South Africa by Africans. The large white vote in favor of the proposed changes indicated that white moderates, including English-speaking supporters of the Progressive Federal party, voted for the changes and that the Conservative party has a smaller base of support than was anticipated. This does not necessarily imply that the right-wing challenge will disappear: indeed, an increase in urban sabotage could easily lead to its resurgence.

Above all, it must not be forgotten that the constitution will bring about only limited changes and that it is a far cry from universal, adult suffrage; Botha emphasized the fact that "We do not want to have one man, one vote, in a unitary structure . . ." The substantial white vote in favor of the changes does indicate that the gap between English- and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans is nar-



rowing. It is therefore not surprising that Professor Jan de Lange, chairman of the *Broederbond*, the once secret Afrikaans society which protected in-group solidarity, can see that South Africa may have a non-Afrikaans-speaking Prime Minister in the near future. In effect, this recognizes the shift from Afrikaner nationalism to a new white consensus on the basic premises that ensure white survival. De Lange insists, however, that "the one thing that the Afrikaner feels is not negotiable is his identity, his language, his church orientation, his feeling that he needs instruction for the young through his own language."

The key question becomes whether the Coloureds and Indians will be coopted into the political system with a sufficient level of commitment to ensure their long-term allegiance. The participation now promised them is greater than they had before November 2, although Coloureds were able to vote for white representatives to the South African Parliament until this right was taken from them in 1968. Coloureds had already shown a disdain for the Coloured Council, which existed before the new constitutional changes, and this body was barely able to function. They are increasingly concerned about their second-class status and the inferior opportunities available to them.

Many Indian and Coloured leaders are also unsure of the wisdom of aligning themselves with whites and thus becoming a buffer between whites and the African population. If the constitution, by its very weaknesses, leads to a wider and more genuine sharing of power, then it will have served a valuable purpose. For the moment, it seems that if it works at all it may lead to even more dangerous polarization.

The most important political debate in white politics is the controversy between the ruling Afrikaner National party and the Conservative party to its right. It is possible that the Conservative party may soon become the official white opposition. The intensity of the differences between these parties was reflected in what came to be known as the "Battle of the Berge." In the South African Parliament in February, 1983, Minister of Labor Stephanus (Fanie) P. Botha, the second most senior member of the Cabinet, became involved in a confrontation with the leader of the Conservative party, Andries P. Treurnicht, a former Cabinet minister and an extreme conservative who had broken away from the National party in 1982 because he felt the party was not rigidly adhering to the basic premises of apartheid. Botha, who is not related to Prime Minister P.W. Botha, challenged Treurnicht to resign his seat in Parliament. In return, Botha offered to resign and seek reelection in a special by-election.

Treurnicht accepted the challenge, and the "Battle of the Berge" began. Treurnicht's constituency is Waterburg and Botha's constituency is Soutpansberg, both in the northern Transvaal close to the Zimbabwe border. The by-elections soon became not only a duel between the two politicians but a significant preliminary test of public opinion on the government's proposed constitu-

tional reforms and on the viability of Treurnicht's Conservative party, which controlled 18 seats in Parliament.

Botha also challenged a second conservative, Thomas Langley, the incumbent of a Pretoria seat, and he too agreed to resign and run for reelection. Andries Treurnicht was reelected in the Soutpansberg constituency, substantially defeating the National party candidate, and Botha retained his seat by only 621 votes out of the 11,579 cast. Ironically, he resigned from Parliament only a few weeks after his reelection. The results indicated a solid (but not necessarily substantial) support for the right-wing conservatives, especially in the Transvaal and in the rural areas, and this was borne out in the referendum.

## AFRICANS AND APARTHEID

Despite the proposed reforms in the new constitution, South Africa continues to impose considerable hardship on Africans. Two recent examples emphasize this point. On Saturday, April 2, 1983, the South African police shot and killed Saul Mkhize, 48, an accountant who had fought to save Driefontein's 5,000 African residents from being removed from an area which they had farmed since 1912. The original residents had bought 300 plots of land one year before implementation of the Natives Land Act that created the African reserves. In the southeastern Transvaal, 200 miles from Johannesburg, Driefontein was one of the last remaining "black spots" in a white area, and the intention of the government was to move its inhabitants to one of the homelands.

Mkhize, who was not a politician and whose main concern was to preserve the interest of his community, was shot in the chest by a South African policeman. The police had declared the protest meeting at which he was speaking to be illegal and had tried to drag Mkhize away. They maintained that he was shot in self-defense, but Africans at the meeting insisted that tear gas canisters fired into the crowd had caused the problem and, furthermore, that the policeman had fired at Mkhize from a distance.

In December, 2,000 Bakwena were forced by the government to move 80 miles away from Magopa on the Transvaal, where they had lived for more than 70 years. The 300 families in Magopa had built their own schools and churches but, as in the case of Driefontein, they were regarded as a "black spot" and were ordered to move to a nearby homeland. Under its Bantustan or homeland policy, the South African government has now moved more than 3.5 million Africans and plans to relocate or "resettle" nearly 2 million more. The homelands, which comprise only 13 percent of the country, are, in most cases, little more than rural slums with inadequate housing facilities, sanitation, and land. Disease is rampant, and employment opportunities are minimal.

## URBAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES

On May 20, 1983, a car-bomb explosion outside the headquarters of South Africa's air force command in

Pretoria, South Africa's administrative capital, killed 18 people and wounded 217. This was the worst sabotage in South Africa's history. More than half those injured were said to have worked for the armed forces, and this episode marked the beginning of a new phase of urban guerrilla violence. For the first time, the banned African National Congress (ANC) took direct responsibility for the bombing.

The Pretoria bombing, which coincided with Botha's announcement of the new constitution, might have been a reprisal for the December, 1982, attack by South African forces on ANC residences in Maseru, Lesotho, when 42 members of the ANC were killed. In February 1983, a smaller bomb had exploded at a government employment office in Bloemfontein, in the Orange Free State, killing one man and wounding 76.

On May 23, South Africa retaliated for the May 20 bombing in Pretoria with a raid on ANC bases in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. The Mozambique government claimed that South Africans bombed civilian targets, killing at least five people and wounding more than 20.

On May 26, 1983, also in Bloemfontein, a car bomb exploded near a labor office, which provides permits for Africans to work in urban areas. This caused extensive damage, but no injuries or deaths. Thus, urban guerrilla activities, followed by reprisals and retaliations, seem to be the hallmark of this new phase in black-white relations in South Africa. The ANC, operating with small groups or cells, will be difficult to contain in crowded urban areas. These urban guerrilla activities make it a more formidable force.

### **THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT**

At Mitchell's Plain near Cape Town on August 20-21, at one of the largest anti-government rallies held in recent years, Alan Boesak, the Coloured religious leader and president of the World Alliance of Reform Churches, launched the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF consists of close to 400 affiliated groups, including churches, community organizations and trade unions, like the South African Allied Workers Union, with a total membership estimated at over a million. The immediate goal of the UDF was to resist the proposed new constitution. The organization asked for "all, here and now. We want our rights; we want them here; and we want them now." Patrons of the organization include Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC, who has been in prison for the past 22 years, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Helen Joseph. There are close ties with the banned African National Congress, but there are also close ties with the clergy, including the Reverend Beyers Naude, the banned leader of the Christian Institute. The importance of the UDF is that it cuts across racial, religious and ideological lines and brings together powerful groups, rather than individuals, which should make it less vulnerable to attacks and bannings by South Africa.

### **AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS**

African trade unions were unanimous in their opposition to the new constitution, and they remain one of the major forces for political influence and change. Much, however, depends on whether and to what extent they will be tolerated in the new political context. Unions must also grapple with the crucial problem of their relationship to liberation movements like the ANC. There is a current setback in membership and in organization, which reflects South Africa's ongoing economic recession. Workers were laid off by major South African companies and for the period April, 1982-April, 1983, 130,000 lost their jobs.

Fluctuations in the international price of gold (which rose to a high of \$500 an ounce in February and has hovered below the \$400 mark since that time) have caused severe problems for South Africa; and the prospect for an economic recovery in 1984 is dim. South Africa's budget at the end of March, 1983, reflected this fluctuation, since in 1982 gold represented 40 percent of the country's export earnings. South Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) fell in 1983; the 1982 drop in the GDP had been the first since World War II. Because of a severe continuing drought, which only now shows signs of abating, it is estimated that farm output will also drop below the 1982 decline of 7.5 percent. In November, the rand fell to a low of \$0.82. In this context, it is not surprising that there is evidence of a decline in black union membership.

### **BLACK URBAN RESISTANCE**

Unexpected changes have positively affected African lives. At the end of May, 1983, the five judges of the Appeals Court unanimously ruled that migrant workers who had held jobs in South Africa for ten consecutive years were entitled to permanent residence with their families in the black townships. The court specifically ruled that an African engineering worker, Tom Mehlole Rikhoto, could continue to live in a black township, even though under the "influx control" policy he was required to return to his homeland each year in order to renew his contract.

The court has thus removed one of the major restrictions on black families living in South Africa's urban areas. Its ruling will affect thousands of workers who are currently classified as temporary employees. These workers have had to live apart from their families and have had to return to their homelands each year. The legally mandated journey back was seen by white officials as a break in continuous service, even if workers returned to the same job; thus most black workers could never qualify for urban residence. At first, the South African government proposed to institute new legislation immediately to counteract the Appeals Court ruling. However, in June, after pressure from the United States and other foreign governments, Minister for Cooperation and Development Pieter G. Koornhof, whose department administers

the many laws affecting blacks in South Africa, agreed that the government would abide by the court's decision, with the proviso that it would pass new legislation requiring black workers to have official certification that adequate housing was available in the urban areas for their wives and children.

## DESTABILIZATION

In a recent article in *The Economist* (London), Simon Jenkins reported that South Africa's foreign policy is in a new and aggressive phase.<sup>1</sup> He maintained that, as a regional superpower, South Africa "now refuses to apologize for anything, let alone apartheid, particularly in regard to its neighboring black states." This represents a shift away from the foreign policy approach that was aimed at persuading the United States, Britain and West Europe to support its interests to one of "destabilization" of the internal politics of its black neighbors. "Now Washington's favor is no longer of great consequence, and Europe's is less so." The South African military has played a key role in the formulation of this new approach, and so has the State Security Council. Jenkins substantiates his case with examples of border incursions by South Africa, either to retaliate against the African National Congress or to intimidate its neighbors so that they refuse to host the ANC. For Jenkins, however, the ANC has become little more than an excuse for a more militarized South African state. He argues that South Africa has regional economic and military dominance and that its ultimate aim is to create a "shield of instability" to deter ANC incursions and at the same time to contain the aspirations of blacks within South Africa by showing them its regional strength.

Jenkins's position is convincing on many levels. He correctly assesses the limited effectiveness of international sanctions and the primary role of the military in the formulation of strategic policies. Jenkins is also correct in his assumption that South African foreign policy is now more flexible and amoral and that the "gun and the maize train," symbols for economic and military threats, presumably speak louder than 100 speeches at the United Nations.

Jenkins's view, however, needs elaboration. That South Africa is actively engaged in interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbors is beyond question; but outside powers and pressure groups have continuing importance. It is tempting, given United States President Ronald Reagan's tilt toward South Africa, to downplay this area. But the Reagan administration's benign policy of constructive engagement, which deemphasizes human rights in favor of geostrategic interests, has limited durability.

<sup>1</sup>July 16, 1983, pp. 19-28.

<sup>2</sup>A voluntary 1977 code mandating nonsegregation and fair employment by American companies working in South Africa; the code was formulated by General Motor's black board member Leon Sullivan.

Circumstances may change within the United States or, even more likely, events within South Africa may once again precipitate an international crisis along the lines of Sharpeville in 1960 or Soweto in 1976. External pressure groups have affected South Africa, albeit on a limited scale. The sports boycott and the Sullivan Code<sup>2</sup> are only two examples that have caused South Africa discomfort and inconvenience. Thus, while South Africa is engaged in the politics of destabilization, it continues its international propaganda offensive and the courting of foreign decision makers in an effort to ensure "favorable" responses from abroad.

Furthermore, to give South Africa too decisive a role in fomenting turmoil in the affairs of its neighbors diminishes the significance of the political choices made by these countries. Its neighbors have a range of options, choices and actions that they can and do employ, often at great cost, against South Africa. South Africa engages in acts of economic, military and political interference, by backing different opposition leaders or violating borders; but deterrence by implicit or explicit threat is not hegemony. Even in the economic sphere, South Africa does not hold complete sway. Trade is not simply a one-way process, and South Africa not only needs, but is dependent on, adjacent markets for its products. In addition, in some instances South Africa's military, diplomatic and economic goals may contradict each other, and South Africa's leaders often back the losing side, miscalculate the importance of political trends and directions, and implement strategies that frequently misfire.

South Africa is a regional superpower that interferes in the internal affairs of its neighbors and is, above all, correctly perceived by them as a disruptive and destabilizing force that undermines their independence and self-determination. But there are limits to the scope and intensity of South Africa's policy of destabilization; fragile alternatives, like the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), exist. A balanced assessment of the destabilization process is needed in order to counteract it effectively.

## NAMIBIA

In January, 1983, South Africa dissolved the National Assembly in Windhoek and again took direct control of Namibia, thus ending the experiment of limited self-government that it had unilaterally initiated in June, 1980. The internal settlement had been proposed by

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*"As the government begins to provide services to people in all regions of the country, the distinction between the government and ZANU-PF begins to blur. . . . There is a sense of permanence about ZANU-PF's presence that is not part of the Western political tradition."*

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## Political Consolidation in Zimbabwe

BY VIRGINIA CURTIN KNIGHT

*Consulting Editor, Current History*

**I**N 1980, the Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe won an overwhelming victory in the new nation's parliamentary elections.<sup>1</sup> Since then, ZANU-PF has consolidated its power by strengthening and extending its reach to all levels of government and society.

But internally the party continues to be beset by ideological disputes and ethnic rivalries. ZANU-PF has scheduled its first national party congress since 1977 for August, 1984, in preparation for general elections that must be held no later than early 1985, as required by the constitution. Factionalism within the party has forced its leaders to delay calling a congress sooner; consequently, many posts within the central committee have been vacant. However, Mugabe's broadly based nationwide support may help him withstand the jockeying for power within the party as the reorganization process takes place.

In the 1980 elections, ZANU-PF won 57 seats out of a possible 80 in the 100-member Parliament; under the terms of the 1979 Lancaster House constitution, 20 seats are reserved for white voters until 1990. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, won 20 seats; the Republican Front (RF), formerly the Rhodesian Front, led by former Prime Minister Ian Smith, won all 20 white seats; and the United African National Council (UANC), led by former Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Bishop Abel Muzorewa, won 3 seats.

ZANU-PF gained additional support in Parliament when in March, 1982, nine RF members left their party and declared themselves independent. And then in 1983 the RF lost its first election since 1962, when independent candidate Bob Nixon outpolled his RF opponent. Today, the Republican Front has eight seats and the independents have eleven. There are two independents in govern-

ment office: Chris Andersen (who was minister of law and order in the Smith regime) is minister of state (public service) and former RF chief whip John Landau is deputy minister of trade and commerce. The eleven independents usually vote with the government.

ZANU-PF's overwhelming political advantage has given government leaders sufficient confidence to encourage parliamentary dialogue. Independents often offer constructive criticism while RF criticism is often emotional. There is enough latitude for Ian Smith to stand and wag his finger at the Prime Minister and tell Mugabe not to make the same mistakes Smith made as Rhodesia's Prime Minister. And Joshua Nkomo can speak to a seldom quiet House and criticize the government's redetention policy as a relic of Smith's days. In addition, in July, 1983, Mugabe began a monthly series of televised question and answer sessions in Parliament. He fields impromptu questions put to him primarily by ZAPU members, RF members and independents.

Mugabe has a large Cabinet: there are 30 full ministers and 14 deputy ministers. With some exceptions, the list of Cabinet members reads like ZANU's "Who's Who" of the liberation struggle. At this stage of the new government, Mugabe has chosen officials who were prominent in the revolution and who command the loyalty of many supporters in their home areas.

In the Cabinet and in the administrative apparatus, technocrats are far outnumbered by former revolutionaries at this writing. Most prominent among the technocratic group in the Cabinet are Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero and Agriculture Minister Senator Denis Norman.

Four of the ministers are members of ZAPU: Minister without Portfolio Daniel Ngwenya, Minister of Mines Callistus Ndlovu, Minister of State (Deputy Prime Minister) in the Prime Minister's Office John L. Nkomo, and Minister of State (Water Resources and Development) in the Prime Minister's office Cephass Msipa.

There are two women in the Cabinet: Victoria Chitepo, minister of natural resources and tourism, and Teurai Ropa Nhongo, minister of community development and women's affairs. Victoria Chitepo is the widow of the late Herbert Chitepo, a national chairman of ZANU, and Teurai Ropa Nhongo was an active member

<sup>1</sup>In 1979, at the Lancaster House conference on a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, leaders of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) agreed to negotiate together as the Patriotic Front (PF). In 1980, ZAPU won the right to campaign as the Patriotic Front in the national election. ZANU took the title ZANU-PF, not to be confused with ZANU, headed by the Reverend N. Sithole. Today, Nkomo's party in Parliament is legally called PF but is commonly referred to as ZAPU.

of the liberation forces and is married to army Commander Rex Nhongo.

Since Mugabe took office in 1980 there have been three major changes in the Cabinet. In early 1981, Mugabe transferred Joshua Nkomo from his post of minister of home affairs to minister without portfolio. He also dismissed Edgar Tekere, ZANU's secretary general, from the Cabinet because of his involvement in the death of a white farmer. Tekere remains a member of Parliament and still has a strong following; in mid-1983 Tekere surprised party stalwarts when he was elected ZANU-PF chairman of Manicaland Province.

In the February, 1982, Cabinet reshuffle, Mugabe dismissed Nkomo, Josiah Chinamano, ZAPU vice-president, and two other ZAPU members after the discovery of arms on ZAPU-owned farms. Mugabe also reappointed Herbert Ushewokunze to the Cabinet. Mugabe had dismissed Ushewokunze from his Cabinet post of minister of health in October, 1981, because of his controversial health policies. Ushewokunze's new Cabinet appointment gave him the much more powerful post of minister of home affairs with control of the police.

### CABINET CHANGES

Throughout 1983, there was speculation that Cabinet changes were imminent. In April, Mugabe seemed to be preparing for change when he publicly criticized unnamed Cabinet ministers for enriching themselves at the people's expense. Mugabe also accused unscrupulous councillors and mayors of being "motivated by an unparalleled instinct for self-aggrandizement and downright avarice."<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after Mugabe's denunciations of corrupt officials, University of Zimbabwe students staged a demonstration in front of the Prime Minister's office, demanding that corrupt officials be weeded out and punished. Although the courts are imposing severe sentences for corruption on some officials and public servants, Cabinet officials and upper-level government employees still remain beyond the law.

In the most recent shuffle in January, 1984, Mugabe was careful not to upset the balance of the Cabinet. He consolidated several Cabinet posts but dismissed only one minister. Of the 22 deputy ministers, he dismissed eight. He brought three ministers—in charge of water resources and development, energy and development, and industry and technology—into the Prime Minister's office, and created a new post in his office to coordinate political affairs and provincial development.

There were several significant personnel changes. Former Minister of Home Affairs Herbert Ushewokunze was transferred to the Ministry of Transportation and replaced by the more moderate Minister of Justice Sinbe Mubako. And Eddison Zvobgo was given more

authority—his Ministry of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs was combined with the Ministry of Justice.

Mugabe also created several new Ministries without Portfolio to accommodate displaced ministers rather than risk antagonizing them with dismissal.

Not only do Cabinet members receive an annual salary of Z\$25,300 (in 1980 the per capita gross national product was Z\$630) and many perquisites of office; they also represent ethnic power blocs within the party. ZANU-PF gets most of its support from Shona-speakers, who make up about 70 percent of the country's population. Under the Shona-language umbrella there are several major groups, each with slightly different dialects, customs and power bases. For instance, Mugabe is from the Zezeru group, which is centered around Harare; Simon Muzenda, Deputy Prime Minister, is a Karanga from the Masvingo area (formerly Fort Victoria), the most densely populated area of the country; and Minister of State (Political Affairs and Provincial Development Coordination) in the Prime Minister's Office Maurice Nyagumbo is a Manyika from the Mutare area in the eastern highlands.

Like the Cabinet, the composition of the ZANU-PF central committee reflects the members' revolutionary roles. The current committee was appointed before independence, although there have been some changes since. The most recent list of central committee members was published in February, 1982, in the *Herald*, the government-controlled newspaper. The list names 26 members; 5 posts are listed as vacant, including Tekere's old post of secretary general. Although their names were not on the list, several other prominent ZANU-PF leaders are thought to be included.

### PARTY POLITICS

In addition to party and government ethnic factionalism, Mugabe is concerned with the continuing debate on Zimbabwe's transformation to a socialist society and the role of capitalism within that process. The results of the party restructuring at the August, 1984, meeting will be an indication of the probable direction of party policy.

As the government begins to provide services to people in all regions of the country, the distinction between the government and ZANU-PF begins to blur. Political patronage is certainly not unique to Zimbabwe or ZANU-PF; it is practiced here as efficiently as anywhere else. But there is a sense of permanence about ZANU-PF's presence that is not part of the Western political tradition. Prime Minister Mugabe declared in 1982 that "as clear as day follows night . . . ZANU-PF will rule in Zimbabwe forever. There is no other party besides ours that will rule this country."<sup>3</sup> He has often expressed his desire to create a one-party state because "Zimbabwe should view itself as one family."<sup>4</sup>

Although Mugabe assures the people that a one-party state will come about democratically, his assurances lose strength at the grassroots level, where there have been

<sup>2</sup>*The Herald*, April 18, 1982.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, January 18, 1982.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, September 22, 1983.

charges in ZAPU areas of brutality and intimidation toward non-ZANU-PF party members. For instance, in 1983, council elections were held in Tsholotsho, which is in the heart of Matabeleland (ZAPU's stronghold); a ZANU-PF candidate beat his ZAPU rival by a vote of 807 to 7. In several wards voters were delivered to the polling places in army trucks and then told to line up behind their candidate.

The media, especially the state-owned television, severely limits reporting of political events, confining its coverage to government and ZANU-PF events. The country's two daily newspapers offer a wider range of views but there is never much criticism of government policy (although individual government officials are often discussed). Former chief press relations officer for ZAPU Willie Musarurwa manages to offer some dissent as editor of the *Sunday Mail*.

Underlying political relations in Zimbabwe is the constant repetition of the theme of creating a one-party state—a ZANU-PF dominated state. ZAPU supporters are concerned about losing political control over their own affairs and being dominated by their long-time rivals, the Shona-speakers. Although four ZAPU members hold Cabinet posts, they are responsible for the delivery of services and do not serve in important decision-making jobs.

The arrest and redetention of ZAPU military leaders Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku continue to be the focal point of contention between ZAPU and the government. Dabengwa and Masuku were arrested in 1982 after the government announced that arms caches had been found on ZAPU-owned farms in Matabeleland. They were tried on charges of illegal possession of arms by the High Court and they were found not guilty. Dabengwa was later tried on treason charges and again found not guilty. Despite their acquittals, however, they were immediately redetained. Their redetention under the Emergency Powers Act has been justified by Mugabe, who says the government has more information than the courts.

## VIOLENCE IN MATABELELAND

Dabengwa and Masuku's arrest triggered a thousand defections from the national army, and subsequent violence in Matabeleland. The kidnappers of the six tourists in July, 1982, demanded the release of Masuku and Dabengwa in exchange for their hostages. And at Christmas time, sporadic political violence erupted in the Nyamandhlovu district when armed, politically motivated bandits terrorized the area. Government water drilling equipment valued at \$2 million was destroyed, bus passengers were robbed and killed at roadblocks, and white farmers were kidnapped and killed.

To pacify the area and assist the local police, the government initially sent in combined national army units, but when ZIPRA (the military wing of ZAPU)

members defected, the Fifth Brigade was sent in. The Fifth Brigade is made up of about 5,000 Shona-speakers who have been trained by the North Korean military and who owe their allegiance to the Prime Minister alone.

Church groups and newsmen submitted documented reports of atrocities committed by the troops; yet the government denied the Fifth Brigade's involvement in the atrocities. To counter the reports of hundreds to thousands of civilian deaths at the hands of the government troops, the government charged that two ZAPU members of Parliament, Sydney Malunga and Vote Moyo (already in detention), were directing the dissident activity in Matabeleland and that the dissidents were loyal supporters of ZAPU.

Reports of dissident activity continued until the end of April, 1983. Reports of government troop activity were scant because the government restricted access to the troubled areas. At the end of July the Fifth Brigade was removed from Matabeleland and Prime Minister Mugabe was able to hold a large rally at a Bulawayo stadium. (There are no non-government reports from Matabeleland at the time of this writing because in November the government declared a two-month moratorium on the publication of any information regarding troop movement or dissident activity in Matabeleland without clearance from a government censor.)

During the height of the violence in Matabeleland, the government accused opposition leader Nkomo of being in league with the South African government "to cause chaos in the country and so attempt to bring down the people's government." In March, Nkomo fled the country.

With his parliamentary seat in jeopardy and quiet temporarily restored to Matabeleland, Nkomo returned to Zimbabwe on August 15. The government withdrew its motion to deprive Nkomo of his seat and, several days after his return, absolved him of responsibility for dissident activity. In a reversal of government tactics, Minister of Home Affairs Ushewokunze minimized Nkomo's importance when he told the Senate that the ZAPU leadership had lost control of the dissidents.

Up until now you could say Dr. Nkomo and part of his leadership still had control over the dissidents, but this position changed earlier this year when Botswana took action against the dissidents.<sup>5</sup>

Ushewokunze claims that when President Quett Masire of Botswana agreed to refuse refuge to dissidents from Matabeleland, the dissidents fled to South Africa, where they joined other groups backed by South Africa that are intent on destabilizing the frontline states. Mugabe has long claimed that the UANC forces of Bishop Muzorewa are living in South Africa, receiving training from the South African government.

There have been intermittent talks between ZANU-PF and ZAPU officials on creating a one-party state. As a political party, however, ZAPU has been weakened by

<sup>5</sup>*The Hansard*, August 18, 1983.



the events of the last 18 months. Many of Nkomo's followers have fled from the country, have been killed or are in indefinite detention. Nkomo lost face and political clout when he fled to London; since his return he has been unusually quiet. Unless a merger of the two parties results in real power-sharing and the release of ZAPU members currently in detention, the unification of the two parties will only muffle dissent and force the opposition elsewhere.

In August, 1983, the High Court found six white air force officers not guilty of destroying nearly \$25-million worth of equipment at the Thornhill Air Force Base. The men were immediately redetained and three of the men were released only after pressure from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (several of the men have British passports). Three others were detained until December 22.

More than any other single action of the government, the redetention of the three air force officers startled and angered the white community. Their redetention made whites more aware of their vulnerability, because established legal institutions failed to provide protection. Whites continue to leave the country at a rate of about 1,500 a month; and if the government carries out its threat to close private schools that do not have at least 60 percent black enrollment by January, 1984, the rate of white emigration will probably increase considerably.

## THE ECONOMY

The foreign business community has been reluctant to invest in Zimbabwe for some of the same reasons that whites leave; principally, the lack of institutions that provide legal protection and the government's stated intention to create a socialist state. Although the government has issued an investment code, it refused to become a party to the United States Overseas Private Investment Code (OPIC). To date, the United States-based Heinz Corporation remains the only American firm that has made direct private investments since independence.

Foreign investment is sorely needed to create jobs and provide foreign exchange. Unemployment remains high, although skilled workers are in demand. Government and private industry often compete for skilled and professional staffs, with industry able to offer higher salaries.

The government has absorbed some of the unemployed by creating nearly 35,000 new jobs in the civil service alone. It has also preserved jobs in the faltering mining sector through outright subsidies to keep the mines open. And the government has restricted a firm's ability to dismiss workers by requiring prior approval from the appropriate ministries.

The government's no-firing policy has affected many sectors of the economy. During the 1982-1983 recession, production levels fell; yet employment levels remained artificially high. In the manufacturing sector, for in-

stance, output fell by 2.4 percent in 1982 and continued to decline in 1983. Mineral output in the first quarter of 1983 was 3 percent below the same period of 1982 and 15 percent lower than the first quarter of 1980. Construction projects for the private sector declined 20 percent in 1982 except for government construction projects like schools, hospitals, health clinics and offices.

Although all areas of the economy have been adversely affected by the world recession, the drought in 1982-1983, preceded by poor rains in 1981-1982, has had a devastating effect on agricultural production in Zimbabwe. In addition to the economic resources that have been diverted to drought relief programs, nearly \$40 million in foreign exchange has been lost because of low yields in the agricultural sector.

According to government and private banking officials, three million people, half of Zimbabwe's rural population, will require drought relief assistance for about six months in 1983-1984 (assuming the rains are good this year). The cost of the relief program is estimated in excess of \$120 million. According to the RAL Merchant Bank Ltd.,

The country has never faced a problem of this nature and magnitude before and the hardships suffered during the war years will be small in comparison.<sup>6</sup>

Urban workers who normally provide assistance to their rural families are having a tougher time; the rate of inflation is high, about 26 percent; jobs are scarce; the government has increased prices of basic foodstuffs as it has eliminated food subsidies; sales taxes have been increased; and workers earning more than \$100 a month are now required to pay an income tax. In late 1983, there was an across-the-board pay increase for workers earning less than \$300 per month, but the increase was not sufficient to compensate workers for higher priced foodstuffs.

Zimbabwe, normally a food exporter, must now import certain foodstuffs, including basics like wheat, cooking oil, beans, groundnuts and sorghum (used for making beer). Some barter deals have been arranged to bypass foreign currency requirements and aid programs are contributing to import programs.

The bumper maize (corn) crop in 1980-1981 and adequate storage facilities have assured the country a sufficient supply of maize during the drought. But the poor rains in 1982-1983 reduced maize output for 1983 by half, to between 500,000 and 600,000 tons. There will probably be a shortage of maize once the stockpiles are depleted. The government announced a high pre-production price for the 1983-1984 growing season to encourage farmers to plant maize.

The small farmer has been hardest hit by the drought.

(Continued on page 135)

<sup>6</sup>RAL Merchant Bank, Ltd., *Executive Guide to the Economy*, June, 1983, p. 1.

**Virginia Curtin Knight** is currently living and working in Zimbabwe.

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*"Factionalism in Chad is as old as the segmentary lineage systems around which revolves much of the sociopolitical life of northern [Chadian] societies . . . . In what appears to be a reenactment of the Lebanese dilemma, foreign-linked factionalism in Chad has now reached the point where faction leaders act increasingly as spokesmen for the objectives, interests and priorities of their external patrons."*

## Chad: The Road to Partition

BY RENÉ LEMARCHAND

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**I**N the summer of 1983, the Chadian volcano erupted once again, and the tremors were felt far and wide. In June, July and August, violence exploded in three consecutive military engagements over the oasis town of Faya-Largeau, pitting Hissene Habre's *Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes* (FANT) against the Libyan-backed rebel forces of former President Goukouni Weddeye. From June 24 to August 10 the town changed hands three times and when, on August 10, Libyan artillery and air bombardment finally delivered it back into the hands of Goukouni, what had once been a flourishing cattle market had become the focal point of a major international crisis.

While the battles for Faya were being fought on the ground, the diplomatic battle saw the United States and Libya edging toward yet another confrontation; France and the United States were at loggerheads over their respective assessments of the Libyan threat; and some Francophone states were arguing among themselves as to whether France or the United States had the better case. Belatedly yielding to domestic and African pressures, French President François Mitterrand finally responded to the Libyan menace by mounting Operation Sting-Ray, France's largest military intervention in Africa since the Algerian war.

Not since the Congo crisis in the early 1960's has an African conflict figured so prominently in the calculations


<sup>1</sup>The Libyan case for "the complete mass unity between the two countries," in short, the annexation of Chad, is nowhere more explicitly stated than in Qaddafi's address to the Arab People's Congress in Tripoli, on January 20, 1981:

There is a very old historical interaction between the Libyan and Chadian people, and between the Chadian people and the Arab nation, and the borders are open between the two countries. . . . There is a large proportion of Arabs among the Chadian people. Eastern and Southeastern Chad is entirely Arab and a large section of the Chadian people are Arab by origin and race, while the overwhelming number are Muslim and Arab culture is the prevailing culture in Chad. The Chadian people have a specificity very different from all Black African peoples.

Quoted in Colin Legum, "The Crisis over Chad," *Africa Contemporary Record 1980-1981* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1982), p. A41.

of cold war strategists; not since the Angolan crisis of the mid-1970's has external military intervention carried greater threats to the stability of the continent. As in the 1960's, the imposition of a cold-war model on a local African conflict was instrumental in shaping Washington's perceptions of the Chadian crisis. The case of Angola, however, provides a more accurate parallel insofar as the balance of external forces is concerned. Through its military support of Goukouni, Libya is now engaged in subversive operations in northern Chad similar to those performed by South Africa on behalf of Jonas Savimbi's guerrilla group in southeastern Angola; by the same token, from the perspective of the Chadian capital of Ndjameña, the French are playing a stabilizing role (to use former United States Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young's celebrated characterization of the Cuban presence in Angola) not unlike that which Havana has played on behalf of the Luanda authorities for almost a decade.

Unlike the Cubans in Angola, however, the French operate within a carefully defined defense perimeter. The so-called "Red Line," which runs along the 15th parallel and splits Chad into two equal fragments, marks the limits of French intervention; reunification of the country by force is out of the question; for the time being France's only objective is to hold its ground. Furthermore, unlike the South Africans in Angola, Libya has not only political but also territorial ambitions in Chad. Libyan Chief of State Muammar Qaddafi has indeed explicitly staked out his claims over Chad, and to that effect has brought in enough reinforcements to match the French buildup in the south.<sup>1</sup> No longer is Faya the terminus of Arab caravans traveling south from Libya; today Libyan military convoys come rumbling into the oasis bringing Soviet and East European arms and ammunition to a rag-tag army of Tubu warriors, Islamic Legionnaires, Libyan army regulars and foreign advisers, transforming the old colonial outpost into an armed fortress. Aozou in the extreme north, Ounianga, and Fada offer much the same spectacle. On each side of the no-man's-land separating the Libyans from the French and dividing their respective Chadian clients from each other, reigns an uneasy peace,



CHAD AND ITS NEIGHBORS

occasionally broken by swift and murderous raids at which Tubus excel. Ironically, although neither Habre nor Goukouni are willing to consider partition as an acceptable solution, Chad has in fact already joined the family of divided nations.

These events are only the latest and most dramatic in a series of convulsions that brought Chad to its knees before it could even walk.<sup>2</sup> A detailed discussion of the many twists and turns that have accompanied the fratricidal war of attrition between the key protagonists lies beyond the scope of this article. By way of a background to the current crisis, however, something must be said of the roots of factionalism in contemporary Chad, and, more important, of foreign-linked factionalism.

The sheer diversity of cultural entities within Chad's

<sup>2</sup>For a succinct diagnosis see my previous discussion in *Current History*, "Chad: The Roots of Chaos," vol. 80, no. 470 (December, 1981), pp. 414-438; also Lemarchand, "Chad: A Precarious Peace Breaks Out," *Africa Report*, vol. 27, no. 2 (March-April, 1982), pp. 15-19. For more detailed background, see Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Conflict in Chad* (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1981).

<sup>3</sup>For an in-depth analysis of the cultural and historical differences and similarities between Daza and Teda, see Jean d'Arbaumont, "Le Tibesti et le Domaine Teda-Daza," *Bulletin de l'IFAN* (Dakar), vol. 16, no. 3-4 (1954), pp. 255-306.

<sup>4</sup>Lloyd Briggs, *Tribes of the Sahara* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) p. 170.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

boundaries were long concealed by the apparent simplicity of the north-south dialectic in the early phase of the civil war. For almost a decade, roughly from 1969 to 1978, civil violence pitted the predominantly Sara, Christianized south against the Islamicized "rebel" north. With little attention paid to the existence of minorities on each side of the north-south cleavage, it was generally assumed that all northerners were Arabs and all southerners, Sara. As is the case with similar ethnic labels, the term Sara covers a wide range of subgroups, some of which played an important role in the overthrow of François Tombalbaye in 1974; and while it is true that the leadership of the rebel movement, the *Front de Libération National Tchadien* (*Frolinat*), was initially recruited among Arabs, the latter do not represent more than ten percent of the total population of Chad. The shock troops of the insurrection in the north were made up of Tubus. Among them two principal subgroups emerged as potential claimants in the struggle for power that followed the collapse of the Sara-dominated government of Félix Malloum: the Teda and the Daza, respectively associated with Goukouni and Habre.<sup>3</sup>

The victory of the *Frolinat* in 1978 marked a radical shift in the dynamics of intergroup competition. From a north-south confrontation, based on ethno-regional and religious ties, the lines of cleavage moved increasingly in the direction of factional struggles centered on subethnic, regional and personal affiliations.

Factionalism in Chad is as old as the segmentary lineage systems around which revolves much of the sociopolitical life of northern societies. In such systems power is widely diffused. Clan, subclan and kinship groups are the principal units around which individual solidarities crystallized, but never long enough to coalesce into a durable nucleus of power. Oppositions and alliances are constantly recalculated, as are the rewards and penalties attendant upon them. In these conditions fragmentation is the rule, and "the principle of freedom [is] raised almost to the level of anarchy."<sup>4</sup> What has been referred to as "the centrifugal nature of the Teda clan structure and the resulting tendency toward extreme fragmentation"<sup>5</sup> applies to the vast majority of societies in northern Chad.

## NEW WAYS OF WAR

What is new about factional strife is that it is now thoroughly politicized and militarized. More is involved here than the mere addition of a political label to primordial loyalties; it means access to modern weapons, ammunition, cash, training facilities, vehicles: in short, access to external sanctuaries. Raids that were once conducted on camelback are now launched on "converted" Toyota jeeps; Redeye missiles and AK-47 rifles have replaced assagais and spears; mortars and multiple rocket launchers will do the rest and, if necessary, and as long as the external patron is willing to do so, air strikes will be called. The politicization-cum-militarization of factional-



ism is indeed inseparable from the external linkages through which intergroup competition is activated and nourished.

Much has been said of the political modernization of traditional societies; much less has been written of the military modernization of traditional forms of warfare, and of its consequences on the outcome of factional conflict. This phenomenon lies at the heart of the current crisis in Chad: the injection of highly sophisticated weaponry into factional hostilities has not only magnified beyond all recognition the scope and intensity of traditional forms of violence but, by virtue of its external ramifications, has recast the process of segmentary escalation to the level of international confrontation.

The struggle between Habre and Goukouni is more than a personal feud between two desert warlords or intergroup hostilities between Teda and Daza; through a complex interplay of domestic and external pressures, the feud has escalated to the point where external powers are now directly involved—France on Habre's side and Libya on Goukouni's, each acting as arms supplier, protector and, on occasion, arbiter of intramural rivalries within its respective client groups.

With the *de facto* partition of the country along the Red Line and the symmetric involvement of France and Libya on behalf of their respective clients, a balance of power has emerged which, for the time being, lends a measure of stability to the political arena. The status quo depends on mutual deterrence. The prospects for long-term stability, however, appear extremely remote as long as Qaddafi remains determined to make good his territorial claims to the northern half of the country, and possibly more. Now, as earlier, the Libyan factor remains the critical element in the geopolitical equation.

### THE LIBYAN FACTOR

If there is any constant in Qaddafi's compulsive meddling in Chadian politics it is his deliberate effort to play one faction off against another in order to advance his overriding strategic objective—to draw Chad into a Libyan sphere of influence. To reward his obedient clients for their presumed willingness to accept Libyan tutelage and to penalize the recalcitrant is, in a nutshell, the basic operating principle behind Qaddafi's intervention in the Chadian arena. In recent times, however, the terms of the quid pro quo have undergone significant changes. No longer is the offer of a privileged sanctuary, training facilities and cash sufficient to win friends and influence

factions. Libya's direct military assistance, in the form of auxiliary troops and advisers, logistical aid, artillery and air support, is now an essential ingredient of the bargain, as is the anticipation of a more or less permanent Libyan presence in Ndjamena if and when Qaddafi's clients come out on top.

Qaddafi's ability to project his logistical and military power effectively into Chad was dramatically revealed in December, 1980, when Libyan tanks, artillery and mercenaries turned the tide against Habre (to Goukouni's short-lived advantage) during the decisive battle for Ndjamena and, more recently, in the summer of 1983, when he again saved the day for his protégé during the long-drawn-out struggle over Faya-Largeau. Events between 1980 and 1983 show that despite consistency in the pursuit of his hegemonic goals, Qaddafi is by no means impervious to the virtues of flexibility and tactical retreats.

The fate of the Libya–Chad merger, announced by Tripoli on January 6, 1981, is a case in point. Although the aim was “to work for the realization of a complete unity between the two countries,” the projected union was quietly shelved when it became known that it had been unilaterally forced on Goukouni against his will and against a background of considerable criticism from neighboring African states.<sup>6</sup> “Complete unity” seemed even more remote when, contrary to all expectations, in November, 1981, Qaddafi agreed to meet Goukouni's request for a withdrawal of Libyan troops. The abrupt removal of Libyan forces meant a drastic reduction of Qaddafi's leverage over Ndjamena. Yet as the country lurched into yet another crisis fresh opportunities arose for renewed Libyan intervention.

In the complex sequence of events following the withdrawal of Libyan troops several points need to be stressed: the May, 1981, OAU (Organization of African Unity) resolution to send an inter-African peacekeeping force to Chad to replace Libyan troops failed utterly to meet its declared objective. Not only did it fail to provide Goukouni with effective protective measures against the onslaught of Habre's rebel forces, but the operation proved extremely costly and set an unfortunate precedent. Some responsibility for the failure of the OAU peacekeeping force can be traced to a basic contradiction in United States policies: while contributing \$12 million to the cost of the OAU operation, the United States leaned over backward to give Habre enough arms, ammunition, vehicles and cash to make sure that he would effectively fight his way back into Ndjamena. Further, the collapse of the Goukouni regime in June, 1982, did more than just expose the utter impotence of the OAU peacekeeping force and the sheer ineptitude of Goukouni as a statesman and politician. It also dealt French policies in Chad a telling blow. As will be recalled, much of the credit for the withdrawal of Libyan troops went to Mitterrand, who in the fall of 1981 brought considerable pressure to bear on Goukouni to persuade

<sup>6</sup>According to Colin Legum, shortly before signing the merger agreement, Goukouni had sent two of his senior commanders to Tripoli as his emissaries “when he begged off.” They never returned, however. The assumption is that they had been murdered at the request of Qaddafi and not, as was subsequently claimed by Tripoli, by “Chadian dissidents.” “Goukouni,” according to Legum, “did not believe the story [told by Tripoli]; but he felt he had a gun behind his back when he was presented with the merger proposal.” Legum, *op. cit.*, p. A40.

him to request such a withdrawal in return for a substantial aid package from France.<sup>7</sup> Until they realized they had backed the wrong candidate, the French had clearly pinned their hopes on Goukouni.

The routing of Goukouni's forces and the transformation of his Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) into a rebel "government-in-exile," presented Qaddafi with a unique opportunity to "recuperate" his former client. What Habre had managed to accomplish with covert United States aid, Goukouni was now determined to achieve with Qaddafi's military backing, thus paving the way for a reenactment of the December, 1980, intervention.

### CRISIS DIPLOMACY

On closer inspection, the second Libyan intervention (1983) differed from the first (1980) in one fundamental respect. When Libyan troops moved into Ndjamen in December, 1980, it was at the request of Goukouni's GUNT, Chad's only legitimate government, in order to crush Habre's dissidence. By 1983, the shoe was on the other foot. In supporting Goukouni against Habre, Libya was in fact throwing its weight behind a rebel faction against a government which at that time claimed the official recognition of the vast majority of the OAU.

Besides enjoying wide OAU recognition as the legitimate head of the Chadian state, by 1983 Habre enjoyed the solid support of the United States. Once an obscure warlord involved in a confusing factional feud against another warlord, Habre had emerged as "our man in Ndjamen." Not only had he given ample proof of his physical courage and astuteness as a guerrilla fighter (which in Chad is about as close as one can get to meeting the requirements of statesmanship) but, more important, his anti-Libyan credentials were impeccable. Few were more deserving of the gratitude and friendship of the administration of President Ronald Reagan.

United States sympathies for Habre developed in the wake of his defeat at the hands of Libyan "auxiliaries" in December, 1980; and in the following months every effort was made by Washington to ensure his political survival, which in effect meant boosting his military capabilities. Beginning in early 1981, through United States Central

<sup>7</sup>For an excellent background analysis of the French position on Chad, see David S. Yost, "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge," *Orbis*, vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter, 1983), pp. 965-997.

<sup>8</sup>These include three principal factions formally under the command of Goukouni: (1) the remnants of Goukouni's own *Forces Armées Populaires* (FAP); (2) Acheikh Ibn Omar's *Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire* (CDR), formerly led by one of Qaddafi's most trusted lieutenants, the late Ahmed Acyl; (3) a splinter group of the Sara-dominated *Forces Armées Tchadiennes* (FAT), led by Abd-el-Kader Kamougue. The latter's decision to cast his lot with Goukouni was largely motivated by the pro-Habre stance of his immediate rival and kinsman, Lieutenant Batinda Rodai. There are probably as many Sara currently fighting on Goukouni's side as there are on Habre's.

<sup>9</sup>See, for example, the interview with General Chevaance-Bertin in *Le Matin*, August 23, 1983, p. 5.

Intelligence Agency (CIA)-sponsored networks running from Langley to Cairo, from Cairo to Khartoum and ultimately to Abeche and beyond, automatic weapons, ammunition, vehicles, fatigues and boots and, above all, cash flowed into Habre's hands. That Habre made excellent use of these resources was demonstrated in the course of his highly successful campaign against the GUNT forces, culminating with the capture of Ndjamen in June, 1982.

While Habre fought his way back into power with United States-supplied automatic weapons and cash, his forces needed a lot more in the summer of 1983 to match the sophisticated weaponry and air power deployed around Faya-Largeau by the Libyan-backed rebel forces.<sup>8</sup>

The fall of Faya-Largeau, on June 24, while confirming the superiority of the Libyan arsenal, caused immediate concern in Washington over the probable fate of its "client" in the absence of an effective United States response. Rather than framing its options in terms of inaction versus direct United States involvement, the Reagan administration saw three distinct though not mutually exclusive possibilities: (1) the immediate authorization of emergency military aid to Chad; (2) a joint French-United States operation in the form of a French air strike against the Libyan positions near Faya-Largeau with the tactical support of AWACS (airborne warning and control system) electronic surveillance planes; (3) the second option, but without United States support. As we now realize, only the first of these options proved feasible, although in the end the French agreed to a large-scale salvage operation on behalf of Habre—Operation Sting-Ray. But neither the timing nor the scale or character of the French intervention had anything in common with what Washington initially envisaged. Instead of a swift, surgical air strike against the Libyans, the French ended up with some 3,000 troops on the ground (backed by 2,500 Zairian paratroopers), Jaguar and Bréguet Atlantic planes and heavy artillery, all of it hemmed in by a pledge of nonintervention against Qaddafi so long as he agreed not to cross the Red Line.

Mitterrand's critics argue that Sting-Ray was ordered at the wrong time and at the wrong place, too late to prevent Goukouni from recapturing Faya, and too far away from Faya to enable Habre to reenact his spectacular counteroffensive of July 31, when, against heavy odds, he successfully fought his way back into the oasis, only to lose it again on August 10.<sup>9</sup> Though basically correct, the indictment overlooks the domestic and external constraints under which Mitterrand tried to hammer out his policy, and for which Washington showed remarkably little appreciation.

(Continued on page 132)

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*In Ethiopia, the "failure to build a genuinely 'democratic' vanguard party, which includes all political interests at all levels and which tackles the national question forthrightly, could prove to be the Derg's most serious political mistake. Moreover, drought, famine and political instability are ever-present obstacles...."*

# The Ethiopian Revolution at the Crossroads

BY EDMOND J. KELLER

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SINCE the dethronement of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974, the Ethiopian revolution has gone through many metamorphoses as *Addis Itiopia* (New Ethiopia) has struggled to be born. The most critical phase in that development was the period between 1976 and 1978 when what we know as the modern Ethiopian nation-state, rent by widespread sociopolitical conflicts, appeared to be on the brink of irreversible balkanization. Yet the military leaders who rule the country, the Derg,<sup>1</sup> were able to mobilize the general population and to initiate new foreign military alliances that enabled them to reestablish a semblance of control over the country. In the wake of these multiple crises, the Derg again attempted to devise a workable formula for building the new society, a society based on a new social myth. Currently, the revolution is entering into yet another decisive phase.

The military coup that resulted in the overthrow of the Emperor has often been described as a "creeping revolution."<sup>2</sup> Between 1973 and 1974, it was an outgrowth of a secret movement within the Ethiopian armed forces, involving junior officers and enlisted men. The cautious and even indecisive character of this movement was dictated by the facts that the military was not a cohesive political organization (although since about 1960 a certain amount of politicization had occurred within the armed forces) and that although the armed forces had become somewhat politicized, there was no monolithic military political organization. More impor-

tant, there were no broadly based, well-organized civilian political groups in the wider society. However, by the summer of 1974 the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee, or the Derg, claiming to represent a broad spectrum of the "men in uniform," began to assert itself politically, forcing the civilian government to engage in certain reforms and policies. Simultaneously, debate occurred within the Derg, not over ideological issues but over the necessity of a coup d'état and ultimately over the desirability of abolishing the monarchy. Finally, on September 12, 1974, the Derg agreed to move and the Emperor was overthrown. At first the new leaders considered maintaining the monarchy under the figurehead rulership of Crown Prince Asfa Wossen, Haile Selassie's son. The plan was scrapped, however, less than one year later.

Under Haile Selassie, Ethiopia was a closed society in many ways. The dominant mode of production was subsistence agriculture, and the predominant social organization was a variant of classical feudalism.<sup>3</sup> The state and a few members of the aristocracy were the most important figures in a nascent capitalism based on export. Foreign capital dominated small manufacturing and import substitution sectors. The state carefully regulated the growth and character of the capitalist sector.

The attitude that led Haile Selassie to engage in cautious, defensive economic modernization led him to try to engage in political reforms that provided the illusion of democratization while maintaining the basic elements of royal absolutism.<sup>4</sup> Ethiopia received its first written constitution in 1930. At the time, a two-chamber Parliament was introduced, and an effort was made to secularize the central government. In 1955, the constitution was revised to provide for universal adult suffrage and a popularly elected Chamber of Deputies. Yet no provisions were made for the establishment of legitimate political parties; candidates for Parliament had to compete as individuals. Moreover, the Prime Minister continued to be an appointment of the Crown.

Young intellectuals were quick to voice opposition to the cosmetic changes made by Haile Selassie even as nationalist movements were being spawned throughout the third world. Some returned from education abroad<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This is an Amharic term which means "committee." Originally this group consisted of around 120 members who represented the 40 units of the armed forces. Today that number is estimated to be less than 40.

<sup>2</sup>See Colin Legum, *Ethiopia: The Fall of Haile Selassie's Empire* (New York: Africana Publishers, 1975).

<sup>3</sup>The relevance of the feudal paradigm to Ethiopia has been the subject of much debate. I do not wish to enter this debate here and only suggest that traits of feudalism characterized the socioeconomic structure of prerevolutionary Ethiopia.

<sup>4</sup>See Edmond J. Keller, "The Revolutionary Transformation of Ethiopia's 20th Century Bureaucratic Empire," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2(1981); pp. 307-335.

<sup>5</sup>See Peter Koehn and L. Hayes, "Student Politics in Traditional Monarchies," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* (Leiden), vol. 13, no. 2 (January-April, 1978), pp. 33-49.



and began to engage in political discussion and form clandestine organizations. Others remained abroad, mainly in Europe and the United States, preparing themselves politically to return to Ethiopia, to begin to transform society according to genuine democratic principles. Haile Selassie skillfully coopted, coerced or otherwise restrained civilian opposition. However, political discontent, including organized labor and the military, coupled with the natural catastrophes of drought and famine, proved unmanageable, and the imperial monarchy collapsed.

An immediate result of Haile Selassie's loss of political control and the subsequent politicization of the armed forces was the development of a more open political climate. Elements within the armed forces, representing different ideological persuasions, began to publish pamphlets and to engage in political dialogues with civilian groups. Exiled political opponents of the old regime began to return home; others in the country who had been underground surfaced and participated in the emerging political debate over the character of a new social order.

When it assumed power, the Derg had to establish its legitimacy and suitability to rule. There was no ideological framework that guided the revolution in the early days. Derg members agreed on only two things: the Emperor had outlived his usefulness, and they—the “men in uniform”—should be the vanguard of the revolution. Initially, civilian groups acknowledged the role of the military in toppling the old order, but they were less certain that the military should be the vanguard of the revolution.

The Derg attempted to win legitimacy by its deeds. The first step in this direction was the issuance of a proclamation entitled *Ethiopia Tikdem* (Ethiopia First), on December 20, 1974. This proclamation was intended to be an ideological statement of the Derg's commitment to “Ethiopian socialism,” which resembled the utopian, populist, nationalist notions that had come to be identified with various versions of African socialism. The policies that grew out of this declaration covered many areas, including the bureaucracy, the economy, political organization and foreign policy. Although *Ethiopia Tikdem* alluded to the need for an all-embracing single party, the absence of even the barest beginnings of such a party was glaring.

The Derg was primarily concerned with insuring the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the state and establishing its own legitimacy. By stepping up the military campaign in Eritrea, it served notice that Ethiopia's internationally accepted boundaries were sacrosanct. In an effort to enhance its popular support, the Derg launched the National Development Campaign Through

Cooperation, involving about 60,000 high school and college students. This campaign was intended to explain the aims of the revolution to peasants and tenants in the countryside. In the process, it was hoped that the diverse ethnic groups that make up Ethiopia would be instilled with a common political and social orientation, a sense of national political integration. Since the Derg had no clear idea of the kind of society it envisioned, had no coherent and cohesive mass party to lead this campaign, and was discussing a multiplicity of competing political ideas and ideals, these youthful campaigners were no substitute for a well-organized and disciplined political organization.

Despite this, the Derg attempted to give Ethiopian socialism some substance. By January, 1975, its economic agenda had begun to take shape. In a relatively short period, all banks and insurance companies and most large-scale manufacturing industries were placed under state control. All rural property became state property, and most urban property was nationalized. The initial rural lands proclamation was followed by several decrees that led to the formation of peasants associations and rural cooperatives. In cities, *kebeles* (urban dwellers associations) were established. In both city and countryside, these new institutions would allegedly empower those who had suffered most under Ethiopian feudalism.<sup>6</sup> Social programs were begun to improve health care, broaden educational opportunities, and provide urban residents with adequate, affordable housing.

The Derg's economic and social policies were clearly intended to cultivate the support of the civilian left as well as the population at large. It actively tried to develop an accord with civilian political organizations of various ideological leanings which had become clearly articulated by 1975. Most of these groups represented different shades of Marxism-Leninism. Among them, the best organized and most active were the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary party (EPRP) and *Meison* (The All-Ethiopian Socialist Union). Pressures from the civilian left had influenced the Derg's decision to turn to Ethiopian socialism. Similar pressures pushed it in a Marxist-Leninist direction after 1974.

The spring of 1976 marked a watershed in the consolidation of the Ethiopian revolution. Not only did the Derg shift its ideological direction, but it also made it clear that it would not share power with the civilian left and would not relinquish its vanguard role in the revolution.

On April 20, 1976, the Derg announced the Program for the National Democratic Revolution and declared a firm commitment to scientific socialism. At the time, the Derg tried to articulate a non-capitalist strategy for the development of the new order. According to current Soviet Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in the absence of a mature capitalist economic system, a national democratic revolution led by a coalition of “revolutionary democrats” is a prerequisite for scientific socialist transformation.<sup>7</sup> This allows for the skipping of the normal capi-

<sup>6</sup>See John M. Cohen and P. H. Koehn, “Rural and Urban Land Reform in Ethiopia,” *African Law Studies*, no. 14 (1977), pp. 3–61.

<sup>7</sup>“Program of the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia,” Addis Ababa (April 20, 1976).

talist phase and provides a bridge to socialism. In spite of this, dialectical materialism, the essence of the orthodox Marxian methodology, is maintained.

The program marked the entry of the revolution into a second, more decisive phase of consolidation. The language of the document is "scientific socialism." The state has renewed its efforts to control all economic and political aspects of society. This has included an emphasis on the development of state farms and a commitment to encourage collectivized farming. There has also been a serious attempt to set up a planned economy.<sup>8</sup>

With the announcement of the program in 1976, the Derg was attempting to address several challenges. First of all, it was trying to "sell" scientific socialism or Marxism-Leninism. This ideology was to supersede "royal absolutism" and "feudalism"; it would also neutralize various groups competing to fill the political vacuum. Second, the Derg was trying to establish its own legitimacy. This dictated an orientation toward centralization in government. Third, the Derg had to try to maintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity. Fourth, the Derg had to address the pressing needs of economic and social development.

#### "SELLING" SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

The Derg tried to use "scientific socialism" as an agent of national political integration; it did not seem anxious to encourage the development of a civilian-based vanguard party, even though the program alluded to this. At the same time, the Derg tried to create an aura of openness and free exchange of ideas by allowing select political groups to operate in a semi-legitimate fashion. Among these were *Abyot Seded* (Revolutionary Flame), founded in 1976 and composed mostly of soldiers with some higher-level bureaucrats; Marxist groups like Meison and the EPRP; the *Waz League* (Labor League) with Maoist tendencies, and ECHAAT ("The Revolutionary Struggle of the Oppressed Ethiopian Masses"), a Marxist group made up mainly of Oromos, who represent the largest single ethnic group in the country. These groups were integrated into an advisory political bureau that discussed policy as well as political issues. Theoretically the political bureau could influence Derg policy.

When it became clear that the Derg was not preparing to share power with civilian groups or to surrender power, bitter ideological disputes erupted between the EPRP and Meison, the most powerful groups in the political bureau. They differed on several grounds; most important, they could not agree on the role of the Derg in the revolution. Meison believed in controlled democracy and was willing to accept the leadership of the Derg, at least in the short run. The EPRP pressed for an unlimited people's democracy and was unreservedly opposed to a vanguard role for the Derg. By 1976, the EPRP began clan-

destinely to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the Derg. It infiltrated mass organizations like the development campaign, labor unions, and peasants and urban dwellers associations. Sporadic bloody encounters, assassinations and counterassassinations involving Meison and the EPRP began to occur in urban areas. By that time, Meison had become the most influential civilian group in the political bureau.

Even as this was happening within the political bureau and in mass organizations, Seded, the military party, felt compelled to challenge the growing influence of Meison. In fact, by becoming more sophisticated in Marxist-Leninist thought, strategy and tactics, Seded members seemed to be systematically preparing themselves and their party to do without the others.

The EPRP's tactics came to be labeled "white terror" by the Derg and were countered by the regime's own "red terror." The object of the "red terror" was to liquidate the so-called enemies of the revolution by any available means. By January, 1978, it is estimated, somewhere between 3,000 and 10,000 suspected members of EPRP had been the victims of the "red terror."<sup>9</sup> This period also coincided with the Derg's growing estrangement from all civilian groups. By early 1979, Seded was the only officially accepted political organization.

In addition to the political challenges the Derg faced at the center, groups on the periphery also arose to question its vision of the new social order. Separatist or national liberation movements in Tigray, Eritrea and Oromo seemed to recognize the vulnerable, exceedingly "soft" character of the new regime as it struggled to create an authoritative state apparatus and to establish its legitimacy. By late 1977, three Eritrean liberation groups controlled all but the major urban centers in the region. In the Ogaden, in the summer of 1977 a combined force of Ogaden irredentists and regular Somali troops attacked and overran Ethiopian positions until they controlled the entire region. Oromo movements also emerged to press their claim for self-determination as did other nationalities throughout the country.

The vulnerability of the Derg was exacerbated by worsening relations with the United States, its primary military patron. United States President Gerald Ford had expressed deep concern in 1975-1976 over the growing and officially sanctioned violence in Ethiopia; and in the fall of 1976, President-elect Jimmy Carter had vowed to exact sanctions against the Derg in an effort to force it to guarantee human rights. President Carter's inauguration coincided with increased violent opposition to the Derg and the beginning of the "red terror." This afforded the President the opportunity to act on his promise. He singled out Ethiopia as a test case for his human rights policy in Africa. He curtailed certain types of military aid to the country and threatened to cut off all military ties. Little consideration seems to have been given to how the Derg viewed its problems or what options it had at its disposal.

<sup>8</sup>See David and Marina Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1981).

<sup>9</sup>See *ibid.*, p. 154.

Unable to rely on United States military aid, the regime turned to the Soviet Union, Cuba and other left-leaning regimes prepared to come to its assistance. The Carter administration then threatened to drop Ethiopia as a client and to embrace its regional adversary, Somalia. All this led to nervousness on the part of the Derg, and eventually, in April, 1977, to a complete break between the United States and Ethiopia. In the summer of 1977, allegedly with the complicity of the Carter administration, Somalia decided to make its move to recapture the Ogaden, which it claimed as a lost portion of historic Greater Somalia.<sup>10</sup> The United States denied complicity and suspended talks on closer Somali-American relations until regular Somali troops were withdrawn from the Ogaden. The Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany, South Yemen and others allocated massive amounts of military aid and technical assistance to Ethiopia. Cuba committed 15,000 troops to the struggle. The Derg was thus able to reestablish domestic control and to repulse and drive back external forces.

Since 1978, domestic opponents of the Derg have been either liquidated, jailed, or coopted. Urban-based civilian groups like EPRP and Meison have been driven deep underground although they survive. What open violent opposition there is today appears in sporadic clashes with Oromo nationalist guerrillas; and more sustained military actions have been launched by the Tigray Popular Liberation Front and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front. The TPLF claims to control 75–80 percent of Tigray Province and has been the target of an intense but unsuccessful Derg effort to smother the movement. The EPLF holds only a small portion of territory inside the region, but it is able to harass Ethiopian forces on a regular basis. The Derg has attempted to undermine these movements by investing huge amounts of development assistance to “rehabilitate” war-torn areas, resettling people who have been displaced by conflict, and arming peasant supporters.

The political instability that occurred between 1976 and 1978 indicated that the Derg was unable, at least initially, to “sell” its scientific socialism. Yet as soon as relative political calm was restored, it began again, with renewed vigor, to build socialism. Its efforts were helped by the heightened atmosphere of threat to the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, stimulated by shifting military alliances and the growing militarization of the Horn.

### THE MILITARIZATION OF THE HORN

The outstanding long-term consequence of the rift between the United States and Ethiopia and the subse-

<sup>10</sup>See Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution* (London: Verso, 1981), pp. 225–231.

<sup>11</sup>See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-73 and 1970-79* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, (1973 and 1979). See also the article by Frank M. Chiteji in this issue.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

quent shifting of strategic alliances in the context of Ethiopia's domestic political instability was an escalation of the arms race in the Horn. Between 1976 and 1979, Ethiopia's armed forces grew from 65,000 to more than 250,000. Today, Ethiopia has about 300,000 men under arms, and a 1983 proclamation introduced national conscription for all men between 18 and 30. In contrast, Somalia's military grew from 31,000 to 54,000 in the same period; Sudan's from 50,000 to 65,000. Military expenditures also skyrocketed. In Ethiopia, they more than doubled, to \$351 million; in Somalia and Sudan, they virtually tripled, to \$92 million and \$237 million respectively.<sup>11</sup>

There is intense competition among the superpowers to make sure their clients are adequately armed. The Soviet Union is the biggest military spender in the Horn, having supplied Ethiopia with more than \$4 billion in military aid since 1977; but the United States is striving to meet any future Soviet or Soviet-sponsored threat to its new clients, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya, with a swift and sure long-range military strike force.

The Carter administration set in motion an encirclement strategy designed to woo Ethiopia's neighbors with military and economic development aid, a practice expanded by President Ronald Reagan. Under his direction, the United States has developed a Rapid Deployment Force capable of projecting America's military power into the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the “Arc of Crisis.” Annual joint exercises involve United States troops along with the forces of the host countries in the region—Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Oman. No United States troops are stationed permanently in these countries, but massive amounts of funds have been given in the form of military aid or invested in modernizing local military facilities. Soviet leaders have continued their heavy investment in military aid not only to Ethiopia, but also to South Yemen and Libya.<sup>12</sup>

The tensions created by the ever-intensifying arms race in the Horn have caused Ethiopia and Somalia to try constantly to “outfox” each other. Each country sponsors guerrilla movements against the regime of the other, and occasional border conflicts involve regular troops. As a result, the Horn resembles a regional and perhaps even a global “powder keg.”

The program clarified the Derg's commitment to socialized economic development and central planning. While the state seized control of the “commanding heights” of the economy as early as 1975, it did not have firm control of the forces of production, distribution and exchange. In late 1978, the Derg proclaimed the National Revolutionary Development Campaign and established the Central Planning Supreme Council. These institutions were intended to lead economic development and engage in central planning. Significantly, these agencies were staffed predominantly by military men with Soviet advisers; clearly the Derg was attempting to keep potential critics from the civilian left at bay.



Impressive strides were made in the first year of the new campaign. The overall economic growth rate jumped from below one percent at the beginning of 1978 to over five percent at the end of 1979. By 1982, however, the rate was again only around one percent. Obviously central planning was no panacea. The economy continued to be in crisis.

### A NEW PLAN

In spite of these mixed results, the Derg forged ahead and announced a 10-year development plan in the summer of 1981.<sup>13</sup> It is generally agreed that the success of this plan depends on the successful mobilization of massive amounts of external capital. In an effort to attract such capital, the Derg introduced a new investment program, providing incentives to would-be foreign investors. It is too soon to determine the impact of this measure, but knowledgeable observers suggest that if the Derg can maintain political calm, foreign investors will return. Ethiopia has a reputation for cautious economic policies and for being a good credit risk. The World Bank, the European Development Fund, and several prospective European bilateral aid donors have begun to make plans to invest in Ethiopian development once again.

The plan is ambitious. In its original form, it envisioned doubling the gross domestic product (GDP) to \$17,375 million at 1979 prices. This would imply a 7.5 percent annual growth rate. By 1983, however, it appeared that such a target would be difficult to reach, and the Derg informally pulled back from the plan and introduced a two-year subplan concentrating on essential projects.

The Derg has introduced other programs to gain a firmer grip over the operation of the economy. Reorganizing the labor movement and setting up mass organizations like peasants associations, women's and youth associations (which it controls), the regime has enhanced the state's authority. The Derg has also set up state farms and encourages collective farming through producer cooperatives. The results have yet to bear significant fruit. State farms represent only about two percent of the land under cultivation and are involved in producing such valued import substitution commodities as sugar and cotton. In spite of the government's heavy commitment to such enterprises, they are not very productive, contributing only five percent of the value of agricultural production.

By 1983, there were more than 1,000 producers' cooperatives with a total membership of over 60,000. They are responsible for such varied functions as building schools, drilling bore holes, and constructing feeder roads in addition to normal agricultural functions.

In Ethiopia, peasants are a potent economic force. They make up more than 90 percent of the total population and account for more than 90 percent of the country's export earnings. The Derg would like to control or at least harness this force, but has yet to succeed. It is expected,

however, that as the state's bureaucratic control deepens and once the long-promised vanguard party is in place, more effective control will be possible.

The Derg also attempted to win support among ethnic minorities. On the symbolic level, it has recognized the equality of all peoples and permits school instruction, newspaper publication and radio broadcasts in several languages. At the more tangible level, many important social reforms introduced during the revolution had a direct and profound effect upon Ethiopia's minorities. Chief among these were the rural and urban land reforms that effectively improved the lot of the poorest of the poor. Similar gains were realized in areas like education and health. By 1982, the regime boasted that some 5.5 million people had become literate since 1974. The literacy rate was reputed to have risen from a meager seven percent of the total population to more than 35 percent. About half of all primary school-age children were in school by 1982 as compared to only 18 percent in 1974. Overall school enrollment over this period was reported to have increased by about 250 percent to more than 2.5 million. In the process, the education budget more than tripled, to \$165 million. Gains were equally dramatic in modern health care. Between 1974 and 1982, the percentage of Ethiopians with access to modern health services grew from 15 percent to almost 50 percent and the proportion of government funds allocated for such purposes rose by approximately 150 percent to \$53 million in 1981.

In spite of the Derg's success in improving the quality of life and the opportunities for social advancement for ethnic minorities, resistance continued into 1982. Part of the reason for this was certainly the failure of the Derg to convince these groups that their lives would improve in the Ethiopia it was trying to build. Recognizing this, the Derg in 1979 committed itself to building a vanguard party.

### WHAT TYPE OF VANGUARD PARTY?

On December 17, 1979, the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) was formally announced. This was to be a broad-based commission that would design and prepare the way for the implementation of an all-embracing party of the working people of Ethiopia, a category meant to include all groups that had been oppressed during the old order. This was to be a party of individuals rather than groups.

The commission took form between 1980 and early 1983. The main policymaking agents are a 7-member

(Continued on page 137)

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<sup>13</sup>See *African Research Bulletin*, 1981, pp. 5899 and 6192.

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*"The overwhelming electoral victory of the National party of Nigeria in 1983 was gravely tarnished. The degree of administrative bungling, deliberate falsification and the intimidation by both police and party political forces as the elections progressed prevented any impartial observer from expressing satisfaction with the results."*

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# The Overthrow of Nigeria's Second Republic

BY RICHARD A. JOSEPH

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THE modern history of Nigeria is replete with striking and abrupt contrasts. Although heralded as a "showcase" for democracy during the early 1960's, Nigeria was plunged into a 30-month civil war in May, 1967. Although promoted by its ruler in the mid-1970's as having one of the strongest prospects for rapid economic development because of earnings from petroleum exports, before the end of that same decade Nigeria found itself seeking sizable loans from overseas banks. The experiences of the past year, 1983, also demonstrated this unpredictability in Nigerian affairs. Despite the country's strong reputation for maintaining amiable relations with its neighbors, the year began with its sudden expulsion of over one million unregistered African aliens. It ended in a similarly abrupt manner with the overthrow of the government of President Shehu Shagari, a mere four months after it had been returned to office in general elections.

Some of the factors that distinguish Nigeria from many other African countries today are the size of its population (90–100 million), the variety of its peoples, the tradition of its democratic institutions, and its high earning capacity from the export of petroleum. At present, the Nigerian federation consists of 19 states, although there are insistent demands to increase this number. Since ethnic, linguistic and cultural affinities are used to justify the demand for new states, there is no guarantee that the process of state-creation can be halted at any specific point, in view of the multiplicity of these affinities in Nigeria.

Many Nigerians will probably agree that their greatest contemporary challenges include the pursuit of harmonious relations among Nigeria's peoples, the creation of an effective and stable democracy, and the achievement of rapid and broad-based economic development. The severe conflicts of the civil war era have given way to a period of peaceful reconciliation, to the surprise of many foreign observers and even Nigerians themselves. Rule by military regimes in the 1970's contributed to the reduc-

tion of internecine passions. The regimes of General Yakubu Gowon and his successors, Generals Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo, tried to place themselves above Nigeria's ethnic, regional and religious divisions. As "guardians" of the nation, the military rulers claimed that their regimes belonged to all Nigerians; and they often acted to ensure that the claim was reflected in the breadth of representation among military officials holding political office as well as among civilians appointed to higher administrative positions.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the new head of state, Major General Mohammed Buhari, has referred to the new military regime as an offshoot of the one which governed Nigeria before 1979. General Buhari was the oil minister and a member of the Supreme Military Council in the 1975–1979 government which returned the country in deliberate stages to constitutional democracy. That military regime enjoyed a certain legitimacy in the minds of many Nigerians, especially when compared with the ineffectual civilian government which succeeded it.

With the return to competitive party politics in 1978–1979, there was widespread concern that significant lines of division would reappear between ethnic and regional groups. Many provisions of the new constitution, as well as the Electoral Act, were specifically designed to reduce the role of sectional considerations in the formation of parties, in the act of voting, and in the composition of new governments at the federal and state levels.<sup>1</sup> At the inauguration of President Shehu Shagari and Vice President Alex Ekueme on October 1, 1979, the pre-military pattern of political alignments had apparently triumphed over the new constitutional provisions. Shagari and Ekueme's party, the National party of Nigeria (NPN), resembled in many respects the dominant party of the first republic, and the same can be said for three of the other four parties, whose core support seemed to duplicate that of earlier party organizations.<sup>2</sup>

The first administration of Shagari, 1979–1983, and the general elections of 1983 clearly suggested that while Nigeria's second republic superficially resembled the first, at a more fundamental level it incorporated a new set of political and economic dynamics. In 1979, the NPN achieved a consistent one-third of both votes cast and seats or offices won.

<sup>1</sup>See Richard A. Joseph, "The Ethnic Trap: Notes on the Nigerian Campaign and Elections, 1978–79," *Issue*, vol. 11, nos. 1/2 (1981).

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*; and K. Panter-Brick, "Nigeria: The 1979 Elections," *Africa Spectrum*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1979).

With the four other parties obtaining a reasonable share of the legislative seats and state governorships, Nigeria seemed well placed to begin operating its competitive party system.<sup>3</sup> The NPN entered into an initial alliance with one of these parties, the Nigerian People's party (NPP), to form a loose governing alliance in the federal capital. The fact that the opposition parties appeared to draw the core of their support from particular areas of the country could be counterbalanced by the earnest attempts they all made to win a national following.

By 1983, however, neither the ruling NPN nor the opposition parties could feel satisfied about their achievements during the previous four years. Several attempts by the opposition parties to form alliances in different combinations (following the early collapse of the NPN-NPP compact) were unsuccessful. As for the NPN, its greatest failings were reflected in the deteriorating state of the economy. As a governing apparatus, the NPN was hampered by its omnibus gathering of political representatives who did not subscribe to any specific ideology or set of programs. What united the party was a willingness to collaborate under the leadership of established northern politicians, along with the guarantee that power would not only be shared as widely as possible but also that the leading positions in the party would be circulated among individuals from the main regions of the country.

### THE 1983 ELECTIONS

The results of the 1983 elections marked a decisive shift in the character of the political system. President Shagari was reelected by a substantial plurality of 47 percent of the total vote, obtaining over 25 percent of the vote cast in 16 of the 19 states, which was well above the constitutional requirement. Although the final authorized figures are not available, the NPN increased its control of legislative seats and governorships from the 35–40 percent range of 1979 to nearly 70 percent. The exception was the gubernatorial elections for which the figure was 63 percent, 12 of 19 offices; the courts canceled one victory on the grounds of electoral malfeasance.

The most striking consequence of the elections of 1983, therefore, was that Nigeria shifted from a competitive party system to a system dominated by one party. The opposition was effectively reduced to three parties enjoying regional support in the west (Unity party of Nigeria, UPN), the east (NPP) and the north (People's Redemption party, PRP). The Great Nigerian People's party (GNPP), already crippled by internal conflicts before the elections, experienced a substantial drop in its total vote. The only new party in 1983, the Nigerian Action party (NAP), was almost universally disregarded.

<sup>3</sup>Based on appendices in Amadu Kurfi, *The Nigerian General Elections: 1959 and 1979* (Lagos: Macmillan, 1983).

<sup>4</sup>Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 16, no. 2 (1978), pp. 221–240.

Where did these developments leave the Nigerian party system? Down, certainly, but not yet out. Students of Nigeria will wrestle for some time with the fact that General Buhari and his comrades-in-arms struck at the very moment when new and positive departures were promised by President Shagari for his second and constitutionally final term of office. With its control of federal patronage, and in view of the pronounced tendency of aspirant politicians to join the bandwagon, President Shagari and his party could have had the opportunity to implement most of their programs without hindrance at the federal level and in the majority of the states. On the other hand, intraparty conflict can be expected to increase as factions have been consolidated within the NPN, especially around the issue of the party's presidential candidate in 1987. The 3 major opposition parties, which among them control 6 states—UPN 3, NPP 2, PRP 1—were still able to maintain a viable presence in national politics. What we shall never know is whether the constitutional system would have gradually developed the necessary self-correcting mechanisms or whether, as the new military regime contends, the country was headed for certain political and economic collapse.

### AN ECONOMIC CUL DE SAC

In the ten years that have elapsed since the sharp upswing in world petroleum prices during the latter months of 1973, Nigeria has gone from a state of economic euphoria to one of economic anxiety. In 1975, the country's mounting reserves of foreign earnings could cover two years at its current level of imports. Eight years later, in January, 1983, Central Bank reserves of \$1.3 billion could pay for only one month's imports. A country which, after the mid-1970's, thought it could finance its elaborate development plans without recourse to foreign loans or aid had to enter into extensive negotiations with its overseas creditors during 1983 to restructure its short-term debts.

There have also been tough bargaining sessions between Nigerian officials and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over the austerity measures demanded by the IMF as a condition for the long-term financing needed to bridge the shortfall in foreign earnings. Although Nigeria's total debt, approximately \$14 billion in early 1983, is much less than that of the major South American debtor nations like Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, this debt will probably continue to increase in view of the country's now constant balance of payments deficit.

A full discussion of this economic quagmire and how it came into being cannot be attempted here. A year before the military government of 1975–1979 transferred power to the Shagari administration, it was officially acknowledged that the country needed to alter its spending patterns.<sup>4</sup> Earnings from petroleum exports were approaching the level of 90 percent of external income;



and the share of total government revenues this represented was also climbing rapidly. Luckily for the new civilian government, oil prices again increased and so also did production, reaching the near maximum output level for Nigeria of 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) in June, 1980. The vagaries of the international oil market and the policies of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) acted to keep oil prices extremely high, despite a softening of demand. By July, 1981, Nigeria was only producing .85 mbd, but the price of its oil had reached \$40 dollars per barrel. In August, 1981, the country reluctantly announced a "discount" in its oil price to bring it down to \$36. Thereafter, the real value of Nigeria's major export product could no longer support the current level of government spending. In the short term, the only option available to the government was to pare away expenditures and drastically slash imports.

Responsibility for this situation must be widely shared. Well before the end of military rule in 1979, scholars had demonstrated the mirage of Nigeria's "oil boom." With the transfer of power to civilians, a new cadre of government officials had to be reeducated. Learning came slowly, because the foreign exchange reserves had climbed to ₦10 billion (₦ = naira) in 1980 after reaching a low of ₦2.7 billion at the time of the transfer of power.<sup>5</sup> The politicians were therefore able to indulge themselves in the trough of oil wealth, to promote special projects for their constituencies and to finance their own corrupt interests. By 1982, when foreign reserves were once again down to the ₦3-billion level, a mere manipulation of the selling price of Nigerian oil could no longer suffice, as it had in August, 1981.

Instead, in April, 1982, the Shagari government was forced to declare an extensive series of austerity measures, banning many imports and placing others under special license. Less than a year later, in February, 1983, despite the impending national elections, it was necessary once again to cut oil prices drastically (this time to \$30 per barrel), in order to keep Nigerian oil competitive with oil from the North Sea. At the OPEC meeting that same month, Nigeria agreed to a production quota of 1.3 mbd, despite the severe shortfall it represented in the country's foreign exchange needs.

Nigeria's economic difficulties reflect the instability of Nigeria's oil earnings since the late 1970's and its increasing dependence on external income. Of equal concern has been the precipitate drop in agricultural exports coinciding with the rapid rise of petroleum as the country's main foreign exchange earner. Prominent on the list of imports have been disposable consumer items and raw material inputs for local industry. Even more striking, however, has been an increasing reliance on foreign sources for

essential foods. Sugar, milk products, frozen fish and stockfish, rice, cooking oil, even chickens have been imported in increasingly large quantities during the past decade. As a consequence, when the Shagari government declared its drastic controls on imports in April, 1982, there was not only a shortage in commodities needed for a range of industrial processes but also a shortage of essential consumer goods. Inflation, unemployment and a reduction in the general level of economic activity came to typify Nigeria as it prepared for the vital 1983 elections.

The worsening economy explained the mass expulsion of "illegal immigrants" in January, 1983. Such a term must be placed in quotation marks because of the long tradition in West Africa that individuals may cross the borders of neighboring countries to engage in trading, herding or social activities with kinfolk. Moreover, one of the stated objectives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (to which Nigeria and the countries of the expelled aliens belong) is to promote the freer movement of their peoples; thus, many of these immigrants regarded themselves as only technically in violation of Nigerian regulations if they had not renewed their entry visas or had bypassed the bureaucracy altogether. In a broader sense they were not the unwelcome guests they were made to appear. In keeping with the worldwide pattern of emigration of peoples from stagnating to dynamic economic centers, many Ghanaians had migrated from their collapsing economy at home to take advantage of oil-fueled employment in Nigeria. As the Nigerian economy contracted, these migrants found—as have West Indians, Turks, Asians and Portuguese in West Europe—that their host country wished to dispense with their labor in the hope of shifting employment opportunities to its own citizens.

### THE ELECTORAL ORDEAL OF 1983

The overwhelming electoral victory of the National party of Nigeria in 1983 was gravely tarnished.<sup>6</sup> The degree of administrative bungling, deliberate falsification and the intimidation by both police and party political forces as the elections progressed prevented any impartial observer from expressing satisfaction with the results. Nigeria had yet to distance itself from the nearly universal inability of elected African governments to conduct free and fair elections. A few weeks before the first election on August 6, it was evident that the country was entering a difficult six-week period. At that time, the Federal Electoral Commission published the much-delayed list of registered voters, which contained over 65 million names.

(Continued on page 138)

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<sup>5</sup>The official value of the naira has dropped to US\$1.41 from the \$1.65 of the late 1970's. It is worth considerably less on the extensive black market.

<sup>6</sup>Larry Diamond, "A Tarnished Victory for the NPN?" *Africa Report* (November–December, 1983), pp. 18–23.

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*"The supply of arms to Africa by major powers has increased drastically as a result of the escalation of armed conflicts between Africans seeking independence from white minority rulers and white rulers determined to preserve their privileged ways of life. The United States and the Soviet Union have both played major roles."*

## Superpower Diplomacy: Arming Africa

BY FRANK M. CHITEJI

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UNTIL the early 1960's, the United States did not have any appreciable policy toward Africa. What little interest Americans had in Africa was often expressed through their allies, who maintained colonial possessions on the continent. It was through them that the United States channeled its arms and other forms of military assistance to Africa, except for Liberia and Ethiopia, which received assistance directly. Although there are no estimates as to the extent of United States arms transfers to the colonial powers, it is a well-known fact that Portugal was a major recipient of such transfers. Portugal in turn, deployed these arms to sustain its colonial hegemony.

In the 1960's, a number of newly independent states established relations with the United States, although few African states were supplied with United States arms. Throughout the 1960's, the primary interest of the United States was to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing its spheres of influence not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in the Mediterranean region. Africa was, therefore, an extension of this policy, and received an added impetus as the colonial powers left Africa, because the West feared Soviet attempts to fill the vacuum left by the departing colonial powers. To prevent this, the United States extended its military assistance to newly independent countries on the continent. Consequently, United States military assistance to Africa jumped from \$5.72 million in the fiscal years 1950–1955 to \$39.7 million in 1956–1960; it rose even higher in subsequent years.<sup>1</sup> In the years between 1976 and 1980, United States arms transfers to Africa were \$1,329.7 million, with North

Africa receiving a total of \$952.2 million. In addition, the United States provided extensive economic aid.<sup>2</sup>

Preferring a low-keyed approach to relations with the African nations, the United States was extremely cautious. Arms and other forms of military aid were sent only to those countries in which potential Soviet influence was very strong. For instance, Tunisia received an impressive military package from the United States after Tunisia's President Habib Bouguiba hinted at the possibility of accepting Soviet military assistance. Similarly, the United States rushed military assistance to the Congo, when the pro-Soviet Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, requested and received the Soviet military assistance he needed to smash the Katangese successionist rebellion led by Moise Tshombe (a pro-Western nationalist).

In the early 1960's, United States arms transfers to Ethiopia (then ruled by the Emperor Haile Salassie) were a response to increased Soviet military assistance to Somalia. After the 1963 border conflict between Algeria and Morocco, the United States increased its military assistance to Morocco in an attempt to offset Soviet arms transfers to Algeria. Thus throughout the 1960's, the United States consistently followed a pattern of supplying arms to the rivals of Soviet recipients.

Today, African leaders apparently do not view excessive military assistance as the solution to their socioeconomic problems. This is not to suggest that United States security interests are on the decline. On the contrary, Africa will remain prominent in American foreign policy as long as there are uncertainties in the Middle East, and as long as the United States attaches significance to Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean. Another strategic concern is access to the key mineral resources in southern Africa and Zaire, which the United States utilizes in abundance.<sup>3</sup>

United States interests in Africa focus almost entirely on the vulnerability of Western shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope. Almost all West Europe's oil supply and a major portion of United States oil imports are carried through these shipping lanes, and a Soviet blockade of these lanes could rapidly become an economic stranglehold on the West. Thus, possible access by the Soviet navy to basing facilities

<sup>1</sup>James P. Smaldone, "U.S. Arms Transfers and Security Assistance Programs in Africa: A Review and Policy Perspective," in Bruce E. Arlinghaus, ed., *Arms for Africa* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983), p. 191.

<sup>2</sup>United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969–1978* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 32.

<sup>3</sup>The United States imports from South Africa over 93 percent of the platinum, 83 percent of the vanadium, 48 percent of the chromium and 37 percent of the manganese that it needs. Ministry of Information, South African Embassy, *South Africa: Persian Gulf of Minerals* (Washington, D.C.: July, 1982), p. 3.

ties in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and (to a lesser degree) on the East African coast might jeopardize United States national security interests and those of its allies.

But given the naval superiority of the Western alliance and the global realities of the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would actually contemplate blockading Western oil shipments. Such an act would most certainly provoke World War III, making the flow of oil irrelevant. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union should seriously consider interrupting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West, there are far more efficient ways of doing so.

Thus motives other than containing Soviet expansion and Soviet threats to the security of the Western alliance are undoubtedly at play. For instance, one should not discount economic motives. In order for multinational corporations to invest profitably in South Africa and Zaire, there must be a stable political climate, that is, one that is "secure" from African nationalist opposition. In this vein, the United States has undertaken to protect those nations with which it does business. This protection includes security assistance. In turn, recipients of such assistance generally support United States positions in world affairs. There is also the additional importance of the economic wealth of South Africa and Zaire and the setback this would cause if that wealth were to fall into Soviet hands.

### SOVIET-AFRICAN RELATIONS

The history of Afro-Soviet relations is brief but revealing. On the day of independence, no African country had diplomatic relations with the Kremlin, and only a few had any contact at all with the Soviet Union. The picture is certainly different today. Most African capitals have a Soviet diplomatic, trade or military mission, and there is a general increase in Soviet activities throughout Africa. Where the Soviet Union itself has not been visible, its allies have represented Soviet interests.<sup>4</sup>

Before the 1960's, the Soviet Union was more concerned with the region immediately south of its borders; Africa did not play a significant part in Soviet policies. But the departure of Western colonial powers from Africa after World War II, a process which intensified in the 1960's, was perceived by the Soviet Union as an opportunity to take the place of the departing colonial powers. To some degree, Africans were eager to establish friendly ties with the Soviet Union, which they identified as having common anti-imperialist objectives.

The Soviet Union, for its part, saw growing African nationalism as having a flavor identical to Soviet

Bolshevism.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps the continuation of white minority rule and the policies of apartheid in South Africa brought the Soviet Union and Africa even closer together. The belief that the only resolution to colonial issues in that region is through armed struggle provided a way for the Soviet Union to increase its ties with a number of African independence movements. As a result, the Soviet Union has provided these movements with arms and military assistance.

Clearly, Afro-Soviet relations were established because both needed them, but Africans needed the Soviet Union more. The Soviet Union has at least four major Soviet objectives in Africa. The first aim is to spread political and economic influence in a manner consistent with Moscow's role as a world power. Soviet doctrine supports the destruction of world capitalism and the introduction of international socialism and communism not only in East European countries, but in Africa as well. In the Soviet Union's estimation, Africa played a crucial role in the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution, regarded by Soviet socioeconomists as the era of Western capitalist growth and expansion. The second objective is to disrupt the political-economic systems established by the European powers in Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that is, to diminish or eliminate Western influence. This goal is pursued outside the general framework of East-West détente.

The third objective is the promotion of Soviet political-strategic interests. In order to achieve this objective, the Soviet Union has entered into treaties of "friendship" with many independent African states, some of whom have become major recipients of Soviet arms. In recent years, Soviet arms transfers to Africa have formed the most tangible feature of military and strategic links between the continent and the Soviet Union. In all likelihood, the Soviet Union will continue to pursue this objective through a series of tactical, pragmatic and ad hoc responses to what the Soviet Union views as promising opportunities. The final Soviet objective is to counter the growing ideological and political challenge posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC).

For their part, since World War II Africans have believed that the Soviet Union plays a valuable role in countering the West's continuing domination. Since the Socialist revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union has successfully portrayed itself as a champion of all anticolonial forces in the world. Thus when African nationalists began pressing for self-rule after World War II, they attracted a great deal of attention from Soviet leaders, who not only identified with African struggles against colonialism but also provided material assistance to movements that called for the overthrow of Western forces in Africa.

The Soviet Union was also hopeful that some anticolonial forces in Africa, in spite of their bourgeois inclinations, would be potential candidates for Marxist orientation. But while Marxism offered some inspiration and support for African independence movements, it did not,

<sup>4</sup>For an extended discussion of this, see Edward Gonzales, "Cuba, the Soviet Union and Africa," in David E. Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 20-21.

<sup>5</sup>See E. A. Tarablin, *The New Scramble for Africa* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), pp. 23-26.



as they had anticipated, produce satisfying results in terms of accelerated socioeconomic growth after independence. As major colonial empires collapsed, only three African countries established local Communist parties: South Africa, Egypt, and the Sudan. A few African nationalists who were ardently pro-Marxist—Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and George Padmore, a Pan Africanist—turned against Soviet political and social imperialism, regarding it as incompatible with their views of nationalism and their preference for a system of private enterprise. By the mid-1960's, with half its countries independent, Africa had failed to produce a single Communist party, in spite of Soviet involvement in independence struggles. Those Communist parties that had been established in South Africa, Egypt and the Sudan during the 1920's disintegrated by the mid-1960's. Although it was the source of arms and ideological inspiration in the initial years of the struggle for independence, the Soviet Union never succeeded in establishing strong spheres of influence in Africa.

The Soviet Union's advent in Africa after World II was an accidental by-product of its primary interest in the Middle East, but it was also a response to active United States penetration of the region. Following the successful Egyptian revolution of the early 1950's by Abdel Gamal Nasser against the corrupt regime of King Farouk, the Soviet Union established strong ties with the new leaders. From Egypt, the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing ties with political groups agitating for independence, or with newly independent states. Soviet successes in Africa at this time were, in part, due to consistent anticolonial and anti-imperial pronouncements and also to open support for African independence movements.

But not all ex-colonial states turned to the Soviet Union; some continued their ties with their ex-colonial powers for more pragmatic reasons. They were, and many still are, concerned more with their economic well-being than with an ideological affinity with the Soviet Union. Some cultivated ties with the United States, again for the same pragmatic reasons.

The Soviet Union also attempted to establish spheres of influence in Central Africa by supporting forces loyal to Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the Congo (now Zaire). But as a result of the United Nations Secretary General's condemnation of such arms transfers, the Soviet Union discontinued its military support for Lumumba. By mid-1960, Lumumba was ousted by a coalition led by Joseph Désiré Mobutu and Joseph Kasavubu, no doubt with extensive support from the United States and other major Western powers. Following the ouster of Lumumba's government, the Soviet diplomatic mission to the Congo was expelled, and the military

alliance between the two countries was discontinued.

In the aftermath of Soviet failures in the Congo, the Soviet Union suffered other setbacks in Africa. For instance, in December, 1961, the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea was ordered to leave that country after he was implicated in subversive activities aimed at either undermining or overthrowing the government of Sékou Touré. In addition, in Kenya, which has been a major recipient of Soviet arms in Africa, the government rejected Soviet arms that were considered obsolete and ordered a 17-man Soviet-military team to leave the country.<sup>6</sup>

Between 1966 and 1968, the Soviet Union continued to suffer additional setbacks. The Prime Ministers of Ghana, Algeria and Mali, all pro-Soviet, were ousted from power by leaders who were not so friendly toward the Soviet Union. Although Algeria continued to receive Soviet military assistance, it reestablished its pre-independence ties with France and other Western nations. Other pro-Soviet nations, Egypt, Somali, Guinea and the Sudan, restored ties with the West and currently receive Western military and economic assistance.

#### CHINA AND AFRICA

Support for African liberation movements has traditionally been dominated by the Soviet Union, which has historically provided the bulk of arms and other forms of military assistance. In recent years, however, the People's Republic of China has also been active in supporting African political movements. Like those of its counterpart, the Soviet Union, China's arms transfers must be seen in a foreign policy context. China, like most other arms suppliers, has learned to employ a variety of formal and informal instruments in the conduct of its foreign policy. They range from actual arms transfers to economic aid and technical assistance.

There is no doubt that Africa has offered China a golden opportunity in its bid for international legitimacy and power. After World War II, independent African nations were instrumental in gaining diplomatic recognition for China and ultimately the admission of China to the United Nations. Neither Chinese nor Africans recognize any immediate strategic significance of Africa for China. However, they admit that Africa is an important battleground for the Chinese war against Western imperialism and Soviet hegemony. For China, Africa is seen as a stage in the world's unfolding revolutionary struggle. Unfailing Chinese support of African liberation movements establishes and maintains China's revolutionary credibility and aids China in the context of cold war and Sino-Soviet competition.

By the mid-1960's, China was establishing ties with a number of political groups in countries like Zanzibar, Uganda, Niger and Cameroon. There is ample evidence that after the Cultural Revolution, China increased its role in international affairs and expanded its interests in Africa. Beijing employed arms-transfer diplomacy as a more conventional foreign policy instrument, while at the

<sup>6</sup>There is good reason to believe that this action was taken because of continued Soviet military support for Somalia, Kenya's archenemy.

same time focusing more intently on southern African liberation movements.

The number of African recipients of Chinese arms and military assistance has been relatively small, although there has been an increase over the years. For example, during the 1973–1976 period, there were 11 new recipients of Chinese arms: Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Gambia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Tunisia and Zaire. The number is likely to increase as more Africans become disenchanted with Soviet military assistance and its “spare parts diplomacy,” which most African nations consider a ploy to blackmail their domestic and external policies.

Increased Chinese arms transfers will, of course, depend on two interrelated factors: whether Africa needs Chinese military assistance and whether China is, indeed, capable of meeting the ever-increasing African need for military modernization. Thus far, African armies seem to prefer more sophisticated arms from the West. Thus China can hardly pose a real challenge to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has been relentlessly trying to keep China from upsetting its monopoly in Africa by increasing Soviet arms transfers even to those nations or political groups that are already recipients of Chinese military assistance. This is primarily because arms and military assistance represent the only successful Soviet foreign policy instrument, at least as far as Africa is concerned. Beset by its own economic problems, the Soviet Union has not been able to provide Africa with meaningful economic assistance. And the Soviet socialist economy has little credibility as a model for economic development in Africa.

Nonetheless, Soviet aid has succeeded somewhat in undermining Western influence as well as reducing African dependence on military and economic assistance. In some countries, like Angola and Ethiopia, Soviet influence has been effective. On the other hand, Chinese aid has had virtually no impact on local military or strategic balances, and has nowhere been decisive.

The Soviet Union will most likely continue to be a major arms supplier even in comparison to the West, simply because it can provide military assistance that is roughly 50 percent cheaper. This is because its deliveries are 50 percent faster and significantly less complex than those of the West. Whether or not the Soviet Union and the United States continue to provide cheaper and/or sophisticated arms more slowly or faster, what Africa needs most is a cure for its growing socioeconomic problems, the major cause of political unrest in Africa. It is obvious that arms transfers have only served to intensify such unrest and have been a contributing factor to a growing local arms race on the continent. Africa's socioeconomic problems cannot be cured with doses of anti-Communist or anticapitalist medicine.

The role of the major powers in African affairs shows their cynicism and lack of genuine understanding of local

problems. When the Sahel was hit hard by drought in 1968, leaving thousands dying from hunger, an international relief operation was not launched until almost four years later, after hunger already had left its deadly imprint in the region. The United States did provide substantial relief aid to the victims of drought, but the Soviet Union looked on inscrutably as the tragedy unfolded, providing only one Antonov aircraft for relief operations.

But when Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1975, the Soviet Union, in a crash program, immediately delivered more than 200 plane-loads of arms to Ethiopia. Many African leaders believe that the Soviet Union risks losing its credibility if it continues denouncing the forces of “imperialism” from the West without doing much to help suffering victims. In recent years, many African leaders have been rather vocal in their complaints about Soviet behavior in Africa. They resent Soviet efforts to manipulate military assistance to recipient nations through spare-parts diplomacy, as well as Soviet reluctance to pass on technology and proper training to Africans. Furthermore, there seems to be a growing awareness on the part of many African leaders that Soviet arms and military assistance in excessive amounts are not the solution to social and economic problems in Africa.

## CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the United States and other Western nations have been generous in their aid to Africa. But when that aid resembles reward for often repressive and corrupt regimes that assume a pro-Western stance, then the net effect can also be counterproductive. Furthermore, United States support for oppressive white minority regimes in South Africa and Namibia leads many African nations to wonder whether or not the United States is genuinely committed to its declared principle of seeking to maintain ties with democratic regimes in the third world. The United States, along with other major industrialized nations, has as a matter of “tradition” supported forces opposed to majority rule in Africa, under the guise of preventing the spread of “communism.”

As a result of increased arms and other military transfers to former colonial powers and because of the continuing refusal of the white minorities to share power with the African majority, African independence movements have often resorted to military solutions, declaring wars of independence against the colonizers and depending on Soviet arms and military assistance. Along with arms and military assistance, the Soviet Union has, of course, taken advantage of the situation by inculcating its own socio-

*(Continued on page 138)*

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# BOOK REVIEWS

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## ON AFRICA

**JFK: ORDEAL IN AFRICA.** *By Richard D. Mahoney.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 338 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$17.95.)

The twentieth anniversary of President John F. Kennedy's assassination was marked by a flood of books on his administration. Mahoney's work stands out from the more general studies because of the new information the author presents on Kennedy's policies in Africa. Using recently declassified files and over 200 interviews, Mahoney brings to light the Central Intelligence Agency's covert activity in the Congo, Ghana and Angola, detailing that it sometimes took place without the President's (or other government officials') awareness. He also captures the intense political infighting among the chief formulators and implementors of the administration's African policy.

Kennedy's views on Africa were a giant step beyond the cold-war-inspired policy of his predecessor. With his admonition that the changes occurring in Africa and elsewhere in the third world were inevitable processes—that the end of colonialism and the growth of nationalism were not Communist-dictated—Kennedy became a hero for the leaders of new nations like the Congo and Ghana. Yet the clarity of Kennedy's view was obscured by the exigencies of the cold war. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the Congo crisis; consequently, the possibility of a Soviet "win" in Africa came to dominate Kennedy's policies. His idealized view became rhetoric; his actual policy was competition with the Soviet Union, even when the Soviet threat came from a "leftist" leader like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

Unfortunately, Mahoney makes only a passing reference to this contradiction between Kennedy's rhetoric and his actions in Africa, a contradiction that was even more apparent in Kennedy's approach toward Vietnam. But this is in keeping with the noncritical tone of the book. *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* is primarily a descriptive history of how Kennedy implemented his African policies, and the personalities and conflicts that were part of it. Although marred by poor editing, it is an important survey of one aspect of Kennedy's foreign policy. W.W.F.

**AFRIKANER POLITICAL THOUGHT: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS, VOL. 1: 1780–1850.** *Edited by Andre Toit and Hermann Giliomee.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. 310 pages, notes and index to documents, \$37.50.)

Toit and Giliomee's work is an indispensable research tool for those studying the development of Afrikaner political thought. The introductory essay by the editors points out that the early Afrikaners did not have a refined political theory to guide them, nor did a political theorist articulate and explicate the basic tenets of the Afrikaner. The editors thus take issue with the ideology and politics of Afrikaner nationalism, a movement that arose about 1870 and has since laid claim to all Afrikaner history.

The great value of this first volume of a projected three-volume study is the assemblage of the disparate writings and documents of various Afrikaners as they developed a body of laws and beliefs to deal with the questions of slavery, labor, trade, and independence from colonial rule. W.W.F.

**SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE INTENSIFYING VORTEX OF VIOLENCE.** *Edited by Thomas M. Callaghy.* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. 420 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$45.00.)

This collection of essays critically analyzes South Africa's political, economic and military relations with its neighboring states. South Africa's attempt to impose a military solution on the growing black guerrilla movements it faces at home and in Namibia is clearly outlined in essays by John Seiler and Thomas Callaghy. Thomas Karis contributes a chapter on the African National Congress that explores the group's history, motivation and nationalist aims. Chapters on the South African Development Coordination Conference and South Africa's growth as the regional superpower are also included. W.W.F.

**MOZAMBIQUE: FROM COLONIALISM TO REVOLUTION, 1900–1982.** *By Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman.* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1983. 235 pages, notes, suggested readings and index, \$17.95.)

This sympathetic study of Mozambique covers the history of the country and the Marxist regime of its revolutionary leaders. The strongest parts of the book are the colonial history and the chapter on the economy. Written for the general reader, it is a good, albeit uncritical, introduction to the country by respected scholars. O.E.S.

**INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.** *Edited by Guendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara.* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,



1982. 270 pages, notes, glossary, bibliography and index, \$32.50, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

The editors have assembled a collection that surveys United States, Communist, Middle Eastern and West European interests in southern Africa. The essays by David Albright on "The Communist States and Southern Africa" and by Robert Price on "U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa" are well-written analyses of two subjects that often inspire only polemical treatments. Also of interest is the essay by Kenneth Grundy detailing the economic hegemony South Africa imposes on the southern African states. W.W.F.

**POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA.** *By John Cartwright.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 310 pages, notes and index, \$22.50.)

Cartwright analyzes the elements that have led to the fact that a single leader dominates many of the decolonized nations of Africa. Arguing that the lack of strong institutions has contributed to this problem, he examines 7 nations whose leaders have developed either coercive or persuasive methods to induce change. O.E.S.

**ZIMBABWE: A REVOLUTION THAT LOST ITS WAY?** *By André Astrow.* (London: Zed Press, 1983. 254 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$34.00, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

Most Western analysts think Zimbabwe has moved too far to the left in the years since independence; Astrow argues that Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government has not made any meaningful changes toward socialism and is in "danger" of taking the capitalist road of other African countries. Astrow traces Zimbabwe's problems to the capitalist economy it inherited at independence and the limitations imposed on the government at the Lancaster House Conference. W.W.F.

**AN INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS.** *By Billy Dudley.* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. 367 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$25.00, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

This comprehensive and critical account of Nigerian political processes since independence analyzes the first republic, the military governments between 1966 and 1979, the elections of 1979 and the second republic. The book is densely written but contains a wealth of information. O.E.S.

## MISCELLANEOUS

**YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1983/84. VOL. 1: Descriptions and Index.** *Edited by the Union of International Associations.* (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1983. 1,500 pages and index, \$168.00.)

Nearly 20,000 private and public organizations are covered in this newest edition. The index of over 100,000 entries allows easy access to the comprehensive descriptions (including member countries) of the listed organizations. This year's edition also includes religious orders and "organizational substitutes"; that is, multilateral treaties, information systems, conference series, and informal networks. O.E.S.

**DIRECTORY OF SPECIAL LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION CENTERS.** 8th Ed. *Edited by Brigitte T. Darnay.* (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1983). Vol. 1: Directory of Special Libraries and Information Centers in the United States and Canada, 1,640 pages, indexes and appendices, \$260.00. Vol. 2: Geographic and Personnel Indexes, 846 pages, \$230.00.

These two volumes are a valuable research source. The more than 16,000 entries cover the special interest libraries of both the universities and private companies (e.g., magazines, newspapers and hospitals). The entries provide up to 25 pieces of information about the library or information center, including special collections, holdings, information specialty and names of persons in charge. O.E.S.

**THE SOVIET VIEW OF U.S. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE.** *By Jonathan Samuel Lockwood.* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983. 175 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$19.95.)

Lockwood argues that the Soviet Union's strategic thinkers have consistently projected Soviet ideas on nuclear war onto United States concepts of strategic nuclear war. This has led to an unrestrained military buildup by the Soviet Union with no end in sight. Lockwood proposes that the United States counteract the Soviet buildup by adopting a three-tiered defense program of civil defense, antiballistic missile systems, and space-based defense systems. Some will find this "solution" a case of projecting perceived Soviet superiority in these areas onto United States military strategy. W.W.F.

**CHINA BRIEFING, 1982** *Edited by Richard C. Bush.* Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1983. 150 pages, index and appendices, \$16.95, cloth; \$6.95, paper.)

The third annual collection of essays produced by the China Council of the Asia Society brings together the views of respected China scholars Richard Bush and Michael Oksenberg on change in China's political system from the "mature" Maoism of 1972 to the "authoritarian" 1982 model, along with an analysis of China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union by A. Doak Barnett. Other essays cover the easing of restrictions on religion, energy problems, and Taiwan; there is also a brief but thorough survey of the Chinese military by June Teufel Dreyer. W.W.F. ■

## SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 108)

South Africa as a maneuver to provide an alternative to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which had been fighting an escalating guerrilla war inside Namibia since 1966. The immediate cause of the dissolution of the National Assembly was the resignation of Dirk Mudge, the chairman of the Council.<sup>3</sup>

South Africa has continuously refused to leave Namibia, despite repeated demands from the United Nations that it should do so according to U. N. Resolution 435.<sup>4</sup> After June, 1980, when South Africa sponsored elections, Mudge and a ministerial council had limited powers. The Council was excluded from passing legislation on areas like defense, which South Africa retained under its own jurisdiction, but substantial changes had been made in regard to discriminatory legislation. Such changes alienated a conservative segment of the small white population. South Africa hoped that once it had built up its strength, the DTA would be able to challenge SWAPO, possibly even in an internationally monitored election. Thus there would be a moderate and acceptable government in an independent Namibia. On this assumption, South Africa participated in talks with the "contact group" of five Western nations (the United States, Britain, Canada, France and West Germany), which by this time had taken the primary initiative for resolving the Namibian issue.

But Namibia remains no closer to a political solution. Indeed, the situation has been complicated by the Reagan administration's linking the transfer of control of Namibia to the withdrawal of approximately 25,000 Cuban military and technical personnel from Angola.<sup>5</sup> Not only is this consistent with President Reagan's East-West perspective, it has been fortuitous for South Africa. Linkage has stalled the talks, thus protracting South Africa's control and options.

What directions can resolve the impasse? Given the policy of the Reagan administration, change can come only with a different United States administration. It has been suggested that the United States could play a less prominent role in the "contact group," thus deemphasiz-

<sup>3</sup>The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), which was led by Mudge, was an alliance of 11 political parties of different ethnic backgrounds (Mudge himself was a white farmer) which came into being in 1976 with substantial backing from South Africa.

<sup>4</sup>The resolution calls for a cessation of hostilities between SWAPO and South Africa, withdrawal of South African troops, and free elections supervised by the U.N.

<sup>5</sup>In Angola, the base for SWAPO operations in Namibia, the Cubans are a strong bolster for the ruling Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). On the other hand, a substantial portion of southern Angola is under the control of Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which has received substantial military and financial support from South Africa. The Cubans are thus a vital countervailing force to the South African-backed UNITA.

ing the Cuban issue, although there is little evidence to show that this is a real possibility. It is most likely that South Africa will once again pursue a variation on an internal settlement and stall on finding a resolution to the problem. Destabilization of the region and the Namibian issue have transformed the southern African quadrant into an area of militarization and conflict. There is little prospect that the prevailing situation will change in the foreseeable future.

## THE FUTURE

South Africa has been undergoing realignments and transitions internally, regionally and internationally. Coloureds, Indians and Africans are now employed in jobs from which they were once excluded, and they are making at least some of the decisions that were once made for them by whites. But the homeland policy with its harsh resettlement programs continues to balkanize South Africa and to perpetuate the fiction that black rights, even for urban Africans who have never left the cities in which they were born, are to be found only in the homelands. In the end, the constitutional changes are little more than political variations aimed at coopting Indians and Coloureds while ignoring the glaring problem of African political representation.

In many ways, the proposals are reminiscent of the unsuccessful mathematical formulas and constitutional engineering in Rhodesia in the 1960's and 1970's, which sought to achieve the impossible task of maintaining white power while appeasing African demands. In the face of this impasse, urban guerrilla activities will increase and will inevitably alter the quality of life for white South Africans. The unanswerable question is whether this will lead to white reforms and compromises or to their greater intransigence.

On the regional level, South Africa has waged a campaign of destabilization that has adversely affected the destinies of its black neighbors. In the process, South Africa itself has been transformed, and today it is a highly militarized state. For the past 35 years it has been all but a one-party state with a strong military presence. Its regional predicament, coupled with the move to a strong presidency, will accentuate the power and predominance of the military, which will now play an increasingly direct and prominent role in policy formation and implementation and could very easily become far more than a key pressure group.

International reactions and responses, especially those of the United States, remain of crucial importance to South Africa. The Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement has taken some of the pressure off South Africa and has given it an opportunity to stall again on the Namibian question. The United States, Britain and West Europe are influential, but the final determination of the complex problems of troubled South Africa will take place within its own borders as whites respond, or fail to respond, to black aspirations and demands. ■

## CHAD

(Continued from page 116)

Long before Sting-Ray materialized, basic differences emerged between the French and American positions. The Reagan administration saw the Chadian crisis in the geopolitical perspective of East-West rivalries. Chad as such was not the primary issue; the perceived threat posed by Qaddafi to the stability of the Sudan and other friendly neighboring states was the critical factor behind Washington's appeal to Mitterrand for an immediate retaliatory strike on Faya-Largeau.

Mitterrand's reluctance to heed Washington's urgings stemmed from a far more sensitive appreciation of the liabilities involved in a military confrontation with Libya: (1) the chances of success of the kind of intervention advocated by the Reagan administration were, in Mitterrand's own estimate, far from self-evident;<sup>10</sup> (2) even in the best of circumstances, the success of the operation would have to be balanced against the losses that it would inevitably entail to French economic and commercial interests in Libya; (3) domestically such a move was bound to generate considerable opposition within Mitterrand's own party and indeed within his Cabinet. That it might be viewed as a surrender to United States pressure was not the least of Mitterrand's concerns as he weighed his options.

Further equivocation, on the other hand, was just as counterproductive from the standpoint of France's credibility among key Francophone states, especially the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Zaire. The visits paid to Washington by Zairian President Sese Seko Mobutu and Sudanese President Abdou Diouf at the height of the crisis made it plain to Mitterrand that France was not the only source of assistance for African states. Mobutu's decision to send some 2,500 paratroopers to Chad, followed by his visit to Washington on August 3, and the authorization shortly thereafter of a \$15-million United States emergency military aid package to Chad were only the most visible signs of the growing concern of the United States and its African allies over French inaction. As if to underscore African fears and give Mitterrand yet another opportunity to take the full measure of the Libyan menace, on August 4 came the news of Captain Thomas Sankara's military takeover in Upper Volta, in what was immediately perceived as a Libyan-instigated coup. Finally, on August 9, as Faya-Largeau was about to fall into Goukouni's hands for the second time, Mitterrand crossed his Rubicon: Operation Sting-Ray began.

While there is little question about Mitterrand's success in meeting his principal objectives—to avoid a direct confrontation with Libya and at the same time to display enough of a deterrent on the ground to prevent a Libyan

advance on the capital city—whether Sting-Ray can pave the way to a long-term solution to the Chadian crisis is a very different matter.

Such a solution can come about only through a negotiated political settlement among the principal parties involved, possibly on the basis of a federal formula. Yet there is little indication that such a settlement will materialize as long as the bargaining process remains stymied by personal animosities and questions of political legitimacy.

The issue of legitimacy was the major stumbling block at the OAU-sponsored peace talks held in Addis Ababa in January. Habre boycotted the conference, and there were irreducible disagreements over which of the 11 delegations to the conference would be allowed to display the Chadian national flag. Behind such "marginal issues," however, lies the more fundamental question of which of the several warring factions may legitimately claim to represent the interests of the Chadian people.

Thus the Addis meeting will go down in history as yet another missed opportunity, in the tradition of Kano I and Kano II, Lagos I, Lagos II and Lagos III.<sup>11</sup> Whether diplomatic trade-offs among patron states will succeed is anybody's guess. But if the law of probability governs Chadian politics one must assume that the volcano will not remain dormant for long.

## MOZAMBIQUE

(Continued from page 104)

al consideration, in Maputo as well as in Pretoria. South Africa's perception that it is the victim of a Communist onslaught overlaps with Frelimo's "internationalism," which is expressed in a variety of ways. With its consistent and outspoken support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, its diplomatic support for the Marxist forces in El Salvador, its anticapitalist verbiage, and its allowing the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa to maintain a presence in Maputo and to plan its actions from there, Mozambique has only fueled Pretoria's misgivings about Samora Machel's regime. On the other hand, South Africa's role in supporting the MNR and a number of commando raids into Mozambique with its own forces has reinforced Frelimo's conviction that coexistence with Pretoria cannot be sustained for the long term.

Despite its proclaimed nonalignment, Mozambique has concluded military and/or political treaties with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, North Korea, East Germany and Cuba. It is completely dependent on Warsaw Pact and Cuban military equipment, training and advice; its secret political police force is a copy of the East German and Soviet police; and there are at least 3,000 military personnel from Cuba and East Europe on its soil. By all measures, Mozambique is the major factor in the internationalization of the conflict between South Africa and the frontline states because of its dependence on non-African security support. In addition to its depen-

<sup>10</sup>See *Le Monde*, August 26, 1983, p. 4.

<sup>11</sup>A series of conferences held in Nigeria that aimed at building a coalition government for Chad; see Thompson and Adloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.



dence on foreign military support, which also includes the deployment of Tanzanian troops in the Cabo Delgado province and Zimbabwe's notorious North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade in Sofala and Zambesia, Mozambique has itself been involved in external military interventions at least twice since independence: The first instance involved FPLM units fighting inside Rhodesia, disguised as indigenous guerrillas; in the second instance, Mozambique sent a small military contingent against Uganda during the 1979 Tanzania-Uganda war.

Despite all these demonstrations of Mozambique's willingness to use force or to involve non-African forces in southern Africa, Maputo's relations with Pretoria are far from simple, and confrontation is only one of their aspects. Even at the time of the transitional government of 1974–1975, South Africa attempted to reach some form of accommodation with Mozambique by sending food aid and continuing some of the economic arrangements it had made with Portugal, all highly advantageous to Mozambique. For three years after independence, Mozambique continued to receive gold at concessionary prices in exchange for supplying labor to South Africa, and the latter continued to respect the old commercial treaties with Portugal, which obliged South Africa to use Maputo for almost half of Transvaal's sea-borne imports.<sup>8</sup>

Despite the 1978 South African decision to discontinue the practice of paying for Mozambican labor in gold at highly favorable prices, South Africa became Mozambique's principal trade partner after independence, replacing Portugal. While South Africa provided only 15 percent of Mozambique's imports in 1976, that figure rose to 40 percent in 1979.<sup>9</sup> When East German mismanagement at the Moatize coal mines resulted in two accidents involving heavy loss of life, South African experts provided aid. Maputo's harbor is still managed by South Africans, and Mozambique's railroads are still dependent on rolling stock lent by South Africa. Despite the United Nations-imposed oil sanctions against South Africa, some of that country's gasoline is provided by Mozambique, most of it Iraqi oil received at concessionary prices and refined by Romanians at Matola.

In addition to its continuing dependence on South Africa for the bulk of its hard currency revenues—from transport fees, workers' remittances, and Caborra Bassa electricity—Mozambique maintains diplomatic contacts with its hated neighbor. High-ranking Mozambican leaders, as well as intelligence personnel, have visited South Africa; and Brand Fourie, then the second-ranking official in the Foreign Ministry in Pretoria, visited Maputo at least once. Despite their sharp ideological differences and hostile public statements, both Mozambique and

South Africa have demonstrated a degree of restraint in their relations with one another. Maputo does not allow the ANC to operate as freely as Angola allows the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to operate against Namibia, while Pretoria does not support the MNR as much as it could. The result is a temporary stalemate, with each country waiting for an opportunity and hoping that the other will weaken. Considering the immense difference in resources and military power, Mozambique, if left to itself, would not have much of a chance of withstanding a consistently hostile South African policy directed at forcibly removing Frelimo from power.

One of Mozambique's principal objectives in southern Africa is to isolate South Africa while insulating itself from that country's economic influence. This aim is shared by most of the black-ruled states in the region, and the identity of aims is reflected in the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC), whose members are Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Angola and Swaziland. The continued existence of SADCC, however, is totally dependent on Western capital and aid in such amounts as to make its goal unrealistic. Moreover, Mozambique's attitude toward the private sector and its alliance system make it less attractive for investments than most of its partners. On the other hand, given Mozambique's essential role as the only alternative to South Africa's railroads and ports, any aid to SADCC has to be at least in part directed to Mozambique's transportation sector. Geography, common hostility toward and fear of South Africa, as well as personal ties of friendship among Samora Machel, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, all contribute to close political and military ties between those countries and Mozambique.

Economic relations, however, have not followed suit, and Mozambique's trade with its black-ruled neighbors remains insignificant. In light of the competitive rather than complementary character of their economies, the SADCC countries' ability to increase their mutual trade significantly is severely limited. Moreover, developments in Mozambique, resulting in generalized insecurity in the countryside and persistent threats to the railroads and harbors, have not only weakened Frelimo's regional importance but have also indirectly furthered South Africa's policy of preventing SADCC from reaching its aims. SADCC's most important problem today, in addition to lack of capital, is the MNR, since its activities have steadily increased SADCC's dependence on South Africa's transportation network. In many ways, Frelimo's ability to solve Mozambique's security problem and to retain power may determine whether SADCC will become an effective economic and political force in southern Africa.

The view shared by the United States State Department, Moscow, Maputo and all African states—that the

<sup>8</sup>For details, see Mario J. Azevedo, "A Sober Commitment to Liberation? Mozambique and South Africa 1974–1979," *African Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 317 (October, 1980), pp. 570–571.

<sup>9</sup>*The Financial Times* (Johannesburg), April 4, 1980.

MNR is only a mercenary gang paid for and controlled by South Africa—appears to be nothing more than wishful thinking. While the guerrillas are clearly dependent on South African logistical support, their motivation cannot be questioned, and at least some of their actions have demonstrated a willingness to cause discomfort to Pretoria. The destruction of the Caborra Bassa–Transvaal power lines, which provide 10 percent of the republic's electricity, was one such instance. Mozambican allegations that Malawi supports the MNR are equally dubious, since the guerrillas have sabotaged the Malawi–Nacala railroad, thus depriving Malawi of its major link to the Indian Ocean.

Like most guerrilla movements of the past few decades, the MNR is an expression of local discontent with government policies, the role of foreigners in the country, and regional or ethnic cleavages, reinforced and fueled, perhaps decisively, by foreign interference. The very size of the MNR forces, variously estimated at between 5,000 and 16,000 in 1982, and probably about 10,000 in 1983, makes it unlikely that any country, South Africa included, could have simply “invented” it.<sup>10</sup> The dramatic increase in the guerrillas' activities to encompass all of Mozambique's provinces, especially the central provinces of Manica, Sofala, Zambesia, Gaza and Inhambane, reflects both an increase in their numbers, from a maximum of 1,000 in 1979<sup>11</sup> to their present size, and the inability of the FPLM and its allies to check the insurgency.

Established in November, 1976, probably in Rhodesia, by a very diverse group of anti-Frelimo Mozambicans, including former FPLM deserters, some with important commands, former black soldiers in the Portuguese elite anti-insurgency forces (*Grupos Especiais, Flechas, Grupos Especiais Paraquedistas*), white refugees, and tribal dissidents from the far northern and central provinces, the MNR operated in alliance with the Rhodesian commandos until 1978. After the proclamation of independence by Zimbabwe and the election of Prime Minister Robert

Mugabe, Samora Machel's friend, the MNR moved its bases to Mozambique and to South Africa.

According to Jacinto Veloso, then security minister and Frelimo Politburo member, the members of the MNR in 1982 included former colonial collaborators, administrators, and soldiers; common criminals, former FPLM members; and followers of former Zimbabwe–Rhodesia Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa; furthermore, it appealed to certain ethnic and tribal loyalties.<sup>12</sup> Veloso's assessment is confirmed by the documented support the MNR receives in the central regions inhabited by the Manica and Ndau tribes of the Shona people,<sup>13</sup> among the Makonde of Cabo Delgado, and some Makuas in Sofala and Gaza. The highly professional character of a number of MNR operations, including the sabotage of the Beira–Zimbabwe pipeline and Beira's harbor, appears to confirm the participation of former Portuguese commandos, while the fact that both the first leader of the group, Andre Matade Matsangaiza, and his successor and the present military commander, Afonso Dhlakama, were former Frelimo members indicates that group's importance within the MNR.

Although it still lacks a coherent political program, other than a visceral anticommunism and a rather inarticulate nationalism indicated by repeated assertions that its members are the “true” followers of Frelimo's founder, Eduardo Mondlane, the MNR is still far more than a disorganized collection of desperados. Frelimo's allegations of MNR atrocities have not been substantiated by neutral observers, while the proven claims of South African logistical support for the MNR do not necessarily delegitimize the organization. The guerrillas' radio station, *Voz da Africa Livre*, operating from eastern Transvaal, reaches enough people in Mozambique to have prompted Frelimo to declare listening to it a crime against the state.

Perhaps the best indications of the serious threat the MNR poses to Frelimo's control over the country are the steps the regime has taken. Not only did the FPLM have to request Zimbabwean and Tanzanian help, but in April, 1982, a military agreement was signed between Mozambique and Portugal, specifying that Portugal would provide anti-insurgency training. Moreover, former Frelimo combatants were called back to active duty and rural militias were established; and Defense Minister Alberto Chipande admitted in 1982 that even former elite soldiers from the colonial army were enlisted.<sup>14</sup> Additional reasons for Frelimo's insecurity are the continuous indications of discontent within the military, including defections, the execution of some officers (including two senior officers) for cooperation with South Africa, and the inability or unwillingness of Cuba or the Warsaw Pact to provide combat troops or to improve the FPLM's effectiveness.

While there is no imminent danger that Frelimo will lose the war against the MNR, there are no signs that it is close to winning it. At the same time, Mozambique does

<sup>10</sup>The figures for MNR's membership are highly unreliable. The only way to approximate them is to examine the areas and number of operations, as well as to compare the contradictory claims coming from the guerrillas and Maputo. In 1982–1983, the most often mentioned figures were between 3,000 and 5,000 (*The Economist*, June 12, 1982); 10,000 according to a number of Frelimo officials; 4,000, according to *Jeune Afrique* (July 7, 1982); 5,000 (Allen and Barbara Isaacman in *Christian Science Monitor*, October 22, 1982); and 16,000, according to the MNR itself (*Newsweek*, August 2, 1982).

<sup>11</sup>The 1979 membership figures for the MNR do not vary as widely as those for more recent periods. The estimates were 1,000, according to former MNR leader Andre Matsangaiza in Brian Crozier, ed., *Annual of Power and Conflict 1979/80* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 169, and at least that many, according to *Le Monde* (December 3, 1980).

<sup>12</sup>Interview in *Afrique-Asie*, July 5, 1982, pp. 46–47.

<sup>13</sup>Barbara and Allen Isaacman, “South Africa's Hidden War,” *Africa Report*, November–December, 1982, p. 6.

<sup>14</sup>Interview in *Expresso* (Lisbon), October 30, 1982, pp. 12–13.

not have the necessary resources to fight the war indefinitely, to raise living standards and thus counteract the guerrillas' appeal to the impoverished peasants and dispossessed urbanites, and to absorb the growing losses resulting from the MNR's sabotage campaign. Having tried the radical option and found Soviet-bloc "internationalism" wanting, Frelimo appears to be prepared to try diplomacy, by attracting Western including United States support in pressuring South Africa to discontinue its support for the insurgents. Even if such pressures prove effective, which is unlikely, it is not at all certain that Pretoria can "disinvent" an insurgent movement with clear motivation and significant, albeit not general, popular support. In addition, such an arrangement would certainly require Mozambique to expel the ANC altogether, a demand still unacceptable to the most ideologically committed leaders in Maputo. The immediate future for Mozambique, economically and militarily, seems to offer more of the same problems the country has faced since 1975. ■

## ZIMBABWE

*(Continued from page 112)*

Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero says that 90 percent of the small-scale farmers are unable to repay their loans to the Agricultural Finance Corporation because of the poor harvests. Some farmers will not qualify for loans next year and thus less acreage will be under cultivation.

Drought has severely affected the national herd as well. For the short-term, beef will be plentiful because animals that would normally remain at pasture have been sold to the Cold Storage Commission for slaughter to prevent their starvation. In the long-term, however, the national herd will be sorely depleted and it will require many years to rebuild it.

The costs of stop-gap measures to cope with the drought and the drought's long-term effect on the production and export market will have incalculable consequences. An economy as fragile as Zimbabwe's, based on limited resources, lacks the flexibility to sustain extreme conditions. The government's handling of the troubles in Matabeleland and the temporary redetention of the acquitted air force officers have tarnished Mugabe's reputation in the West as a man of integrity who respects established institutions. At the moment, jockeying for position and strength in anticipation of the August, 1984, all-party ZANU congress obscures political direction; the outcome of the party congress will show which faction is in control and what it intends to do with that control. ■

## UNITED STATES POLICY

*(Continued from page 100)*

certainty about future relations between the two countries.

Paradoxically, the strains in United States-Zimbabwe ties were occurring just as the Reagan administration was

beginning to pay greater attention to the non-Namibian dimension of its regional policy. It was forced to do so by escalating conflict between South Africa and its immediate neighbors, especially Mozambique.

## SPIRALING VIOLENCE

On January 30, 1981, South African commandos had attacked an African National Congress (ANC) headquarters in Matola, just outside Maputo, Mozambique's capital. This raid signaled a new, more aggressive phase in South Africa's policy toward its neighbors. In the words of its military architects, Pretoria's strategy was one of "offensive" or "proactive" defense. Modeled after Israel's regional strategy, the new South African posture sought to use economic coercion, indirect support for opposition movements in neighboring countries, direct military action, and subversion to neutralize governments that might consider aiding anti-South African guerrillas.

The specific incidents that accounted for the perception of spiraling violence in the region include:

- the assassination of two leading members of the exiled South African National Congress in Zimbabwe and Mozambique;
- a significant escalation of the guerrilla war being waged against the Mozambican government by the South African-backed National Resistance Movement (MNR);
- an attempt by South African mercenaries, including several South African Defense Force members, to overthrow a socialist government in the Seychelles;
- South African attacks on buildings occupied by ANC members in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, and Maputo;
- South African economic pressure on Zimbabwe including a temporary withdrawal of locomotives lent to Zimbabwe by South Africa and a threatened cancellation of a preferential trade agreement between the two countries;
- reports that South Africa was providing some training and small amounts of arms to dissidents opposed to the Mugabe government; and
- a pattern of increasing and sophisticated sabotage activity by the ANC, including dramatic bombings at the Koeberg nuclear reactor facility and a military headquarters in downtown Pretoria.

These trends worried the United States for three reasons. First, they feared that growing pressure on President Samora Moisés Machel's government in Mozambique might cause him to seek increased support from the Soviet bloc, including possibly Cuban troops. Such a step might provoke a South African preemptive move that could lead to a dangerous international confrontation. Second, the Reagan administration has frequently argued that escalating regional violence will slow the pace of change in South Africa. Finally, a continuation of these trends could force the United States to choose sides in the



region, which is exactly what constructive engagement was designed to avoid.

The most visible and positive result of the Reagan administration's decision to focus greater attention on the regional dimension of its strategy has been the development of a surprisingly warm relationship with Mozambique. Relations between the United States and Mozambique reached an all-time low in early 1981 following Mozambique's expulsion of several American officials on spying charges. The United States ambassador to Maputo was withdrawn, and a limited emergency food aid program was cancelled. When Chester Crocker made his first trip to the region in April, 1981, President Machel refused to see him. By 1983, this situation had turned around almost entirely. In September, a new American ambassador was sent to Mozambique and Mozambique appointed an ambassador to Washington for the first time. (Since independence, it has had an ambassador to the UN in New York.) Proposals for the resumption of a limited aid program were being discussed. And both sides seemed convinced that this warming trend would continue.

What accounts for this turnabout? The main factor was a recognition by both parties that they shared a mutual interest in reducing conflict in the region. In late 1981 and 1982, Machel had attempted to communicate his interest in rapprochement through a wide variety of formal and informal channels. However, the Reagan administration does not appear to have made a serious effort to follow up these gestures until December, 1982, when it appeared that the growing MNR insurgency might cause Machel to call in outside support. At that time, Crocker's chief deputy, Frank Wisner, was dispatched to Maputo. A visit by Crocker followed in January. In addition to these developments, the meetings led to the beginning of a direct dialogue between South Africa and Mozambique on security matters.

No matter how successful its regional dimension, however, constructive engagement will ultimately be judged on the basis of its record regarding apartheid.

### CROCKER AND SOUTH AFRICA

When Crocker initially outlined constructive engagement, he presented it as a "results" oriented strategy. If this strategy had succeeded relatively quickly (i.e., by the end of 1982), as Crocker and his closest aides at first apparently believed it would, the consequences would have been far-reaching. A success would have stifled criticism of constructive engagement and made it easier to deal with South Africa more openly and pragmatically. It would have provided a big boost to American credibility throughout the region and dealt a major diplomatic blow to the Soviet Union, which had already been hurt by Robert Mugabe's 1980 election victory in Zimbabwe following the Lancaster House settlement. A successful Namibian settlement might have given the Botha government confidence to move faster with its internal reform

program, which would, in turn, reconfirm the merits of constructive engagement. In short, the administration believed that an agreement on Namibia would set in motion a self-reinforcing spiral of positive developments in southern Africa.

By the end of 1983, however, the Namibian negotiations appeared to be totally stalemated; and without a Namibian success to legitimate it, the entire United States strategy of constructive engagement was called into question.

To evaluate constructive engagement accurately, however, it is important to recognize that its South African dimension has two strands. The one that has received the most attention is the "communication and confidence building" strand; but equally if not more important is the "black bargaining power" strand. Over the past three years, with the support of Congress, the Reagan administration has taken a number of steps in this direction, including:

- setting up a \$4 million program to educate black South Africans in the United States;
- increasing funding for an AFL-CIO program to train black union leaders; and
- providing \$3 million to assist small black business development in South Africa;

However, efforts to improve black bargaining power will not produce the kind of visible, short-term results necessary to allay concerns about the effects of the "communication and confidence building" strand of constructive engagement.

In order to gain the confidence of the Botha government and thus make "quiet diplomacy" effective, Crocker made a number of controversial concessions to Pretoria in 1981–1982. These included granting visas to a South African rugby team, loosening up "gray area" restrictions on exports of equipment to South Africa that might be used by the police or military; vetoing a Security Council resolution condemning South African intervention in Angola; allowing members of the South African Coast Guard to come to the United States for training; and voting in favor of a loan to South Africa from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even more important than these actions, however, was Crocker's early rhetoric. In trying to establish a balance in his statements on apartheid, Crocker raised concerns about the seriousness of the administration's opposition to apartheid.

To alter this seeming "tilt" toward white rule, several Congressmen—including Stephen Solarz (D.) of New York and William Gray (D.) of Pennsylvania—introduced legislation in 1982 and 1983 to force a harder line against South Africa. The measures included a requirement that the United States vote against loans to South Africa unless it could be demonstrated that they benefited the black majority; a ban on sales of South African gold Krugerrands; and a law that would have made it mandatory for United States-based corporations to follow fair employment practices in South Africa.

The administration's response to growing domestic pressure came in Under Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger's June, 1983, explication of southern Africa policy, when he condemned apartheid in the clearest and most detailed terms ever used by a senior American official speaking on South Africa. In his speech, Eagleburger declared:

The political system in South Africa is morally wrong. We stand against injustice, and therefore we must reject the legal and political premises and consequences of apartheid. . . . We reject unequivocally attempts to denationalize the black South Africa majority and relegate them to citizenship in the separate tribal homelands. . . . Neither can we countenance repression of organizations and individuals by means of administrative measures like banning and detention without due process of law.

By one means or another, South Africa's domestic racial system will be changed.

This language contrasted sharply in tone with Chester Crocker's much quoted statements of August, 1981, that the Reagan administration would not "choose between black and white" or "destabilize South Africa in order to curry favor elsewhere."

At year's end in 1983, it remained to be seen whether Eagleburger's declarations marked a shift in policy toward South Africa or simply a change in rhetoric. ■

## ETHIOPIA

(Continued from page 121)

executive committee and a 93-member central committee. The COPWE congress is the largest of the national institutions in this hierarchy. It consists of between 1,500 and 1,600 carefully chosen delegates, who represent a wide range of mass organizations that have been carefully shaped by the Derg. At the time of this writing, there have been two COPWE congresses, the most recent in early 1983. The second COPWE congress passed several resolutions on matters ranging from organizational affairs to economic development. The most important development, however, was the announcement that the vanguard party would finally be inaugurated in September, 1984, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the revolution. At that time, the Derg would wither away and be replaced by the executive and central committees of the party.

Between 1980 and 1983, the Derg carefully built the COPWE bureaucracy so that it shadowed the state bureaucracy. By mid-1983, the COPWE organization stretched from the national center to the 14 regions and their subregions, neighborhood and cell levels. In all, there were an estimated 6,500 COPWE cells. The total membership of the commission was not certain. Mem-

bership was not open to all; the quest was for the few "committed Communists," abiding by organizational discipline and prepared to do reliable work.

Beneath this concern for discipline was the Derg's desire to assure its undisputed preeminence. In addition to creating a party that penetrated all sectors of society, the Derg was successful in insinuating military personalities into the most authoritative positions. For instance, the 7 members of the COPWE executive committee are Derg members; 79 of the 123 standing and alternate members of the central committee are military people and almost half the general membership of COPWE come from the armed forces.<sup>14</sup>

More significant than the predominance of the military in COPWE is the fact that this party-in-the-making is not taking the form of democratic centralism. Although mass organizations like labor unions and peasant associations have been well represented in COPWE congresses, they occupy no positions of leadership. Such roles are reserved for soldiers and bureaucrats.

Even if the dominant role being played by "men in uniform" in COPWE and in government is accepted, the observer notes the lack of serious attention given by the Derg as well as COPWE to a resolution of "the national question." No mass organizations represent ethnic minorities, nor are their interests represented in the COPWE leadership.<sup>15</sup> This is certain to inhibit the possibility that the vanguard party can act as an agent of national political integration.

The Ethiopian revolution stands at a crossroads. It seems to be on the verge of creating a state socialist society, even though this will have only the barest resemblance to any historic form of state socialism. The Derg is committed to "scientific socialism" as long as it can define the new normative charter. At the same time, a commitment to Ethiopian nationalism broadly defined seems to underlie all the regime's policy choices. To succeed, Ethiopia's leaders will have to be blessed by good luck and be prepared to rule pragmatically. Recent economic and social reforms seem to indicate some pragmatism. However, political shortsightedness along with natural catastrophe could well subvert whatever credits result.

The failure to build a genuinely "democratic" vanguard party, which includes all political interests at all levels and which tackles the national question forthrightly, could prove to be the Derg's most serious political mistake. Moreover, drought, famine and political instability are ever-present obstacles to a sustained development program. Between 1982 and 1983, more than 4.5 million people in the most politically unstable regions of the country were affected by natural disaster and war. Ethiopia was lucky enough to avert a catastrophe on the order of that which brought down Haile Selassie because of a massive positive response from the international community.

The outstanding question in revolutionary Ethiopia

<sup>14</sup>See "Ethiopia: The Revolution Struggles to Consolidate its Gains," *Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1981).

<sup>15</sup>See "Military Authorities Attempt to Popularize Revolution," *Neul Zürcher Zeitung*, March 20-21, 1983, p. 5.

today is not ideology but leadership. The Derg must prove in the near future that it is an enlightened leadership rather than a collection of self-serving military opportunists. The wrong choice could extend the period of political consolidation and greatly inhibit economic development. ■

## ARMING AFRICA

*(Continued from page 128)*

political and economic ideas into the independence movements and, consequently, forging a marriage of convenience between the Africans and the Soviet Union. This trend is likely to grow as long as Western nations (and the United States in particular) show no inclination to support African causes. ■

## NIGERIA

*(Continued from page 124)*

Simple mathematical calculations ensued: assuming that half the population was less than 18 years old and thus unable to vote, the new voting list suggested that Nigeria had a total population of 130 million Nigerians (if everyone eligible registered). Such a figure is one-third higher than the highest estimated population of the country. Obviously, there were hundreds of thousands of false or duplicate names on the voting registers, vast quantities of extra voting cards in the hands of unscrupulous individuals, and hundreds of superfluous polling stations. All the well-known electoral irregularities of the past were therefore in evidence: multiple voting by individuals, the casting of ballots by underaged youths, the stuffing of ballot boxes and the alteration of vote counts by corrupt officials.

Attempts to separate fact from fiction in the 1983 elections will certainly be made by undaunted Nigerian and foreign scholars. The judicial system, which has the responsibility for adjudicating electoral contests, was deluged by petitions to correct the results in many constituencies. Often, judges took the easy way out by dismissing petitions on the grounds of some technicality. At times, they were courageous in nullifying the election of NPN governors and senators only to find their judgment reversed at a higher appellate level. Strict time limits for the submission of electoral petitions and a general reluctance to risk calling the entire political system into question enabled candidates to retain offices they had won illegitimately. In the case of the election of the President of the federation, the precedent established in 1979 when Shagari's election was upheld in the face of a strong challenge by the second-placed candidate, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was implicitly reaffirmed by the refusal of the courts to give serious attention to legal challenges to Shagari's reelection, despite the extensive evidence of malfeasance throughout the country.

The cost to the country of the 1983 election exercise was considerable: five hundred million naira was spent to set in place a vast and cumbersome electoral machinery;

there was a deliberate postponement of the final negotiating of international agreements to alleviate the currency and balance of payments problems; and the nation suffered wanton destruction of life and property in riotous protests against the alleged rigging of the elections, especially in the western states. Finally on December 31, 1983, the military leaders once again assumed their self-appointed roles as ultimate arbiters of Nigeria's destiny. The ease of their takeover reflected the extent to which the civilian government had lost legitimacy in the eyes of the demoralized and anxious population.

## THE DILEMMA OF NEW MILITARY RULE

General Mohammed Buhari and the new military government will have no difficulty substantiating their charges against the politicians they chased from power. Corruption had once again reached astounding levels, at a time when the masses of the people were subjected to increasingly severe austerity measures. Inefficiency and mismanagement abounded, and the country was attracting critical attention overseas because of the squalor of its cities, the prevalence of armed robbers and its decreasing ability to meet its financial commitments.

Yet, once the sense of relief has passed, especially over the fact that the coup engendered so little loss of life, there is likely to be a deep sense of disappointment with the failure that this military intervention represents for the country and for Africa as a whole. The second republic lasted little longer than the four years it took to create the new constitutional system between 1975–1979. Many of those who monitored the shift from a competitive party system to the single-party dominance of the 1983 elections still hoped that the system would confound its critics and develop the necessary self-correcting mechanisms. Though vanquished, the main opposition parties were not destroyed in the 1983 elections. And, given a fairer electoral contest in 1987, they might have rebounded to provide a sustained challenge to the dominant NPN.

Instead, reflecting the sentiments of a significant number of Nigeria's intellectuals, politicians, and businessmen, the military officers believed that the NPN government of Shagari would eventually "bring Nigeria to its knees." President Shagari was thereby denied the opportunity to demonstrate that the more technocratic Cabinet he had put together for his second term would succeed where its predecessor, swollen with patronage appointments, had failed.

Nigeria now has a long road to travel both in overcoming its economic difficulties and in reestablishing a government that is accountable to the people. The crux of the Nigerian dilemma is that both military and civilian governments have proven unsatisfactory in the past. Perhaps it is time to try the military-civilian diarchy which the country's first President, Nnamdi Azikiwe, has long proposed as the only temporary solution to Nigeria's ruinous political cycles. It will be sometime before this nation will want to hear of preparations for a third republic. ■



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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A Current History chronology covering the most important events of January, 1984, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Arms Control

(See *U.S.S.R.*; *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

### East-West Conference on Security in Europe

Jan. 17—In Stockholm, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz addresses the opening round of the conference; he asks the Soviet Union to join the U.S. in a comprehensive dialogue.

Jan. 18—In a harshly worded speech, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko attacks the U.S. as the main threat to peace in the world; he says that President Ronald Reagan's call for improved relations between the 2 countries is a deceptive ploy.

In their 1st meeting in 15 months, Shultz and Gromyko meet privately for 5 hours to discuss the major problems dividing the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

### European Economic Community (EEC)

(See *France*)

### Islamic Conference Organization

(See also *Egypt*)

Jan. 16—The 4th meeting of the 42-member organization begins in Casablanca.

Jan. 19—In its concluding session, the conference votes to readmit Egypt to the conference; Libya, Syria and Southern Yemen walk out to protest the decision.

### Lebanon Crisis

(See also *France*; *Israel*; *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 4—16 Israeli fighter-bombers attack targets in eastern Lebanon; the state radio in Beirut reports that at least 100 people have been killed, mostly civilians.

Jan. 5—The Lebanese government asks the U.S. to extend the role of the U.S. members of the multinational peacekeeping force to allow them to patrol southern Lebanon's coast.

Jan. 6—A Lebanese government official reports that an agreement to separate the factions fighting in Lebanon is being delayed because of objections by Walid Jumblat, head of the Druse Progressive Socialist party.

Jan. 8—A U.S. Marine is killed when a group of Marines is ambushed by unknown gunmen on a beach near downtown Beirut.

Jan. 10—Lebanese government officials report that technical demands by the factions allied with Syria are delaying implementation of the disengagement agreement.

Jan. 14—Major Saad Haddad dies from cancer at his home in southern Lebanon; Haddad headed the Christian militia force in southern Lebanon that was supported by Israel.

Jan. 15—The *U.S.S. New Jersey* fires on Druse militia positions after the U.S. peacekeeping force is fired on; no casualties are reported.

Jan. 17—Hussein Farrash, the Saudi Arabian consul general in Beirut, is kidnapped.

Jan. 18—The president of the American University of Beirut, Malcolm H. Kerr, is killed by gunmen from the fundamentalist group Islamic Holy War. The group says that Kerr was killed because of the U.S. military presence in Beirut.

Jan. 21—U.S. government officials report that U.S. warships have been put on a high state of alert following reports that terrorists are planning suicide attacks on the ships.

Jan. 22—Jumblat says that his forces will not stop fighting the government until the Cabinet of President Amin Gemayel resigns.

Jan. 30—Shiite Muslim militia bombard the U.S. Marine base in Beirut; 1 Marine is killed, along with 2 Lebanese army soldiers; the Shiites claim the Marines' return fire killed 2 Shiite civilians.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *Warsaw Pact*)

Jan. 29—NATO's Economic Committee releases a report showing that military spending by the Soviet Union has increased by 2.5 percent a year, not 4 percent, since 1976.

### Organization of African Unity

(See *Chad*)

### United Nations (UN)

Jan. 4—Elisio de Figueiredo, Angola's chief delegate to the UN, appeals to the Security Council to halt the South African invasion of southern Angola that began December 6.

Jan. 11—Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau meets with Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar; he proposes that the 5 nuclear powers use the UN as a forum to discuss reducing nuclear weapons.

Jan. 18—Pérez de Cuéllar sends a letter to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, asking him to reconsider the December 29 U.S. decision to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Jan. 31—In a letter to UNESCO director Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, Soviet President Yuri Andropov says he supports UNESCO's programs.

### Warsaw Pact

Jan. 10—A proposal presented to NATO envoys calls for negotiations on banning chemical weapons.

### World Bank

Jan. 14—At a news conference, World Bank President A.W. Clausen says that 31 nations have agreed to give \$9 billion to the International Development Agency, an agency of the World Bank.

## AFGHANISTAN

(See also *Pakistan*)

Jan. 10—Western diplomats in New Delhi report that Afghan guerrillas shot down 3 Soviet MiG's in the last 2 weeks; the diplomats also say that Soviet airstrikes have killed more than 100 civilians.

## ANGOLA

(See also *Intl.*, *UN*; *Namibia*; *South Africa*; *U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 22—Portuguese officials report that the Angolan government has begun a major counterattack against South African-supported rebels; the anti-government guerrillas hold a large portion of southern Angola.

**ARGENTINA**

Jan. 10—Former President Reynaldo Bignone is arrested; Bignone is being investigated for his role in the disappearance of 2 military conscripts who were members of the Communist party.

Reuters news service reports that 482 unidentified bodies have been found in a cemetery near Buenos Aires.

Jan. 23—The government signs a friendship pact with the government of Chile; the 2 nations resolve to end peacefully a territorial disagreement over a waterway near the tip of South America.

**BOLIVIA**

Jan. 19—President Hernán Siles Zuazo reappoints 13 of the 18 members of his Cabinet who resigned last month.

Jan. 26—The Congress votes to censure the President for reappointing the 13 ministers.

**BRAZIL**

Jan. 22—Navy Minister Maximiano da Fonseca says that Brazil will be able to produce nuclear weapons by the 1990's.

Jan. 28—The government signs a syndicated loan agreement that includes \$6.5 billion in new money with more than 700 foreign commercial banks; Brazil is more than \$1.5 billion in arrears to foreign commercial banks and has foreign debts exceeding \$90 billion.

**CANADA**

(See *Intl, UN; China*)

**CHAD**

(See also *France*)

Jan. 8—President Hissen Habre announces that he will not attend the national reconciliation talks scheduled to begin tomorrow; he says he will not attend the talks sponsored by the Organization of African Unity because rebel leader Goukouni Oueddei was given a high-level welcome by the conference host, Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam.

Jan. 25—The French Defense Ministry announces that a French jet on a reconnaissance mission in northern Chad was shot down and its pilot killed.

Jan. 27—The French government orders its troops in Chad to extend the cease-fire line northward by 60 miles; it orders the troops to attack any forces that cross the line.

**CHILE**

(See *Argentina*)

**CHINA**

(See also *U.K., Great Britain*)

Jan. 7—Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang arrives in the U.S.; he is the 1st Chinese Prime Minister to visit the U.S.

Jan. 10—Zhao meets with President Ronald Reagan, who tells Zhao that the 2 countries share "common ground" in opposing foreign expansion.

Jan. 12—Zhao and Reagan sign 2 agreements on exchanging scientific and technological information.

Jan. 17—In an interview with *The New York Times*, Zhao reiterates his contention that the issue of Taiwan will determine future U.S.-Chinese relations.

Zhao travels to Canada and addresses a joint session of the Parliament; he praises Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's arms control effort.

Jan. 23—The "spiritual pollution" campaign that was begun by the Communist party in October has ended, according to Chinese officials.

Jan. 24—Returning from Canada, Zhao arrives in Shanghai.

**CUBA**

Jan. 2—In a speech marking the 25th anniversary of the revolution, President Fidel Castro attacks the U.S., saying that the government is under the leadership of "Nazi-fascist barbarians."

**CYPRUS**

(See *Turkey*)

**DENMARK**

Jan. 10—The Conservative party of Prime Minister Poul Schluter wins 42 seats in Parliament; the other 3 parties in the government coalition lose seats, leaving the government without a majority in Parliament.

**ECUADOR**

Jan. 16—The government reports that Peruvian troops killed an Ecuadorean soldier in a clash along the border. The Peruvian government says that its troops were fired on by Ecuadorean soldiers.

**EGYPT**

(See also *Intl, Islamic Conference*)

Jan. 30—The government announces that it is accepting the Islamic Conference Organization's invitation to rejoin the conference; Egypt was suspended from the group after it signed the Camp David accords in 1978.

**EL SALVADOR**

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

Jan. 1—Guerrillas blow up the last suspension bridge that unites the eastern and western sections of the country.

Jan. 4—Military sources report that the army has transferred 2 former intelligence officers to foreign posts; the men were accused by the U.S. of involvement with right-wing death squads.

Jan. 11—Provisional President Alvaro Magaña says that the report by the U.S. National Bipartisan Commission on Central America released today is "responsible."

Jan. 26—An American woman is shot and killed when the bus she is traveling in fails to stop at a roadblock.

**ETHIOPIA**

(See *Somalia*)

**FRANCE**

(See also *Chad*)

Jan. 2—The government announces it is reducing by 25 percent the number of French troops stationed in Beirut as part of the multinational peacekeeping force.

Two groups, the Armed Arab Struggle and the Children of Sheik Abdullah, claim responsibility for the New Year's Eve bombing of a train en route to Paris that killed 5 people and wounded 50.

Jan. 14—Finance Minister Jacques Delors tells a group of West European Socialists that action should be taken to staunch the flow of European capital to the U.S.

Jan. 16—The Defense Ministry announces that the government will sell Saudi Arabia a \$4.5-billion mobile anti-aircraft missile system.

Jan. 18—Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson warns the European Economic Community that the problems it faces could destroy it.

Jan. 26—The Foreign Ministry announces that Libya "seems to bear the responsibility" for the downing of a French airplane in Chad yesterday.

## GERMANY, EAST

- Jan. 22—The government allows 6 East Germans to leave the country; the 6 sought sanctuary in the U.S. embassy in East Berlin January 20.
- Jan. 25—U.S. intelligence sources report that a more accurate Soviet missile, the SS-22, has been spotted in East Germany. The missile has a range of 560 miles.

## GERMANY, WEST

(See also *Israel*)

- Jan. 20—A U.S. soldier supposedly kidnapped on January 13 and found unharmed January 15 admits that he was not kidnapped by anti-missile demonstrators as he had previously claimed.
- Jan. 24—Chancellor Helmut Kohl arrives in Israel for a 6-day visit.
- Jan. 26—A parliamentary committee opens an investigation into the dismissal of 4-star General Günter Kiessling on the grounds that he is a homosexual.

## GREECE

- Jan. 16—Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu appoints 4 new Cabinet ministers; 4 ministers exchange portfolios.

## GRENADA

- Jan. 1—An interim government official reports that legal experts are being recruited to represent the 35 Grenadians being detained without charge since the U.S. invaded the island 2 months ago.
- Jan. 21—Former Prime Minister Eric Gairy returns after 5 years in exile in the U.S.; Gairy was ousted by Maurice Bishop in 1979.

## GUATEMALA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Jan. 14—General Oscar Mejía Victores says that he will retain executive and legislative powers until July, 1985; the military government will allow elections for a constituent assembly in July, 1984.

## HONDURAS

(See also *Nicaragua*)

- Jan. 11—A U.S. helicopter pilot is killed by Nicaraguan troops after his helicopter is forced down near the Nicaraguan border.

## HONG KONG

(See also *U.K., Great Britain*)

- Jan. 14—Thousands of young people riot in 3 districts of Hong Kong; the rioting, the worst in 17 years, has been sparked by a 2-day taxi strike that paralyzed the island.

## INDIA

- Jan. 31—Nearly 250,000 opposition party activists, rallying to support farmers, are arrested in the state of Maharashtra.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis; Germany, West*)

- Jan. 3—Thousands of government workers disrupt their offices today to protest the government's austerity measures.
- Jan. 8—Cabinet Secretary Dan Meridor denies reports that Israel plans to withdraw its troops from Lebanon even if there is no reciprocal withdrawal of Syrian troops.
- Jan. 10—An opposition party member of the Knesset discloses a secret military document that recommends an early withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon.
- Jan. 11—The General Zionist Council votes 58 to 49 to reject former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's bid to become chairman of the agency's immigration department.

- Jan. 18—Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir criticizes Jordanian King Hussein's call to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to move toward a "practical formula" for negotiations with Israel; Shamir says that Israel "will not conduct any negotiations with the terrorists."

- Jan. 25—Shamir's coalition survives 3 opposition attempts to pass a no-confidence vote against the government.

- Jan. 29—Chancellor Kohl leaves for West Germany. Minister without Portfolio Mordechai Ben Porat resigns because of the government's policies on Lebanon and the economy.

## JAPAN

- Jan. 25—The Cabinet approves a 1984 budget that calls for a 6.55 percent increase in the defense budget.
- Jan. 26—Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe arrives in Washington, D.C., for talks with Vice President George Bush and other Cabinet officials.
- Jan. 30—The government signs an agreement with the U.S. allowing greater U.S. penetration of the Japanese telecommunications market; U.S. companies will compete equally with Japanese firms in bidding for contracts.

## JORDAN

(See also *Israel*)

- Jan. 5—King Hussein calls Parliament into session for the 1st time since 1974.
- Jan. 9—The Parliament meets; in a move requested by King Hussein, it approves a constitutional amendment that allows Palestinians from the Israeli-occupied West Bank to be appointed as members of Parliament.
- Jan. 16—In an address before the Parliament, Hussein calls on the "free and legitimate" portion of the PLO to help Jordan do its "duty to Jerusalem, Palestine and its people."
- Jan. 28—In comments to foreign reporters, King Hussein says that Jordan welcomes and needs U.S. military assistance, but any assistance would be used only at Jordan's discretion.

## KOREA, SOUTH

- Jan. 11—Minister of Unification Sohn Jae Shik rejects a proposal from North Korea that calls for talks between the 2 countries and the U.S. on unification; Sohn says that North Korea must first apologize for the bombing in Burma that killed 21 people, including several members of the South Korean Cabinet.

## LEBANON

(See *Intl, Lebanon Crisis*)

## LIBYA

(See *France; Mauritius*)

## MAURITIUS

- Jan. 14—Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth says several Libyan diplomats were expelled yesterday for interfering in the government's foreign affairs.

## MOROCCO

- Jan. 22—King Hassan II says that rioting that left at least 60 dead in the last few days was caused by Communists, followers of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Zionist intelligence agents; he says that there will be no increase in food prices, a concern that sparked some of the rioting.

## MOZAMBIQUE

- Jan. 13—Representatives of the government meet in Maputo with South African officials for talks on promoting tourism between the 2 countries.



**NAMIBIA**(See also *South Africa*)

Jan. 22—The Portuguese government radio reports in Lisbon that secret talks are being held among officials from the U.S., South Africa and Angola on the future of Namibia; the U.S. denies that talks are being held.

**NICARAGUA**(See also *Honduras*)

Jan. 9—The government radio reports that guerrillas have attacked Potosí, the main port in the Gulf of Fonseca, for the 5th time this month.

Jan. 15—The head of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the largest group fighting the government, says that with continued aid from the U.S. the guerrillas can topple the Nicaraguan government in 1984.

Jan. 17—Opposition party members and other critics say that government proposals for free national elections in 1985 are not strong enough to guarantee truly free elections.

Defense Minister Humberto Ortega Saavedra says that the U.S. helicopter forced down on January 11 was supporting anti-government guerrillas.

**NIGERIA**

Jan. 1—Major General Mohammed Buhari says that he is in control of the country; the military overthrew the government of President Shehu Shagari yesterday. Buhari says that the coup was staged "to save this nation from imminent collapse."

Jan. 2—In a speech to top civil servants, Buhari says that dishonest civil servants will be jailed without bothering with the "nonsense" of trials.

Jan. 3—According to the state radio in Lagos, President Shagari has been placed under house arrest.

Jan. 9—Western diplomats in Lagos report that at least 4,000 state officials have turned themselves in to the military authorities; most of the officials have been released, but about 400 are still in detention for alleged corruption.

Jan. 17—In an interview with *The New York Times*, Buhari says that the country will be returned to democratic rule once the economy is returned to normal.

Jan. 18—Buhari swears in a new Cabinet; 7 of the 18 ministers are career military men. Buhari warns the Cabinet that the Supreme Military Council will monitor the Cabinet's conduct.

**PAKISTAN**

Jan. 28—The government reports that Afghan MiG's have attacked the Pakistani border, killing 40 civilians and wounding 60.

**PERU**(See *Ecuador*)**PHILIPPINES**

Jan. 4—Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile orders the military to stop its investigation into the killing of opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino Jr.

Jan. 11—President Ferdinand Marcos agrees to an opposition demand that voter lists be revised to remove fictitious names; the opposition parties have said that they will participate in elections in May if this and other demands are met.

Jan. 31—Tens of thousands of demonstrators gather in Manila to protest the killing of opposition leader Aquino.

**POLAND**(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 6—The Roman Catholic Church in Poland informally

reports that Jozef Cardinal Glemp has agreed to government demands to curb outspoken priests; in return the government will free some political prisoners and end political trials.

Jan. 30—The government announces that food prices will be increased about 10 percent; this increases the cost of living 3.5 percent.

**SAUDI ARABIA**(See *Intl., Lebanon Crisis; France*)**SOMALIA**

Jan. 30—The state-run radio reports that Ethiopian jets attacked a section of the northwest region; at least 40 people were killed, many of them schoolchildren.

**SOUTH AFRICA**(See also *Intl., UN; Angola; Mozambique; Namibia*)

Jan. 4—The Labor party unanimously approves a resolution that calls for early elections to the new chamber of Parliament for South Africans of mixed race; the Labor party is the largest party representing mixed race people.

Jan. 7—The government reports that its forces have engaged Cuban troops in southern Angola; South Africa invaded Angola on December 6.

Jan. 8—Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha offers to begin direct negotiations with guerrillas of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

Jan. 15—A military spokesman announces that all South African troops have been withdrawn from Angola. 21 South African soldiers were killed in the invasion.

Jan. 19—The government rejects a proposal by Angola that calls for negotiations on SWAPO and the future of Namibia.

Jan. 27—U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker arrives in Cape Town to begin negotiations with government officials to link the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the independence of Namibia.

Jan. 31—Prime Minister P.W. Botha says that South Africa has begun a limited "disengagement" of its occupation forces in southern Angola; South African troops have occupied portions of Angola for more than 2 years.

**SPAIN**

Jan. 29—Lieutenant General Guillermo Quintana Lacaci is assassinated by Basque terrorists in Madrid.

**SURINAME**

Jan. 9—Lieutenant Colonel Dési Bouterse, the military Head of State, announces that he has dismissed the entire Cabinet to "correct" national policy.

**SYRIA**(See *Intl., Islamic Conference, Lebanon Crisis; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)**TAIWAN**(See *China*)**TUNISIA**

Jan. 3—The government declares a nationwide dusk-to-dawn curfew to combat rioting that has spread to most of the major cities. At least 25 people have been killed in the rioting, which began after the government announced a 125 percent increase in the price of bread.

Jan. 6—President Habib Bourguiba announces that the price of bread is being rolled back; he says that the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali exceeded his instructions

when it raised the bread price 125 percent.

Jan. 7—Government officials report that President Bourguiba has dismissed Prime Minister Mzali.

## TURKEY

Jan. 3—The government announces that it will withdraw 1,500 men from Cyprus over the next 2 months; there are an estimated 25,000 Turkish troops in the Turkish Cypriot section of the island.

## U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl. East-West Conference, NATO; Afghanistan; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 1—A study by the British government reports that aid given by the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries to developing countries is substantially lower than Soviet bloc claims; the report says that the bloc gave only \$8 billion in the years between 1976 and 1980; official figures for the Soviet bloc show \$44 billion.

Jan. 11—The minister of gas industry confirms that there has been a fire at the 1st and biggest of the 41 pumping stations on the Siberian natural gas pipeline.

Jan. 12—The official press agency Tass reports that an agreement with Angola has been reached to strengthen "Angola's defenses" because of South Africa's aggressive actions in Angola.

Jan. 13—The government announces the execution for bribery of 2 foreign trade officials, the most senior officials executed since President Yuri Andropov took office.

Jan. 14—Minister for Oil and Gas Boris Y. Shcherbine is named a Deputy Prime Minister.

Jan. 24—In an interview with *Pravda*, President Andropov asks the U.S. for practical deeds that show it wants better relations with the Soviet Union; the interview follows a conciliatory speech by U.S. President Ronald Reagan on January 16.

Jan. 29—The government releases a list of 7 alleged U.S. violations of arms control agreements; the U.S. has accused the Soviet Union of 7 violations.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Great Britain

Jan. 1—Defense Ministry officials report that the 1st battery of U.S.-supplied cruise missiles is operational; the missiles were deployed in Britain in December.

Jan. 21—In an interview, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher calls for a debate on the welfare state; she says that Britain is sitting on a "social security time bomb."

Prime Minister Thatcher says that U.S. President Ronald Reagan's conciliatory speech to the Soviet Union this week is an "important change."

Jan. 26—The 8th round of talks with the Chinese government over the status of Hong Kong adjourns; a communiqué says that the talks were "useful and constructive."

## UNITED STATES

### Administration

Jan. 3—The Farmers Home Administration (FHA) reports temporary modifications in its rules to enable it to resume foreclosure actions against delinquent borrowers; last fall U.S. district court Judge Bruce Van Sickle issued a temporary injunction preventing the FHA from foreclosing mortgages on some 1,800 farms in 44 states.

Jan. 4—Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer resigns effective January 12, in order to defend himself against Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charges of

illegally passing "insider" stock information.

Jan. 5—The SEC files suit in U.S. district court, claiming that Thayer used inside information to help 8 people make \$1.9 million illegally in stock-trading profits.

President Ronald Reagan nominates Defense Department general counsel William Howard Taft 4th to succeed Thayer as deputy secretary of defense.

Jan. 6—President Reagan says that U.S. Information Agency director Charles Z. Wick "will continue there" in spite of the disclosure that for several years he secretly taped phone calls without asking permission of the caller.

Jan. 8—President Reagan's 13-member Task Force on Food Assistance reports that "hunger does persist" in the U.S. but says it is unable to document "allegations of rampant hunger. . . ."

Jan. 12—In its report, President Reagan's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control claims that by the adoption of some 2,500 recommendations to eliminate waste, the government could save \$424.4 billion over 3 years; industrialist J. Peter Grace led the 18-month survey.

Jan. 13—The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission denies an operating license to the Byron Nuclear Power Station in Illinois; this is the 1st time an operating license has been refused unconditionally.

Jan. 19—The Federal Communications Commission votes to delay until 1985 the imposition of monthly access fees for long-distance telephone service; the fees are to be added to local telephone charges.

Jan. 20—The Environmental Protection Agency sues 9 Missouri companies and 19 individuals to force them to clean up dioxin contamination at 6 sites in Missouri.

Jan. 22—The White House reports the resignation of William French Smith as Attorney General.

Jan. 23—President Reagan announces the nomination of presidential counselor Edwin Meese 3d to succeed Smith as Attorney General.

Jan. 24—A 3-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit lifts its January 3 ban on the publication of a judge's opinion criticizing the Justice Department's handling of a tax fraud case.

Jan. 25—President Reagan gives his annual State of the Union Message to both Houses of Congress and a nationwide television audience; he claims there is "renewed energy and optimism throughout the land."

Jan. 28—The Department of Energy announces that from now on only major nuclear tests will be announced; since 1975, all tests have been announced.

Jan. 31—President Reagan previews his fiscal 1985 budget for congressional Republicans; it projects expenditures of \$925 billion and a deficit of \$180 billion.

### Civil Rights

Jan. 5—Staff director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Linda Chavez recommends major changes in the programs of the commission; she calls for a reexamination of the direction taken by many of the commission's programs.

Jan. 17—The Commission on Civil Rights votes 6 to 2 to adopt a statement deploring the use of quotas by the Detroit Police Department in considering the promotion of minority group officers.

### Economy

Jan. 5—A record 159.99 million shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

Jan. 6—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate fell to 8.1 percent in December.

Jan. 13—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.2 percent in December; for all 1983 the index rose only 0.6 percent.

- Jan. 20—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) grew at an annual rate of 4.5 percent in the 4th quarter of 1983.
- Jan. 24—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.3 percent in December and rose only 3.8 percent for all 1983.
- Jan. 31—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.6 percent in December.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl., East-West Conference, Lebanon Crisis, UN; China; Cuba; El Salvador; France; Germany, East; Germany, West; Grenada; Honduras; Japan; Jordan; Namibia; Nicaragua; South Africa; U.S.S.R.; U.K., Great Britain*.)

- Jan. 3—President Reagan expresses his "appreciation" to Syrian President Hafez Assad for Syria's release of downed U.S. Navy flier Lieutenant Robert Goodman; Democratic presidential aspirant Jesse Jackson succeeded in obtaining his release today.
- Jan. 4—Goodman and Jackson return to the U.S. and meet with President Reagan at the White House.
- Jan. 7—The U.S. Agency for International Development approves \$32.7 million in food aid for 6 African nations.
- Jan. 9—Secretary of State George Shultz meets Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang in Washington, D.C.
- Jan. 10—President Reagan announces the nomination of William A. Wilson as U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican; full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Vatican are established for the 1st time in 117 years.
- Jan. 11—In a report to President Reagan, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America asks President Reagan to meet with Central American leaders and suggests the establishment of a Central American Development Organization; the commission, chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, urges an increase in military aid to El Salvador and an overall total of some \$8 billion in economic aid for the region.
- Jan. 13—The State Department reveals that President Reagan has determined that the Soviet Union has committed 7 "violations or probable violations" of agreements on arms control.
- Jan. 14—President Reagan calls on Congress to act in a bipartisan fashion on the Kissinger Commission's Central American proposals.
- Jan. 16—In a White House speech, President Reagan calls on the Soviet Union to return to conferences to negotiate nuclear arms agreements, saying that "we [the U.S.] will never retreat from negotiations."
- Jan. 19—President Reagan lifts 2 U.S. sanctions against Poland: Polish vessels may again fish in U.S. waters and some limited charter flights may land in the U.S.
- Jan. 22—Secretary of State George Shultz says that the Soviet Union has proposed and the U.S. has agreed to resume negotiations aimed at reducing troops and conventional arms in Europe March 16 in Vienna.
- Jan. 29—The State Department says the U.S. will sell \$2-million worth of helicopter parts to Guatemala, the 1st such sale since 1977.
- Jan. 30—Chief arms control negotiator Edward-L. Rowny says he believes the U.S. and the Soviet Union could make a "breakthrough" in negotiating arms control if Soviet negotiators resume the talks; he says that the U.S. would agree to merge strategic arms control and intermediate-range missile negotiations and would be willing to listen to "any reasonable proposal."
- Jan. 31—Secretary of State Shultz leaves for Central America; he says that El Salvador has made "considerable progress" in human rights and in curbing the death squads.

### Labor and Industry

- Jan. 24—Reversing a previous decision, the National Labor Relations Board rules that a company may move work from a union to a nonunion plant during the course of a union contract unless the contract forbids such a move.
- Jan. 26—A 4th quarter loss of \$4.99 billion is reported by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company; the loss, the largest ever recorded by any company, is due in part to costs involved in the breakup of the Bell System.

### Legislation

- Jan. 23—The 2d session of the 98th Congress opens after a 2-month recess.
- Jan. 28—The Senate joins 33 members of the House in a suit in U.S. district court to determine the constitutionality of President Reagan's pocket veto of the congressional requirement that he certify human rights progress in El Salvador to Congress.

### Political Scandal

- Jan. 9—The former head of the toxic waste program of the Environmental Protection Agency, Rita M. Lavelle, is sentenced to 6 months in prison and is fined \$10,000 for perjury in her testimony at a congressional hearing.

### Politics

- Jan. 29—President Reagan announces that he and Vice President George Bush will seek reelection in 1984.

### Supreme Court

- Jan. 11—In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court rules that federal law does not prevent the punitive damage award of \$10 million won by the estate of Karen Silkwood in a suit charging the Kerr-McGee Corporation with negligence. The Court returns the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit; the award can be appealed on other grounds.
- In a 5-4 decision, the Court rules that the environmental concerns of the coastal states need not be considered when the federal government offers oil and gas leases for sale on the outer continental shelf.
- Jan. 17—The Court rules 5 to 4 that when consumers use video recorders to tape television programs for their own use they are not violating federal copyright laws.
- Jan. 18—The Court rules unanimously that trial judges must allow the public and the press to attend jury selection hearings except in "rare" circumstances.
- Jan. 23—In a 5-4 ruling, the Court declares that the Constitution bars federal courts from ordering state officials to comply with state laws.
- The Court rules 7 to 2 that neither the Constitution nor its own death penalty procedures require the procedure known as "proportionality review" before a state can carry out the death penalty.

### URUGUAY

- Jan. 18—Workers stage the 1st general strike in 11 years; the government bans the strike and sends riot police to eject strikers occupying factories. The strike was called to demand more political freedom and wage increases.

### VATICAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)


### ZIMBABWE

- Jan. 3—Prime Minister Robert Mugabe reduces the size of his Cabinet; the Cabinet is cut from 57 to 49 ministers and deputy ministers.




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